One of Neoliberalism’s key features is the supremacy of the financial system over the rest. Something to be considerate is the amount of money spent by the government in the last 40 years to save it from the crisis it created itself. The COVID-19 crisis has the potential to create a depression even worst than the 1930s if the governments don’t act. This is fuel to populists to destroy democracy. In 2008, the size of the casino part of the financial system was 10 times, yes, 10 times the size of the real economy. Politicians and central bankers have been saying there’s no money. The UK bailout for two or three banks in 2008-9 was roughly the equivalent to FIFTY times Latvia’s GDP. Fifty economic years. In other words, there’s money. Besides, in the last fifteen years it seems that increasing the monetary base by creating money hasn’t resulted in inflation. The problem is how the financial system is dependent on government’s money. It’s a type of perverse financial keynesianism which diverts money from education, health, science, culture, pensions, defense and results in deep wealth concentration and inequality. Worst, many times it impedes countries to develop their economy since it competes with the real sector for government resources. What’ll happen in the future depends of how the governments will react to the crisis. If it’ll do the same as in 2008-9, directing the money to the financial system we’re doomed. It is necessary to spend vast sums of money to provide minimum incoming for people, direct financing, no banks, for business to keep them alive, to invest in education, science, arts, culture, health, defense (to avoid conflict). Most importantly, it’s necessary to rethink the economy and its structures. In Latvia’s case, this could be a wonderful chance for developing more complex economic sectors. We’re small enough to redirect our economy towards high technology sectors. A simple example is to produce respirators. For us, it would be a big business. Maybe even a permanent one after the crisis. More important, it would give the opportunity to start developing clusters in certain areas of high complexity, resulting in a synergy that would push the economy up. Right now being small is a great opportunity. We shouldn’t ignore it.
So, this is the part of Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly which frightened some people, with the videos. He has some valid points as the USA withdrawing from the ABM and announcing the deployment of new nuclear weapons, besides the perception of an increasing willingness of American officials in the Trump administration to use them. Overall, his main audience was the Russian public. Since living conditions are deteriorating in Russia and elections are in March 18, he played the great power card. Overall, people shouldn’t be worried about it. The main issue with nuclear war isn’t the destruction and the causualities. The main problem is the nuclear winter and the spread of radiation by winds, which is believed to extinct human life in the planet. Look:
The fact is that these weapons are still being tested or are projects. He didn’t mention other missile systems like Onyx, Kalibr, Tsirkon and Brahmos which aren’t as incridible as the Sarmat II, but if real can cause great headaches for the Western defense planners. I’ll write more about them soon. Now to the speech:
The operation in Syria has proved the increased capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. In recent years, a great deal has been done to improve the Army and the Navy. The Armed Forces now have 37 times more modern weapons. Over 300 new units of equipment were put into service. The strategic missile troops received 80 new intercontinental ballistic missiles, 102 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and three Borei nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Twelve missile regiments have received the new Yarsintercontinental ballistic missile. The number of long-range high-precision weapons carriers has increased by 12 times, while the number of guided cruise missiles increased by over 30 times. The Army, the Aerospace Forces and the Navy have grown significant stronger as well.
Both Russia and the entire world know the names of our newest planes, submarines, anti-aircraft weapons, as well as land-based, airborne and sea-based guided missile systems. All of them are cutting-edge, high-tech weapons. A solid radar field to warn of a missile attack was created along Russia’s perimeter (it is very important). Huge holes appeared after the USSR disintegrated. All of them were repaired.
A leap forward was made in the development of unmanned aircraft; the National Defence Control Centre was established; and the operational command of the far maritime zone was formed. The number of professional service members has increased by 2.4 times, and the availability of equipment in the Armed Forces grew from 70 percent to 95–100 percent. The years-long queue for permanent housing was eliminated, and the waiting period was cut by 83 percent.
Now, on to the most important defence issue.
I will speak about the newest systems of Russian strategic weapons that we are creating in response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States of America from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the practical deployment of their missile defence systems both in the US and beyond their national borders.
I would like to make a short journey into the recent past.
Back in 2000, the US announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia was categorically against this. We saw the Soviet-US ABM Treaty signed in 1972 as the cornerstone of the international security system. Under this treaty, the parties had the right to deploy ballistic missile defence systems only in one of its regions. Russia deployed these systems around Moscow, and the US around its Grand Forks land-based ICBM base.
Together with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the ABM Treaty not only created an atmosphere of trust but also prevented either party from recklessly using nuclear weapons, which would have endangered humankind, because the limited number of ballistic missile defence systems made the potential aggressor vulnerable to a response strike.
We did our best to dissuade the Americans from withdrawing from the treaty. All in vain. The US pulled out of the treaty in 2002. Even after that we tried to develop constructive dialogue with the Americans. We proposed working together in this area to ease concerns and maintain the atmosphere of trust. At one point, I thought that a compromise was possible, but this was not to be. All our proposals, absolutely all of them, were rejected. And then we said that we would have to improve our modern strike systems to protect our security. In reply, the US said that it is not creating a global BMD system against Russia, which is free to do as it pleases, and that the US will presume that our actions are not spearheaded against the US.
The reasons behind this position are obvious. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, which was known as the Soviet Union or Soviet Russia abroad, lost 23.8 percent of its national territory, 48.5 percent of its population, 41 of the GDP, 39.4 percent of its industrial potential (nearly half of our potential, I would underscore), as well as 44.6 percent of its military capability due to the division of the Soviet Armed Forces among the former Soviet republics. The military equipment of the Russian army was becoming obsolete, and the Armed Forces were in a sorry state. A civil war was raging in the Caucasus, and US inspectors oversaw the operation of our leading uranium enrichment plants.
For a certain time, the question was not whether we would be able to develop a strategic weapon system – some wondered if our country would even be able to safely store and maintain the nuclear weapons that we inherited after the collapse of the USSR. Russia had outstanding debts, its economy could not function without loans from the IMF and the World Bank; the social sphere was impossible to sustain.
Apparently, our partners got the impression that it was impossible in the foreseeable historical perspective for our country to revive its economy, industry, defence industry and Armed Forces to levels supporting the necessary strategic potential. And if that is the case, there is no point in reckoning with Russia’s opinion, it is necessary to further pursue ultimate unilateral military advantage in order to dictate the terms in every sphere in the future.
Basically, this position, this logic, judging from the realities of that period, is understandable, and we ourselves are to blame. All these years, the entire 15 years since the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, we have consistently tried to reengage the American side in serious discussions, in reaching agreements in the sphere of strategic stability.
We managed to accomplish some of these goals. In 2010, Russia and the US signed the New START treaty, containing measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. However, in light of the plans to build a global anti-ballistic missile system, which are still being carried out today, all agreements signed within the framework of New START are now gradually being devaluated, because while the number of carriers and weapons is being reduced, one of the parties, namely, the US, is permitting constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.
Despite our numerous protests and pleas, the American machine has been set into motion, the conveyer belt is moving forward. There are new missile defence systems installed in Alaska and California; as a result of NATO’s expansion to the east, two new missile defence areas were created in Western Europe: one has already been created in Romania, while the deployment of the system in Poland is now almost complete. Their range will keep increasing; new launching areas are to be created in Japan and South Korea. The US global missile defence system also includes five cruisers and 30 destroyers, which, as far as we know, have been deployed to regions in close proximity to Russia’s borders. I am not exaggerating in the least; and this work proceeds apace.
So, what have we done, apart from protesting and warning? How will Russia respond to this challenge? This is how.
During all these years since the unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, we have been working intensively on advanced equipment and arms, which allowed us to make a breakthrough in developing new models of strategic weapons.
Let me recall that the United States is creating a global missile defence system primarily for countering strategic arms that follow ballistic trajectories. These weapons form the backbone of our nuclear deterrence forces, just as of other members of the nuclear club.
As such, Russia has developed, and works continuously to perfect, highly effective but modestly priced systems to overcome missile defence. They are installed on all of our intercontinental ballistic missile complexes.
In addition, we have embarked on the development of the next generation of missiles. For example, the Defence Ministry and enterprises of the missile and aerospace industry are in the active phase of testing a new missile system with a heavy intercontinental missile. We called it Sarmat.
Sarmat will replace the Voevoda system made in the USSR. Its immense power was universally recognized. Our foreign colleagues even gave it a fairly threatening name.
That said, the capabilities of the Sarmat missile are much higher. Weighing over 200 tonnes, it has a short boost phase, which makes it more difficult to intercept for missile defence systems. The range of the new heavy missile, the number and power of its combat blocs is bigger than Voevoda’s. Sarmat will be equipped with a broad range of powerful nuclear warheads, including hypersonic, and the most modern means of evading missile defence. The high degree of protection of missile launchers and significant energy capabilities the system offers will make it possible to use it in any conditions.
Could you please show the video.
Voevoda’s range is 11,000 km while Sarmat has practically no range restrictions.
As the video clips show, it can attack targets both via the North and South poles.
Sarmat is a formidable missile and, owing to its characteristics, is untroubled by even the most advanced missile defence systems.
But we did not stop at that. We started to develop new types of strategic arms that do not use ballistic trajectories at all when moving toward a target and, therefore, missile defence systems are useless against them, absolutely pointless.
Allow me to elaborate on these weapons.
Russia’s advanced arms are based on the cutting-edge, unique achievements of our scientists, designers and engineers. One of them is a small-scale heavy-duty nuclear energy unit that can be installed in a missile like our latest X-101 air-launched missile or the American Tomahawk missile – a similar type but with a range dozens of times longer, dozens, basically an unlimited range. It is a low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost an unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries. It is invincible against all existing and prospective missile defence and counter-air defence systems. I will repeat this several times today.
In late 2017, Russia successfully launched its latest nuclear-powered missile at the Central training ground. During its flight, the nuclear-powered engine reached its design capacity and provided the necessary propulsion.
Now that the missile launch and ground tests were successful, we can begin developing a completely new type of weapon, a strategic nuclear weapons system with a nuclear-powered missile.
Roll the video, please.
You can see how the missile bypasses interceptors. As the range is unlimited, the missile can manoeuvre for as long as necessary.
As you no doubt understand, no other country has developed anything like this. There will be something similar one day but by that time our guys will have come up with something even better.
Now, we all know that the design and development of unmanned weapon systems is another common trend in the world. As concerns Russia, we have developed unmanned submersible vehicles that can move at great depths (I would say extreme depths) intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels, including some of the fastest. It is really fantastic. They are quiet, highly manoeuvrable and have hardly any vulnerabilities for the enemy to exploit. There is simply nothing in the world capable of withstanding them.
Unmanned underwater vehicles can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, which enables them to engage various targets, including aircraft groups, coastal fortifications and infrastructure.
In December 2017, an innovative nuclear power unit for this unmanned underwater vehicle completed a test cycle that lasted many years. The nuclear power unit is unique for its small size while offering an amazing power-weight ratio. It is a hundred times smaller than the units that power modern submarines, but is still more powerful and can switch into combat mode, that is to say, reach maximum capacity, 200 times faster.
The tests that were conducted enabled us to begin developing a new type of strategic weapon that would carry massive nuclear ordnance.
Please play the video.
By the way, we have yet to choose names for these two new strategic weapons, the global-range cruise missile and the unmanned underwater vehicle. We are waiting for suggestions from the Defence Ministry.
Countries with high research potential and advanced technology are known to be actively developing so-called hypersonic weapons. The speed of sound is usually measured in Mach numbers in honour of Austrian scientist Ernst Mach who is known for his research in this field. One Mach is equal to 1,062 kilometres per hour at an altitude of 11 kilometres. The speed of sound is Mach 1, speeds between Mach 1 and Mach 5 is called supersonic, and hypersonic is above Mach 5. Of course, this kind of weapon provides substantial advantages in an armed conflict. Military experts believe that it would be extremely powerful, and that its speed makes it invulnerable to current missile and air defence systems, since interceptor missiles are, simply put, not fast enough. In this regard, it is quite understandable why the leading armies of the world seek to possess such an ideal weapon.
Friends, Russia already has such a weapon.
The most important stage in the development of modern weapons systems was the creation of a high-precision hypersonic aircraft missile system; as you already know for sure, it is the only one of its kind in the world. Its tests have been successfully completed, and, moreover, on December 1 of last year, these systems began their trial service at the airfields of the Southern Military District.
The unique flight characteristics of the high-speed carrier aircraft allow the missile to be delivered to the point of discharge within minutes. The missile flying at a hypersonic speed, 10 times faster than the speed of sound, can also manoeuvre at all phases of its flight trajectory, which also allows it to overcome all existing and, I think, prospective anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems, delivering nuclear and conventional warheads in a range of over 2,000 kilometres. We called this system Kinzhal (Dagger).
But this is not all I have to say.
A real technological breakthrough is the development of a strategic missile system with fundamentally new combat equipment – a gliding wing unit, which has also been successfully tested.
I will say once again what we have repeatedly told our American and European partners who are NATO members: we will make the necessary efforts to neutralise the threats posed by the deployment of the US global missile defence system. We mentioned this during talks, and even said it publicly. Back in 2004, after the exercises of the strategic nuclear forces when the system was tested for the first time, I said the following at a meeting with the press (It is embarrassing to quote myself, but it is the right thing to say here):
So, I said: “As other countries increase the number and quality of their arms and military potential, Russia will also need to ensure it has new generation weapons and technology.
In this respect, I am pleased to inform you that successfully completed experiments during these exercises enable us to confirm that in the near future, the Russian Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, will receive new hypersonic-speed, high-precision new weapons systems that can hit targets at inter-continental distance and can adjust their altitude and course as they travel. This is a very significant statement because no country in the world as of now has such arms in their military arsenal.” End of quote.
Of course, every word has a meaning because we are talking about the possibility of bypassing interception boundaries. Why did we do all this? Why did we talk about it? As you can see, we made no secret of our plans and spoke openly about them, primarily to encourage our partners to hold talks. Let me repeat, this was in 2004. It is actually surprising that despite all the problems with the economy, finances and the defence industry, Russia has remained a major nuclear power. No, nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the problem, and nobody wanted to listen to us. So listen now.
Unlike existing types of combat equipment, this system is capable of intercontinental flight at supersonic speeds in excess of Mach 20.
As I said in 2004, in moving to its target, the missile’s gliding cruise bloc engages in intensive manoeuvring – both lateral (by several thousand km) and vertical. This is what makes it absolutely invulnerable to any air or missile defence system. The use of new composite materials has made it possible to enable the gliding cruise bloc to make a long-distance guided flight practically in conditions of plasma formation. It flies to its target like a meteorite, like a ball of fire. The temperature on its surface reaches 1,600–2,000 degrees Celsius but the cruise bloc is reliably guided.
Play the video, please.
For obvious reasons we cannot show the outer appearance of this system here. This is still very important. I hope everyone understands this. But let me assure you that we have all this and it is working well. Moreover, Russian industrial enterprises have embarked on the development of another new type of strategic weapon. We called it the Avangard.
We are well aware that a number of other countries are developing advanced weapons with new physical properties. We have every reason to believe that we are one step ahead there as well – at any rate, in the most essential areas.
We have achieved significant progress in laser weapons. It is not just a concept or a plan any more. It is not even in the early production stages. Since last year, our troops have been armed with laser weapons.
I do not want to reveal more details. It is not the time yet. But experts will understand that with such weaponry, Russia’s defence capacity has multiplied.
Here is another short video.
Those interested in military equipment are welcome to suggest a name for this new weaponry, this cutting-edge system.
Of course, we will be refining this state-of-the-art technology. Obviously, there is far more in development than I have mentioned today. But this is enough for now.
I want to specifically emphasise that the newly developed strategic arms – in fact, new types of strategic weapons – are not the result of something left over from the Soviet Union. Of course, we relied on some ideas from our ingenious predecessors. But everything I have described today is the result of the last several years, the product of dozens of research organisations, design bureaus and institutes.
Thousands, literally thousands of our experts, outstanding scientists, designers, engineers, passionate and talented workers have been working for years, quietly, humbly, selflessly, with total dedication. There are many young professionals among them. They are our true heroes, along with our military personnel who demonstrated the best qualities of the Russian army in combat. I want to address each of them right now and say that there will absolutely be awards, prizes and honorary titles but, because I have met many of you in person many times, I know you are not after awards. The most important thing is to reliably ensure the security of our country and our people. As President and on behalf of the Russian people, I want to say thank you very much for your hard work and its results. Our country needs them so much.
As I have already said, all future military products are based on remarkable advances that can, should and will be used in high-technology civilian sectors. I would like to stress that only a country with the highest level of fundamental research and education, developed research, technology, industrial infrastructure and human resources can successfully develop unique and complex weapons of this kind. You can see that Russia has all these resources.
We will expand this potential and focus on delivering on the ambitious goals our country has set itself in terms of economic, social and infrastructure development. Effective defence will serve as a guarantee of Russia’s long-term development.
Let me reiterate that each of the armament systems I referred to is uniquely important. Even more importantly, taken together all these advances enable the Defence Ministry and General Staff to develop a comprehensive defence system, in which every piece of new military equipment will be assigned a proper role. On top of strategic weapons that are currently on combat alert and benefit from regular updates, Russia will have a defence capability that would guarantee its security in the long term.
Of course, there are many things that we have to do in terms of military construction, but one thing is already clear: Russia possesses a modern, high-technology army that is quite compact given the size of the territory, centred on the officer corps, who are dedicated to their country and are ready to sacrifice anything for its people. Sooner or later, other armies will also have the technology, the weapons, even the most advanced ones. But this does not worry us, since we already have it and will have even better armaments in the future. What matters is that they will never have people or officers like the Russian pilot Major Roman Filipov.
I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defences and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives.
It was our duty to inform our partners of what I said here today under the international commitments Russia had subscribed to. When the time comes, foreign and defence ministry experts will have many opportunities to discuss all these matters with them, if of course our partners so desire.
For my part, I should note that we have conducted the work to reinforce Russia’s defence capability within the current arms control agreements; we are not violating anything. I should specifically say that Russia’s growing military strength is not a threat to anyone; we have never had any plans to use this potential for offensive, let alone aggressive goals.
We are not threatening anyone, not going to attack anyone or take away anything from anyone with the threat of weapons. We do not need anything. Just the opposite. I deem it necessary to emphasise (and it is very important) that Russia’s growing military power is a solid guarantee of global peace as this power preserves and will preserve strategic parity and the balance of forces in the world, which, as is known, have been and remain a key factor of international security after WWII and up to the present day.
And to those who in the past 15 years have tried to accelerate an arms race and seek unilateral advantage against Russia, have introduced restrictions and sanctions that are illegal from the standpoint of international law aiming to restrain our nation’s development, including in the military area, I will say this: everything you have tried to prevent through such a policy has already happened. No one has managed to restrain Russia.
Now we have to be aware of this reality and be sure that everything I have said today is not a bluff ‒ and it is not a bluff, believe me ‒ and to give it a thought and dismiss those who live in the past and are unable to look into the future, to stop rocking the boat we are all in and which is called the Earth.
In this connection, I would like to note the following. We are greatly concerned by certain provisions of the revised nuclear posture review, which expand the opportunities for reducing and reduce the threshold for the use of nuclear arms. Behind closed doors, one may say anything to calm down anyone, but we read what is written. And what is written is that this strategy can be put into action in response to conventional arms attacks and even to a cyber-threat.
I should note that our military doctrine says Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons solely in response to a nuclear attack, or an attack with other weapons of mass destruction against the country or its allies, or an act of aggression against us with the use of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state. This all is very clear and specific.
As such, I see it is my duty to announce the following. Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of short, medium or any range at all, will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, with all the attendant consequences.
There should be no doubt about this whatsoever. There is no need to create more threats to the world. Instead, let us sit down at the negotiating table and devise together a new and relevant system of international security and sustainable development for human civilisation. We have been saying this all along. All these proposals are still valid. Russia is ready for this.
Our policies will never be based on claims to exceptionalism. We protect our interests and respect the interests of other countries. We observe international law and believe in the inviolable central role of the UN. These are the principles and approaches that allow us to build strong, friendly and equal relations with the absolute majority of countries.
Our comprehensive strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China is one example. Russia and India also enjoy a special privileged strategic relationship. Our relations with many other countries in the world are entering a new dynamic stage.
Russia is widely involved in international organisations. With our partners, we are advancing such associations and groups as the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. We are promoting a positive agenda at the UN, G20 and APEC. We are interested in normal and constructive cooperation with the United States and the European Union. We hope that common sense will prevail and our partners will opt for honest and equal work together.
Even if our views clash on some issues, we still remain partners because we must work together to respond to the most complex challenges, ensure global security, and build the future world, which is becoming increasingly interconnected, with more and more dynamic integration processes.
Russia and its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union seek to make it a globally competitive integration group. The EAEU’s agenda includes building a common market for electricity, oil, petroleum products and gas, harmonising financial markets, and linking our customs authorities. We will also continue to work on a greater Eurasian partnership.
Ar prieku piedālos SSE Rīgas “Task Force on Reducing Inequality” pēc bijuša Zviedrijas vēstnieka Henrika Lendholma aicinājuma. Apakšā dažas domas par šo jautājumu.
Analizējot nevienlīdzību, ir nepieciešams atbildēt uz četriem svarīgākajiem jautājumiem (Stewart 2015):
- Kāda ir nevienlīdzība?
- Starp ko ir nevienlīdzība?
- Kad ir nevienlīdzība?
- Kur ir nevienlīdzība (Costa 2015)?
Pirmais jautājums nav jāskata saistībā ar individuālu darbu un sasniegumiem, kas balstās uz iespēju vienlīdzības ideju (Costa 2015), bet gan plašākā nozīmē, piemēram, attiecībā uz rasi, etnisko izcelsmi, dzimumu un sociālos aizspriedumus kā sociālās mobilitātes faktorus. Turklāt politiskās varas asimetrijas tiesībās, sociālajās tiesībās, neveselīgas vides iedarbībā, minot tikai dažus, ir būtiskas nevienlīdzības dimensijas, kuras bieži ignorē, koncentrējoties uz sociālekonomisko nevienlīdzību (Therborn 2013, Berthe un Ferrari 2012, Costa 2015). Uz otro jautājumu jāatbild, izmantojot tādus jēdzienus kā horizontālā nevienlīdzība, starpsektoru nevienlīdzība un kategoriskā nevienlīdzība. 
Trešais jautājums ir būtisks, jo ļoti bieži ekonomikas analīze neņem vērā laiku un vēsturi. Kā atzīmē Kosta (Costa 2015), sociālās struktūras ir ilglaicīgu vēsturisku procesu rezultāts. Ceturtajam jautājumam ir īpaša nozīme, jo pētījumi par nevienlīdzību pārsvarā ir vērsti uz reģionālu vai nacionālu mērogu. Tomēr nevienlīdzība jāapsver plašākā mērogā, ņemot vērā ekonomisko un varas attiecību strukturālās īpašības starptautiskā līmenī. Citiem vārdiem, nevienlīdzība ienākumos, ienākumu koncentrācijā, izglītības kvalitātē, sociālajā aizsardzībā, bezdarbā, dzīves apstākļos utt. starp valstīm, ko izraisa atšķirīgi attīstības un ekonomikas sarežģītības līmeņi, kas rada nevienlīdzīgas ekonomiskās un politiskās attiecības.
Ortodoksālā ekonomika pieņem, ka neattīstītajās valstīs ekonomiskās izaugsmes process palielinās ienākumu atšķirības starp bagātajiem un nabadzīgajiem. Tajā pašā laikā attīstītajās valstīs rezultātam vajadzētu būt pretējam, citiem vārdiem, ekonomikas izaugsmei vajadzētu radīt ienākumu konverģenci starp bagātajiem un nabagajiem. Šī ideja balstās uz Saimona Kuzneta (Simon Kuznets) 1955. gada rakstu “Ekonomikas izaugsme un ienākumu nevienlīdzība”. Lai gan viņš skaidri norādīja, ka “iespējams, rakstā ir 5 procenti empīriskas informācijas un 95 procenti pieņēmumu, dažus no tiem, iespējams, vēlamā uzdošana par īstenību” (Kuznets 1955: 26), ideja par to, ka vispirms jābūt izaugsmei un tad dalīšanai, neapšaubāmi kļuva par vissvarīgāko ekonomisko aksiomu, lai attaisnotu ienākumu koncentrēšanu un tādējādi nevienlīdzību.
Smalkāks skatījums ir ekonomistiem Paulam Rozenšteinam-Rodanam, Hansam Zingeram un Albertam Hiršmanam (Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Hans Singer, Albert Hirschman), kuri uzskatīja, ka valsts ražošanas struktūra noteic, kā veidojas un tiek sadalīti ienākumi. Tādējādi ienākumu nevienlīdzība vai konverģence rodas valsts attīstības procesa, nevis ekonomikas izaugsmes rezultātā. Tas nozīmē, ka attīstības modeļi, nevis tikai izaugsme pati par sevi, jeb veids, kādā valsts ekonomika diversificējas no lauksaimniecības un ieguves industrijas uz sarežģītāku ražošanas struktūru, ir labāki nākotnes ekonomikas izaugsmes, nabadzības līmeņa, sociālās labklājības (Bourguignon 2004; Ravallion 2004) un ekonomiskās nevienlīdzības prognozētāji.
Reālā pasaulē nepastāv tāda lieta kā tīrs brīvais tirgus vai pilnīga konkurence. Drīzāk ir dažādi ekonomikas regulēšanas veidi ar lielāku vai mazāku valsts iejaukšanos. Šo ekonomikas regulēšanas ietvaru nosaka politiskā līmenī, un tas savukārt noteic izaugsmes un attīstības modeļus. Tādējādi nevienlīdzības līmenis, tās dinamika un samazināšanas iespējas ir atkarīgas no valsts ekonomikas struktūras. Tas rodas politisku lēmumu rezultātā, kas noteic, lai gan ne pilnībā, ekonomikas attīstības procesu un rezultātā lielāku vai mazāku nevienlīdzību kādā ģeogrāfiskā telpā un noteiktā vēsturiskā laikposmā.
Citiem vārdiem, nevienlīdzība, tās iemesli un sekas ir jāanalizē, izmantojot daudzpusēju pieeju. Šajā rakstā galvenā uzmanība tiks pievērsta sakarībai starp ekonomikas sarežģītību un tās saikni ar sociāli ekonomisko nevienlīdzību Latvijā.
Latvijas Džini koeficients pēc valdības pārdales ir 0,34. Pēc ESAO datiem tas ir nedaudz labāks nekā Lielbritānijai, Jaunzēlandei un Amerikas Savienotajām Valstīm un līdzīgs Spānijai, Grieķijai, Portugālei un Rumānijai. Tas ir rezultāts tam, ka valstij ir nozīmīga pārdales loma subsīdiju, pabalstu un citu sociālo atbalstu formā. ESAO dati rāda, ka pirms valsts pārdales darbības Latvijas Džini koeficients būtu 0,50, kas ir līdzīgs Meksikai. Tādējādi izmantojot tikai šo rādītāju, iznāk, ka Latvijas sabiedrība nav īpaši nevienlīdzīga. Latvijas Džini koeficients ir par četriem punktiem augstāks nekā vidēji E28, bet par deviņiem punktiem zemāks nekā Urugvajai (0,42). Rūpīgāka analīze liecina, ka Latvijā 10% bagātākiem pieder 25,6% no valsts izlīdzinātajiem ienākumiem. Tas nozīmē, ka Latviju nacionālā līmenī var uzskatīt par valsti ar zemu ienākumu nevienlīdzību, kā Beļģija un Japāna. Izmantojot 20:20 attiecības metriku, Latvijā ir mazāka nevienlīdzība nekā, piemēram, Lielbritānijā, lai gan tā ir lielāka nekā Skandināvijas valstīs.
Vēl viens veids, kā mērīt nevienlīdzību, ir bagātība. Šajā gadījumā Latvija tiek uzskatīta par valsti, kurā ir liela bagātības nevienlīdzība. Tas ir industrializācijas un ekonomikas sarežģītības, t.i., konkurētspējīgas attīstības trūkuma dēļ. Lielākā daļa labklājības Latvijā rodas no valsts līdzekļu piesaistīšanas, galvenokārt no privatizācijas, finanšu starpniecības un nekustamā īpašuma. Nekustamā īpašuma gadījumā tas ir saistīts ar zemes vērtības pieaugumu, kas nav saistīts ar investīciju un produktivitātes pieaugumu. Zemes cena palielinās tikai tāpēc, ka ir liels pieprasījums noteiktās vietās. Tā kā daudzi miljonāri ir vienkārši renti meklējoši aģenti, kuri kļuvuši bagāti, piesavinoties valsts īpašumu vai naudu vai palielinot nekustamā īpašuma vērtību, Latvijā ir divi būtiski nevienlīdzības faktori – īpašumtiesības uz nekustamo īpašumu vai nē, un politika konkurētspējai starptautiskā līmenī ar zemām algām. Tieši šīs nevienlīdzības ir iemesls esošajam emigrācijas līmenim.
Noskaidrojot aprēķinos, ka bagātības sadalījums Latvijā ir nevienlīdzīgs, nākamais solis ir izanalizēt, cik Latvija ir nevienlīdzīga salīdzinājumā ar citām valstīm. Tas ir nepieciešams, jo neviena valsts nav izolēta sala. Tā kā Latvija ir Eiropas Savienības dalībvalsts, to var uzskatīt par vienības daļu – tāda, kas arī ir nevienlīdzīga. Šādā perspektīvā augstākais neto bagātības rādītājs Latvijā bija 254,8 tūkstoši eiro, Beļģijas augstākais neto bagātības rādītājs bija 1407,5 tūkstoši eiro, Vācijas – 1284,2 tūkstoši, Igaunijas – 541,0 tūkstoši, citējot tikai dažus. Tas nozīmē, ka Latvijas ekonomiskā elite starptautiskā salīdzinājumā ir nabadzīga. Tas pats attiecināms arī uz citiem rādītājiem – absolūtos skaitļos Latvijas neto bagatība ir daudz zemāka nekā citās Eiropas Savienības valstīs. Tas nozīmē, ka starptautiskajā sistēmā ir dziļa nevienlīdzība. Dažas valstis ir daudz bagātākas nekā citas un gūst lielāku labumu no brīvās tirdzniecības un brīvās kapitāla kustības.
1.tabula – Labklājības nevienlīdzība
Latvijas gadījumā to noteic ekonomikas sarežģītības trūkums. Ekonomikas sarežģītība ir “sabiedrības zināšanu mērījums, kas tiek pārtulkots produktos, ko tā ražo” (Hartmann et alli 2017:1). Citiem vārdiem, ekonomikas attīstība ir nepārtraukts sarežģītāku spēju kopu apgūšanas process, kas rosina pārmaiņas uz darbībām ar augstāku produktivitātes līmeni (Hidalgo un Hausmann 2009). Sarežģītākie produkti ir smalkas ķīmiskās vielas, mašīnas un metāli. Vismazāk sarežģīti produkti ir kokmateriāli, tekstilmateriāli, izejvielas un preces, kā arī vienkārši lauksaimniecības produkti (Felipe et alli 2011). Pastāv pārliecinoši pierādījumi, ka ekonomiskās sarežģītības rezultātu pieaugums samazina ienākumu nevienlīdzību. Tas ir tāpēc, ka pastāv saikne starp valsts ražošanas struktūru un ienākumu nevienlīdzību, jo ražošanas struktūras ir dažādu faktoru rezultāts no institūcijām līdz izglītībai (Hartmann et alli 2017: 10-11).
1.attēls: Latvijas ekonomikas sarežģītība: eksports 1995 – 2016 un eksports 2016. gadā
2.attēls: Zviedrijas ekonomikas sarežģītība: eksports 1995 – 2016 un eksports 2016. gadā
Avots: Ekonomikas sarežģītības atlants, Hārvardas Universitāte
Latvijā ir viens no zemākajām ekonomikas sarežģītības līmeņiem Eiropas Savienībā. Latvijas neto eksports ir viens no vismazāk sarežģītajiem, galvenokārt tie ir kokmateriāli, lauksaimniecības produkti un preces (sk. 1.attēlu iepriekš). Tajā paša laikā Zviedrijai ir viena no pasaules sarežģītākajām ekonomikām (sk. 2. attēlu), un tā ir viena no vistaisnīgākajām pasaules valstīm. Šajā gadījumā ir pilnīgi skaidra saikne starp ekonomikas sarežģītību un sociālo, labklājības, ienākumu, izglītības kvalitātes u.c. līmeni. Taisnīgi secināms, ka valstis ar augstu ienākumu līmeni eksportē sarežģītākus produktus, savukārt valstis ar zemu ienākumu līmeni ir galvenie mazāk sarežģītu produktu eksportētāji (Felipe et alli 2011).
Kopš neatkarības atgūšanas no Padomju Savienības Latvijas ekonomikas politika ir sekojusi piecām galvenajām paradigmām. Pirmkārt, valstij būtu minimāli jāiejaucas ekonomikā, tādējādi ļaujot attīstības procesam notikt pašam par sevi. Otrkārt, Latvijai ir jāattīsta banku darbība, tranzīts, tūrisms, lauksaimniecība un kokmateriāli kā galvenās ekonomikas nozares, jo Latvijas ģeogrāfiskais stāvoklis ir dabiska priekšrocība, un tāpēc, ka šīs nozares ir vieglāk attīstīt nekā ražošanu. Izņemot banku darbību, šajās nozarēs ir zems ekonomiskās sarežģītības līmenis.
Treškārt, biznesa attīstības finansēšana gandrīz pilnībā tika nodota privātajām bankām. Tā kā privātās bankas nopietni uztver risku, jo to bizness ir nopelnīt nevis zaudēt naudu, finansējot jaunus uzņēmumus un dinamiskus uzņēmumus, tad riskantās nozares kļuva par problēmu. Rezultātā tās pašas primitīvās un nesarežģītās nozares tiek finansētas, kamēr potenciāli kompleksi uzņēmumi nesaņem pietiekamu atbalstu. Ceturtkārt, darba tirgus tika reformēts, lai panāktu lielāku tirgus elastību, kā rezultātā samazinājās algas, t.i., cilvēki kļuva nabadzīgāki un nevienlīdzīgāki, kas ir viens no galvenajiem faktoriem starptautiskās konkurētspējas panākšanai. Tā kā algas ir zemas, uzņēmumiem nav motivācijas modernizēt un aizstāt darbaspēku ar kapitālu, tādējādi ražīgums salīdzinājumā ar citām valstīm ir zemāks.
Piektkārt, iepriekšējie punkti attīstīja “rentes” kultūru valstī. Ļoti bagāti ir tie, kas varēja iegūt renti no kādiem zemes gabaliem, vai tas būtu mežs vai nekustamā īpašuma aktīvi un to vērtības pieaugums. Arī ar kādu aktīvu, parasti no valsts, iegūšana un pārdošana kādam citam, parasti ārvalstu investoriem. Īsumā Latvijas ekonomikas politika no neatkarības atjaunošanas brīža ir veicinājusi nesarežģītas ekonomikas izveidošanu, kā tas redzams 1. attēlā. Rezultātā nav izstrādāta industriālā politika, kas dotu norādes valsts pārvaldes atbalstam uzņēmējdarbības attīstībai sarežģītās nozarēs.
Sarežģītāku ekonomikas nozaru attīstīšana ir vienīgais veids, kā pastāvīgi samazināt nevienlīdzību visās tās dažādajās formās un izpausmēs. Tas jādara, palielinot gan valsts, gan privātā sektora līdzdalību valsts attīstības procesā. Pirmais solis būtu izstrādāt un ieviest valsts attīstības stratēģiju. Nākamais solis ir stimulēt inovācijas. Sarežģītas ekonomikas saglabāšana nav rezultāts kādas ekonomikas nozares, ražošanas tehnikas vai kāda konkrēta produkta ražošanas zināšanai. Tas tiek darīts, radot pastāvīgu spēju radīt jaunas produktīvas kombinācijas, procesus un produktus un vadot inovāciju procesu. Trešais solis ir koncentrēt visus valsts kontrolētos resursus, tostarp Eiropas fondus konverģencei un strukturālajai attīstībai, lai attīstītu nozares ar augstu ekonomisko sarežģītību.
Ceturtkārt, valstij ir jāizveido programmas ar privātām bankām, lai garantētu, ka jaunie uzņēmumi un uzņēmumi ļoti sarežģītās nozarēs saņem pietiekamu finansējumu ar zemām procentu likmēm. Piektkārt, ir jāveic visas nepieciešamās reformas, lai piesaistītu ārvalstu investorus, kuri vēlas izveidot Latvijā ražošanas rūpnīcas un pētniecības telpas. Fiskālās politikas pasākumi un citi stimuli, kas darbojas banku un tranzīta jomā, bieži vien nav vislabākie augstas sarežģītības nozaru attīstības atbalstam. Sestkārt, sadarbībā ar privāto sektoru ir jāsāk pārkvalifikācijas programmas uzņēmējiem, darbiniekiem un ierēdņiem. Septītkārt, ir nepieciešamas programmas sociālās nevienlīdzības mazināšanai, kamēr notiek attīstības process.
 Horizontāla nevienlīdzība ir starp konkrētām sociālām grupām, kuras noteic pēc rases, etniskās izcelsmes, reliģijas, reģionālās kultūras utt. (Stewart 2015: 270).
 Starpgrupu nevienlīdzība rodas dzimumu, rasu un šķiru mijiedarbības rezultātā. Dažas pieejas pieņem jebkuru citu dažādu kategoriju kombināciju (Anthias 2012).
 Kaut arī kategoriskās atšķirības tiek uzskatītas par atsevišķu talantu vai darbību variāciju rezultātu, patiesībā tās vairāk atbilst dihotomijām, piemēram, melns / balts, vīrietis / sieviete, pilsonis / ārzemnieks, musulmanis / kristietis, nevis individuālām pazīmju, tieksmju vai snieguma atšķirībām (Tilly 1998: 6-7).
 Šajā rakstā attīstība un izaugsme tiek saprasta Šumpētera teorijas izpratnē.
Nodokļu reforma ir raisījusi polemiku. Protams. Latvijas nodokļu politika soda uzņēmējus un strādniekus, bet ir ļoti labvēlīga turīgiem cilvēkiem, tāpēc ir diezgan liela pretestība to mainīt. Turīgie finansē partijas taču. Šis ir Flika paradoksa galvenais pamats, jeb 2010.g toreizējais AirBaltica prezidents Bertolts Fliks teica, ka “(B)ūt bagātam Latvijā ir ļoti lēti, un man tā nodokļu sistēma perfekti der. Bet būt nabagam Latvijā ir ļoti dārgi, un tas ir briesmīgi.”
Diskusija galvenokārt balstās uz diviem punktiem. Nav tā, ka atbalstu šo nodokļu reformu, bet tomēr aicinu domāt par tiem no cita uzskatījuma.
i. Ienākuma nodokļi lielām algām ir vieni no augstākajiem ES
Tas nav. Piemēram (runa iet tikai par IIN nevis par IIN+SOC+un citi):
Ir interesants pievērst uzmanību tam, ka Latvija šobrīd ir 30. vietā. Dažas valsts, kur nodokļi ir mazāk nekā Latvijā ir:
Kāds ir pirmais visacīmredzamākais secinājums? Ka IIN nodokļi attīstītās valstīs ir daudz augstāks nekā neattīstītās valstīs.
ii. Ir stiprs viedoklis, ka jauno darba nodokļu likmju un augstākas darba izmaksas dēļ nebūs investīcijas konkurētspējīgās nozarēs, īpaši ārzemju investījas.
Tas ir mīts. Pirmkārt, ja tas būtu patiesība, ņemot vērā Latvijas esošo nodokļu slodzi, mums līdz šīm būtu investīciju bums. Mums nebija. Otrkārt, kā izskaidrot ārzemju investīcijas Skandināvijā, Vācijā, ASV, utt.? Atbilde ir vienkārša. Augstās produktivitātes nozarēs darba izmaksas nav visbūtiskākās. Citēju Risto Laulajainen and Howard A. Stafford’s “Corporate Geography Business Location Principles and Cases.” Tā ir gandrīz 25 gādu veca, bet joprojām aktuālā:
“The generalization is that relatively unsophisticated production processes requiring less skilled workers producing standardized products are more likely to be located in low-wage peripheral areas with ample labor pools; sophisticated products and processes are more likely to be found in established manufacturing regions, and often near corporate headquarters and R&D laboratories.”
Tāds ir Latvijas gadījums. Es esmu gatavs piekrist tam, ka jaunās likmes nebūs labvēlīgas Latvijas esošajiem ekonomiskajiem sektoriem. Galu galā, kopš neatkarības galvenais konkurētspējas mehānisms ir bijuši mazas algas, nevis darbu aizstāt ar kapitālu un saražot augstākās tehnoloģijas preces. Protams, ka ir izņēmumi, bet kopumā Latvijas ekonomika vēl daudz kas jāattīstās. Lai tas būtu, noteikti jāmaina esoša ekonomisko politika, jo pēc 25. gadiem tā rezultāts ir neapmierinošs.
Tāpēc diskusijai jābūt dziļakai. Jārunā nevis vienkārši par progresīvo nodokļu, bet par progresīvo fiskālo politiku kā daļa no industriālās politikas, kas mērķē uz augstās produktivitātes sektoru attīstību. Igaunijas ekonomikas produktivitāte ir ievērojami augstāka, tāpēc algas arī. Lietuva drīz mūs apsteigs. Drīzāk, tas ir rezultāts no tiem saucamiem nemateriāliem faktoriem kā izglītība, birokrātija, tiesu neatkarība, (ne)korupcija, utt..
Latvijai ir nepieciešams izveidot attīstības politiku, nevis vienkārši domāt par izaugsmi. Ļoti nopietni aicinu ņemt vērā atšķirību starp “izaugsmi” un “attīstību”. Diemžēl ekonomikas zinātne ir diezgan ideoloģiska. Vairākas pieejas, tā skaitā tā, kas ir pašlaik modē, pieņem, ka izaugsme un attīstība ir viena un tā pati lieta. Taču, izaugsme nenozīmē attīstību. Mums bija ļoti strauja izaugsme starp 2004. g. un 2008. g., bet ir skaidrs, ka tā nebija attīstība. Attīstības līmeni var konkrēti un viegli noteikt, salīdzinot valstu eksportus. Piemēram, Latvija un Zviedrija. Mēs galvenokārt eksportējam primāras preces. Zviedrija eksportē ieročus, Volvo un Scania mašīnas, IKEA (tās nav vienkārši mēbeles, bet ir koncepcija: dizains, praktiskums, kvalitāte), Ericsson telekomunikāciju iekārtas un, vēl svarīgāk, tehnoloģiju, Electrolux sadzīves tehniku, utt. Ja mūsu ekonomika turpinās augt tajos pašos sektoros kā līdz šim, mēs neattīstāmies. Vai nu mēs stagnējam, vai mēs palikām arvien vairāk attīstīto valstu aizmugurē. Izaugsmei ir jābūt ar attīstību.
Tāpēc nodokļu politikai vai drīzāk fiskālai politikai ir jābūt daļa no industriālas politikas, kas ir instruments Latvijas ekonomikas attīstībai. Esoša attīstības politikai bija piemērota 1990-jos gados un varbūt līdz pat brīdim, kad Latvijas pievienojās Eiropas Savienībai. Paldies visiem, kas palīdzēja Latvijai pāriet uz moderno ekonomiku. Tagad Latvijai vajag citu ekonomisko politiku lai attīstītos. Jādomā ārpus vecas ekonomistu paaudzes (Repše, Godmanis, utt.) teorētiskiem rāmiem un pieņēmumiem. Tie nestrādā, jo esam citā attīstības posmā un valsts ekonomikai ir citas problēmas un vajadzības.
Es vēlāk rakstīšu, kas būtu nepieciešams. Konceptuāli atbilde ir vienkārša: valsts jāatbalsta reālās ekonomikas augstas produktivitātes nozarēm, nevis finanšu sektoram, mājokļu tirgum, baļķu eksportētājus, utt. Kā konceptu, tas ir ļoti acīmredzams un vienkārši. Lai to īstenotu reālā dzīvē, būs ļoti grūti “neredzamo spēku” dēļ.
As every year, General Gerasimov’s address to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences was published by the VPK (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/35591), Military-Industrial Courier, Issue No 10 (674), 15th March 2017. Below is Mark Voyger from NATO LANDCOM’s brilliant translation. My comments are in green.
A World on the Brink of War
Tracking the current challenges is not enough, it is the future ones that must be forecast
Army General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the RF AF
This article is based on the report “Contemporary Warfare and the Current Problems of the Defense of our Country” presented by the ChoGS to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences.
It was Clausewitz who compared warfare to an expanded single combat, defining it as an act of violence whose purpose is to force the adversary into acting according to our will. The prominent Russian and Soviet theoreticians from the early 20th century Andrey Snesarev and Aleksander Svechin had their considerable contribution to the development of the science of warfare. The subject of their research became the main trends in the conduct of warfare that are the result of not only the political, but also of the economic and social relations. By the early 1990s a firm understanding had been formed of warfare as the means of attaining political goals based exclusively on armed struggle.
Svechin and Snesarev are very important Russian military thinkers. The first was the first chief of the Soviet General Staff.
A classification was developed in the USA that includes traditional and non-traditional warfare, and in the beginning of 21st century the American theoreticians posited that hybrid warfare should be added to it. They define it as actions taken during a period, which is impossible to define purely as either war or peace.
The concept of Hybrid Warfare was fully developed by Frank Hoffman, but I remember to see a Master Thesis from some USA’s military institutional calling similar strategies “hybrid” already in the beginning of the 1990’s. It was mostly about developments of Low Intensity Conflict. If someone find it, please drop me a line.
“The mobilization capacities of the social networks were first revealed during the conflicts in the Middle East”
Our country’s science and practice offers a more balanced approach to the classification of contemporary armed conflicts that accounts for a larger number of parameters. At the same time, the definition of warfare is lacking in the international and domestic official documents. The Military Doctrine of the RF calls it a form of resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts by using military force.
An active discussion is ongoing in trying to clarify the term itself. Some of the scholars and specialists adhere to the classical definition. Others propose a radical revision of the views on the content and substance of the term “warfare”, as they think that armed struggle is not one of its mandatory attributes. At present one can encounter definitions, such as information, economic, hybrid warfare, and numerous other variations.
The General Staff pays due attention to the discussion of the said problem. In 2016 a discussion was organized at the Military Academy of the General Staff on the meaning of the term “warfare” under the current conditions. The said issue was being discussed during the session of the Security Council’s scientific council section. In the course of the discussions a common position was elaborated on the necessity of analyzing the characteristics and features of contemporary armed conflicts, and of revealing the trends in their emergence and evolution.
This is most the result of authors as Chekinov. Bogdanov, Maruyev and others claiming for “futurology” to be recognized as a branch of Military Sciences. The Russian General Staff has great interest in the subject.
The No-Contact Warfare has been replaced by the Hybrid One
Such conflicts of the end of the 20th and early 21st centuries differ from each other in the composition of their participants, the types of weapons used, the forms and methods of troop actions. At the same time, however, they do not exceed the limits of the overall content of warfare, while they include as components various forms of struggle – the direct armed one, along with political, diplomatic, information, and others. New features have appeared nowadays. These include the change in the ratio of contribution of one or another type of struggle into the overall political success of the war, the overwhelming superiority of one of the sides in terms of military power and economic strength.
Basically, it is a development of Low Intensity Conflict. New technologies, etc., of course changed the character of warfare.
Contemporary conflicts can be characterized by a number of features.
The experience of NATO’s operations in Yugoslavia that ushered in the age of the so-called no- contact or distance warfare, did not gain universal distribution. The reason for this was objective since the limitations of geographical, as well as economic nature impact the attainment of the goals of war. The factor of the cost of armaments, and of the war as a whole, started to play an important role in the choice of methods for conducting military actions.
He is referring to Slipchenko’s discussion about 6th Generation Warfare. Also, Putin’s idea that warfare has to be asymmetric, as explained by him already in 2006. Besides, it is clear he knows Russia doesn’t have the money to afford engaging in long traditional wars. Russia isn’t a rich country.
An important feature is the increased use of the newest robotic systems and unmanned aerial vehicles of various purposes and actions.
New forms of application of the diverse forces and means have appeared. For example, in the course of the operation in Libya, a no-flight zone was created while simultaneously imposing a naval blockade in conjunction with the joint actions of private military companies from the NATO member- states, and the armed formations of the opposition.
Here it’s clear how the Russians see the West as a mirror. If they use private military companies as mercenaries in the orst sense of the word, of course the US and NATO do the same.
The army operating concepts of the leading states postulate that achieving information dominance is an indispensable pre-requisite of combat actions. The means of mass media and social networks are used to perform the set tasks. Simultaneously, the forces and means of information-psychological and information-technical influence are activated. Thus, the mobilization capacities of the social networks were first revealed during the conflicts in the Middle East.
The conflict in Syria became a visual example of the use of hybrid methods. It involved the simultaneous use of traditional and non-traditional actions of military, as well as non-military nature.
It’s implicit that the Hybrud part was the proteste of the populaiton agains Assad. Of course it has to be Western interference…
During its first phase the internal Syrian contradictions were transformed into armed demonstrations of the opposition. After that, they became organized in nature with the support of foreign instructors, accompanied by active information warfare.
It’s the West again. And the United States is to blame. The CIA, the illuminati, the Free Mansonry and Soros. :-))))))
Later on, terrorist groups supplied and directed from abroad entered the fight against the government forces.
The hybrid actions are actively introduced in practice on the international arena by the USA and the NATO countries. In many respects this is conditioned by the fact that this variation of activities does not fall under the definition of aggression.
In the Western media the combination of such methods has received the name “hybrid warfare”. However, it is still premature to use this term as an established one.
I agree, Sir.
The New Perception of a Common Term
The analysis indicates a number of trends testifying of the transformation of armed conflicts in the beginning of the 21st century. Nowadays the erasing of the boundary between the state of war and peace is obvious. The negative side of hybrid actions is becoming the new perception of peacetime, when no military or other overt violent measures are used against one or another state, but its national security and sovereignty are under threat and can be violated. The range of reasons and causes for using military forces is widening, as it is activated ever more often to secure the economic interests of states under the slogans of defending democracy, or the inculcation of democratic values into one country or another.
He’s clearing referring to the USA again, but he has a point.
The emphasis of the content of conflict methods is moving toward the wide application of political, economic, diplomatic, information and other non-military means, implemented by involving the protest potential of the population.
It’s post-modern Low Intensity Conflict.
The non-military forms and means of action have experienced unprecedented technological development, and have acquired a dangerous, often violent nature.
Their practical use can trigger the collapse of the energy, banking, economic, information and other spheres of the state’s vital functions. The example can be adduced of the impacts of the cyberattacks against Iran’s energy infrastructure sites in 2015.
Or Russian attacks against Estonia…
The analysis of the characteristics, features and trends in the evolution of contemporary conflicts demonstrates that all of them share a common feature – the use of violent military means. At the same time, almost classical armed struggle is used during some of those, such as the two US wars against Iraq or the NATO operations against Yugoslavia. In other conflicts, such as Syria, for example, the armed struggle was waged by one of the parties in the form of anti-terrorist operations, and by the enemy – in the form of actions of the illegal armed formations and terrorist groups. This way, the essence of wars in modernity and in the foreseeable future will remain the same. Their main feature is the presence of armed struggle.
This is a very important point. It isn’t only asymmetric Low Intensity Conflict (Hybrid, if you prefer). Concentional military force is and will be part of the Russian strategy.
Along with that, the question of defining the nature of warfare has not been closed, it is still relevant and requires constant studies and a thorough development.
For this purpose, the scientific-business program of the international military-technical forum “Army-2017” to be held in August of this year will include a “roundtable” discussing the topic of “Contemporary warfare and armed conflict: characteristics and features”. The scientists from the Academy of Military Science must take the most active participation in it. It is necessary to continue working on the inter-institutional standardization of the military-political and military terms and definitions.
The rise of the world’s conflict potential underlines the relevancy of a number of tasks in the sphere of our country’s defense.
The High-Precision Measures
The main among those remains the same – the guaranteed repelling of potential aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies from any direction. At the same time, it is necessary to guarantee the neutralization of the threats to the security of the country by relying on the existing forces and means in the course of performing the activities of strategic containment in peacetime. In that regard, the role and importance of forecasting the military threats and dangers increases, as it is expedient to conduct it in conjunction with the assessment of economic, information and other challenges.
“The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the RF Armed Forces will
increase fourfold by 2021”
The improvement of the capabilities of the Armed Forces is implemented by means of the balanced development of all of the troops (forces) branches and services, the mastering of high-precision weapons and the modern means of communication, reconnaissance, automated command and control, and electronic warfare. At present, a large-scale re-armament of the Strategic Rocket Forces with modern systems is underway. The navy is receiving new nuclear submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles that have no analogues in the world. The strategic aviation airplanes, our legendary missile carriers Tu-160 and Tu-95MS are being actively modernized. This will allows us to re-arm the strategic nuclear forces with 90 percent of modern weapons by 2020. The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the RF Armed Forces will increase fourfold by 2021, which will allow for guaranteeing the security of Russia along the entire perimeter of our borders. By 2021 the share of modern weapons and military hardware in the Ground Forces will be no less than 70 percent. The Aerospace Forces will receive new-generation airplanes, which will increase the combat capabilities of the air force by 50 percent. The Navy will receive modern ships armed with high-precision long- range missiles.
It WILL. One day. The important point here isn’t about they having the capabilities or not at this moment. First, it is about the strategic changes on the Russian strategy, the way of fighting. Second, that they’re trying to catch up and sooner or later they might surprose the West with some new technologies.
A considerable role in increasing the combat capabilities is played by robotics. The large-scale and substantiated application of robotic systems of various purposes will increase the effectiveness of troop actions, and will guarantee the considerable reduction of personnel loss.
It’s like an Industrial Revolution in combat capabilities.
The Science of Preemption
Nowadays the Armed Forces are gaining combat experience in Syria. They have had the unique opportunity to check and test the new models of weapons and military hardware under complex climatic conditions. It is necessary to continue summarizing the experience gained by using the means of armed struggle during the Syrian campaign, and draw lessons for their improvement and modernization.
We must remember – victory is always achieved by using not only the material, but also the spiritual resources of the people, its cohesion and its drive for resisting aggression by using all its strengths. The military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is exerting serious efforts to restore the nation’s confidence in the army. Nowadays the Armed Forces are reaching a fundamentally new level of combat readiness, and it is enjoying the utmost support of society. In the interest of increasing their prestige further, it is important to develop the linkages between army and society, and in order to achieve that we must improve the system of training of service members and of patriotic upbringing of the youth.
Solving the current problems of our country’s defense would be impossible without studying them in a thorough and preemptive fashion. In that regard, it is worth focusing the attention on the priority tasks of the Academy of Military Science.
The study of the new forms of conflict between states and the development of efficient methods to counter that stand above all.
In other words, Russian miltary scientists will look very closely to what the US and NATO do. They will reframe what they’ve seen within their own moral system, beliefs, etc., and that will become the new developments of Russian New Generation Warfare.
A relevant task is the development of scenarios, long-term forecasts of the evolution of the military- political and strategic situation in the most important regions of the world. It is necessary to study operationally the features of contemporary armed conflicts and based on them to develop the work methodology of military command and control and the troop actions under various conditions.
General Gareev, did you understand? Enough of your guys writing about WWII. It’s the second time he saying that.
A separate study is required of the problems related to the organization and conduct of regrouping of forces (troops) to distant theaters of operations. The standard tasks of military science have not lost their relevancy, as they also need further development.
Voyennaya Misl will start to publish such articles soon. I’m ready to bet.
Russia is buying 49,265 military burial flags. Are they preparing to starting a major war or some “budgetnik” is just making money? During the entire Vietnam War the number of KIA (Killed in Action) was similar, just to have an idea. See the procurement call below (Google translation):
|GENERAL INFORMATION||PURCHASING DOCUMENTS||THE EVENT LOG|
GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE PROCUREMENT
|The method for determining the supplier (contractor, executor)||Electronic auction|
|Name of an electronic platform in the information and telecommunication network “Internet”||ETP NEP|
|E platform in the information and telecommunication network “Internet”||http://www.etp-ets.ru|
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
|purchase object||Buying heraldic products (flags, banners, flags and logos) for the needs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence.|
|purchase Stage||Submission of applications|
|Information about the connection with the position of the schedule||Communication with the position of the schedule is not set|
|Number of model contracts, standard contract terms||Communication with the model contract, standard terms and conditions of the contract has not been established|
INFORMATION ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SUPPLIER (CONTRACTOR, EXECUTOR)
|The organization that conducts placement||MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION|
|Mailing address||The Russian Federation, 105175, Moscow, ul. Myasnitskaya, d.37a, p.1|
|Location||The Russian Federation, 119019, Moscow, Znamenka, House 19|
|Responsible Officer||The administrator of a single information center Vetchinin Elizabeth B.|
|Contact phone number||7-495-6930177|
|Additional Information||Information is absent|
INFORMATION ON THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE
|Date and time of filing||02.17.2017 10:16|
|The date and time for the submission of applications||03.09.2017 8:00|
|Place of filing||EMAIL SITE The information and telecommunications network “INTERNET»: www.etp-ets.ru|
|Application Procedure||established in article 66 of the Federal Law of April 5, 2013 № 44-FZ “About contract system in the procurement of goods, works and services for state and municipal needs” (hereinafter – the Law № 44-FZ).|
|The expiration date review of the first parts of the applications of the participants||03/16/2017|
|Date of the auction in electronic form||03/20/2017|
|Time of the auction||9:00|
|Additional Information||Information is absent|
THE INITIAL (MAXIMUM) CONTRACT PRICE
|The initial (maximum) contract price||36 560 002.79|
|Source of financing||federal budget.|
|Identification procurement code||
|Payment of the contract by year||Information is absent|
INFORMATION ABOUT THE PURCHASE OBJECT
|Terms, restrictions and limitations of access to goods originating from a foreign state or group of foreign states, works and services, respectively, performed or rendered by foreign persons||the documentation of the electronic auction.|
|NAME OF GOODS, WORKS, SERVICES||CODE OKPD2||UNIT OF
|AMOUNT||PRICE PER UNIT OF MEASURE.||COST OF|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 3.5)||220.127.116.11||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The logo of the Centre (integrated security management) (Type 4.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||1.00||34 500,00||34 500,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 3.5)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 3.1)||126.96.36.199||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.7)||188.8.131.52||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 3.7)||184.108.40.206||PC||11,00||2 023.33||22 256.63|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem on the arms trafficking Supervision Service of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4.1)||220.127.116.11||PC||2.00||34 500,00||69 000,00|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.3)||18.104.22.168||PC||4.00||1 100,00||4 400,00|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.4)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Railway Troops (Type 3.5)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.1)||188.8.131.52||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 3.1)||220.127.116.11||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Financial Monitoring Department of the state defense order of the RF Ministry of Defense (Type 4.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||2.00||34 500,00||69 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Western Military District (Type 4.2)||22.214.171.124||PC||3.00||6 833.33||20 499.99|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.4)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 3.1)||188.8.131.52||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.7)||184.108.40.206||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|Flags for military ceremonies: The flag of the State flag of the Russian Federation for the coffin cover (Type 3.8)||220.127.116.11||PC||49265.00||509,00||25 075 885,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Eastern Military District (Type 4.2)||18.104.22.168||PC||2.00||6 833.33||13 666.66|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.4)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 3.5)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.1)||188.8.131.52||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 3.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.7)||220.127.116.11||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.3)||18.104.22.168||PC||4.00||1 100,00||4 400,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7)||22.214.171.124||PC||16,00||2 023.33||32 373.28|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.7)||126.96.36.199||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Office of the state supervision of nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4.2)||188.8.131.52||PC||5.00||6 833.33||34 166.65|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 1 Guards Engineering Brigade of Engineers (Type 4.2)||220.127.116.11||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 28 pontoon bridge brigades (Type 4.2)||18.104.22.168||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the City of Moscow (Type 3.3)||22.214.171.124||PC||4.00||1 100,00||4 400,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.5)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.1)||188.8.131.52||PC||6.00||5 500,00||33 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Railway Troops (Type 3.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7)||220.127.116.11||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.4)||18.104.22.168||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.5)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.6)||126.96.36.199||PC||4.00||42 750,00||171 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.7)||188.8.131.52||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7)||184.108.40.206||PC||750,00||2 023.33||1517 497.50|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4)||220.127.116.11||PC||5.00||23 500,00||117 500,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Central Research Institute of the test engineer troops (Type 4.2)||18.104.22.168||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.4)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (Type 3.5)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.5)||188.8.131.52||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.5)||184.108.40.206||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.5)||220.127.116.11||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 3.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4)||22.214.171.124||PC||5.00||23 500,00||117 500,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the International Mine Action Centre of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4.2)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.5)||188.8.131.52||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.5)||184.108.40.206||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.5)||220.127.116.11||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||50,00||5 500,00||275 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.1)||22.214.171.124||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.7)||126.96.36.199||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the eighth management of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 4.1)||188.8.131.52||PC||1.00||34 500,00||34 500,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 18 test site of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Type 4.2)||184.108.40.206||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.1)||220.127.116.11||PC||32,00||5 500,00||176 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the federal autonomous institution of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, “the Central Army Sports Club” (Type 3.1)||22.214.171.124||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.7)||126.96.36.199||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 3.7)||188.8.131.52||PC||11,00||2 023.33||22 256.63|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Defence Ministry (Type 4.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||2.00||34 500,00||69 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 187 Emblem of the training center of engineering troops (Type 4.2)||220.127.116.11||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.2)||18.104.22.168||PC||4.00||1 233.33||4 933.32|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.5)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 3.1)||126.96.36.199||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 3.7)||188.8.131.52||PC||11,00||2 023.33||22 256.63|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 210 Guard Emblem inter regional training center (Type 4.2)||184.108.40.206||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 3.5)||220.127.116.11||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 66 Training Centre (interagency, methodical) (Type 4.2)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.4)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.1)||188.8.131.52||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.7)||184.108.40.206||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 3.7)||220.127.116.11||PC||11,00||2 023.33||22 256.63|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Office of the state supervision of nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||2.00||34 500,00||69 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 76 single track railway battalion (Type 4.2)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.3)||126.96.36.199||PC||4.00||1 100,00||4 400,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.5)||188.8.131.52||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 3.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.7)||220.127.116.11||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Office emblem (the construction and development of the application of the system of unmanned aerial vehicles) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 4.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||2.00||34 500,00||69 000,00|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 630 Emblem single track railway battalion (Type 4.2)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.4)||126.96.36.199||PC||1.00||6 910,00||6 910,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.5)||188.8.131.52||PC||1.00||11 966.67||11 966.67|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.1)||184.108.40.206||PC||2.00||5 500,00||11 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 3.1)||220.127.116.11||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.7)||18.104.22.168||PC||6.00||2 023.33||12 139.98|
|EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the military unit 21480 (Type 4.2)||22.214.171.124||PC||1.00||6 833.33||6 833.33|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.1)||126.96.36.199||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.2)||188.8.131.52||PC||4.00||1 233.33||4 933.32|
|Standart OFFICIAL: Standard of 68 army corps commander||184.108.40.206||compl||1.00||105 466.67||105 466.67|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.2)||220.127.116.11||PC||4.00||1 233.33||4 933.32|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Znamenny complex technique (Type 1.1)||18.104.22.168||compl||16,00||60 976.67||975 626.72|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Pantaler||22.214.171.124||PC||20,00||7 933.33||158 666.60|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Russian Federation State flag (Type 2)||126.96.36.199||compl||1.00||18 233.33||18 233.33|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of military control bodies, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 2.2)||188.8.131.52||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Grasp assistant Znamenshchikov||184.108.40.206||PC||40,00||5 400,00||216 000,00|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 2.2)||220.127.116.11||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 2.2)||18.104.22.168||compl||40,00||17 666.67||706 666.80|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 2.2)||22.214.171.124||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: A copy of the Victory Banner (Type 2.1)||126.96.36.199||compl||1.00||18 233.33||18 233.33|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Engineering Troops (Type 2.2)||188.8.131.52||compl||11,00||17 666.67||194 333.37|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 2.2)||184.108.40.206||compl||10,00||17 666.67||176 666.70|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the federal autonomous institution of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense “Central Army Sports Club” (Type 2.2)||220.127.116.11||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|BANNERS: Znamenny complex battle flag of the military unit (Type 1)||18.104.22.168||compl||25,00||81 476.67||2036 916.75|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 2)||22.214.171.124||compl||1.00||18 233.33||18 233.33|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 2.2)||126.96.36.199||compl||10,00||17 666.67||176 666.70|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Signal Corps (Type 2.2)||188.8.131.52||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 2.2)||184.108.40.206||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 2)||220.127.116.11||compl||1.00||18 233.33||18 233.33|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 2.2)||18.104.22.168||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 2.2)||22.214.171.124||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 2.2)||126.96.36.199||compl||11,00||17 666.67||194 333.37|
|Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Flag of the Navy (Type 2)||188.8.131.52||compl||1.00||18 233.33||18 233.33|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Navy (Type 2.2)||184.108.40.206||compl||10,00||17 666.67||176 666.70|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 2.2)||220.127.116.11||compl||10,00||17 666.67||176 666.70|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Railway Troops (Type 2.2)||18.104.22.168||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 2.2)||22.214.171.124||compl||11,00||17 666.67||194 333.37|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.1)||126.96.36.199||PC||8.00||5 500,00||44 000,00|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 2.2)||188.8.131.52||compl||11,00||17 666.67||194 333.37|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3)||184.108.40.206||PC||3.00||15 933.33||47 799.99|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.1)||220.127.116.11||PC||8.00||5 500,00||44 000,00|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||8.00||5 500,00||44 000,00|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.1)||22.214.171.124||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 2.2)||126.96.36.199||compl||40,00||17 666.67||706 666.80|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 2.2)||188.8.131.52||compl||10,00||17 666.67||176 666.70|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 2.2)||184.108.40.206||compl||3.00||17 666.67||53 000,01|
|FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 2.2)||220.127.116.11||compl||11,00||17 666.67||194 333.37|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.1)||18.104.22.168||PC||4.00||5 500,00||22 000,00|
|FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.1)||22.214.171.124||PC||8.00||5 500,00||44 000,00|
|Total:||36 560 002.79|
BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS REQUIREMENTS
|Requirements for participants||1 Uniform Requirements for participants (in accordance with Part 1 of Article 31 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ)
the documentation of the electronic auction.
2 Uniform Requirements for participants (in accordance with Paragraph 1.1 of Article 31 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ)
the documentation of the electronic auction.
|Restricting participation in the definition of the supplier (contractor, executor), established in accordance with the Federal Law № 44-FZ (in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 42 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ||not installed.|
|Place of delivery of goods, works and services||Russian Federation, is contained in Appendix 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.|
|Terms of delivery of goods or completion of the work or the schedule of services||is contained in Annex 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.|
CONDITIONS OF A CONTRACT
|Place of delivery of goods, works and services||Russian Federation, is contained in Appendix 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.|
|Terms of delivery of goods or completion of the work or the schedule of services||is contained in Annex 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.|
|Requires software applications|
|The amount of security applications||1828 000.14 Russian ruble|
|The procedure for making money as security applications||Providing the application for participation in electronic auctions can be provided only by a party to make money. Participation in the electronic auction is possible with the personal account of the purchase of a participant, open for operations to ensure the participation in this auction on the account of the operator of an electronic platform, funds for which have not implemented the blocking operations in the personal account in accordance with Part 18 of Article 44 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ, in an amount not less than the amount of security applications for participation in the electronic auction.|
|Payment details for the transfer of funds at evading member purchases from contract award||p / c 40302810900001001901 l / s 05,951,001,870, BIC 044501002|
PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT
|Provision of the contract is required|
|The size of the contract to ensure||5484 000.42 Russian ruble|
|The procedure of ensuring execution of the contract, to ensure requirements, information on banking support contract||Contained in the documentation of the electronic auction. Requirements for the public performance of the contract established in the documentation of the electronic auction. Banking support of a government contract: Not required.|
|Payment details for the contract||p / c 40302810900001001901 l / s 05,951,001,870, BIC 044501002|
This is sections 11,12 of the now declassified OSS’s Simple Sabotage Field Manual, a 1944 document that has been declassified. The OSS became the CIA after WWII. The full document is here.
(11) General Interference with Organizations and Production
(a) Organizations and Conferences
(1) Insist on doing everything through “channels.” Never permit short-cuts to be taken in order to, expedite decisions.
(2) Make “speeches.” Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your “points” by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. Never hesitate to make a few appropriate “patriotic” comments.
(3) When possible, refer all matters to committees, for “further study and consideration.” Attempt to make the committees as large as possible – never less than five.
(4) Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible.
(5) Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions.
(6) Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to reopen the question of the advisability of that decision.
(7) Advocate “caution.” Be “reasonable” and urge your fellow-conferees to be “reasonable” and avoid haste which might result in embarrassments or difficulties later on.
(8) Be worried about the propriety of any decision -raise the question of whether such action as is contemplated lies within the jurisdiction of the group or whether it might conflict with the policy of some higher echelon.
(b) Managers and Supervisors
(1) Demand written orders.
(2) “Misunderstand” orders. Ask endless questions or engage in long correspondence about such orders. Quibble over them when you can.
(3) Do everything possible to delay the delivery of orders. Even though parts of an order may be ready beforehand, don’t deliver it until it is completely ready.
(4) Don’t order new working materials until your current stocks have been virtually exhausted, so that the slightest delay in filling your order will mean a shutdown.
(5) Order high-quality materials which are hard to get. If you don’t get them argue about it. Warn that inferior materials will mean inferior work.
(6) In making work assignments, always sign out the unimportant jobs first. See that the important jobs are assigned to inefficient workers of poor machines.
(7) Insist on perfect work in relatively unimportant products; send back for refinishing those which have the least flaw. Approve other defective parts whose flaws are not visible to the naked eye.
(8) Make mistakes in routing so that parts and materials will be sent to the wrong place in the plant.
(9) When training new workers, give incomplete or misleading instructions.
(10) To lower morale and with it, production, be pleasant to inefficient workers; give them undeserved promotions. Discriminate against efficient workers; complain unjustly about their work.
(11) Hold conferences when there is more critical work to be done.
(12) Multiply paper work in plausible ways. Start duplicate files.
(13) Multiply the procedures and clearances involved in issuing instructions, pay checks, and so on. See that three people have to approve everything where one would do.
(14) Apply all regulations to the last letter.
(c) Office Workers
(1) Make mistakes in quantities of material when you are copying orders. Confuse similar names. Use wrong addresses.
(2) Prolong correspondence with government bureaus.
(3) Misfile essential documents.
(4) In making carbon copies, make one too few, so that an extra copying job will have to be done.
(5) Tell important callers the boss is busy or talking on another telephone.
(6) Hold up mail until the next collection.
(7) Spread disturbing rumors that sound like inside dope.
(1) Work slowly. Think out ways to increase the number of movements necessary on your job: use a light hammer instead of a heavy one, try to make a small wrench do when a big one is necessary, use little force where considerable force is needed, and so on.
(2) Contrive as many interruptions to your work as you can: when changing the material on which you are working, as you would on a lathe or punch, take needless time to do it. If you are cutting, shaping or doing other measured work, measure dimensions twice as often as you need to. When you go to the lavatory, spend a longer time there than is necessary. Forget tools so that you will have to go back after them.
(3) Even if you understand the language, pretend not to understand instructions in a foreign tongue.
(4) Pretend that instructions are hard to understand, and ask to have them repeated more than once. Or pretend that you are particularly anxious to do your work, and pester the foreman with unnecessary questions.
(5) Do your work poorly and blame it on bad tools, machinery, or equipment. Complain that these things are preventing you from doing your job right.
(6) Never pass on your skill and experience to a new or less skillful worker.
(7) Snarl up administration in every possible way. Fill out forms illegibly so that they will have to be done over; make mistakes or omit requested information in forms.
(8) If possible, join or help organize a group for presenting employee problems to the management. See that the procedures adopted are as inconvenient as possible for the management, involving the presence of a large number of employees at each presentation, entailing more than one meeting for each grievance, bringing up problems which are largely imaginary, and so on.
(9) Misroute materials.
(10) Mix good parts with unusable scrap and rejected parts.
(12) General Devices for Lowering Morale and Creating Confusion
(a) Give lengthy and incomprehensible explanations when questioned.
(b) Report imaginary spies or danger to the Gestapo or police.
(e) Act stupid.
(d) Be as irritable and quarrelsome as possible without getting yourself into trouble.
(e) Misunderstand all sorts of regulations concerning such matters as rationing, transportation, traffic regulations.
(f) Complain against ersatz materials.
(g) In public treat axis nationals or quislings coldly.
(h) Stop all conversation when axis nationals or quislings enter a cafe.
(i) Cry and sob hysterically at every occasion, especially when confronted by government clerks.
(j) Boycott all movies, entertainments, concerts, newspapers which are in any way connected with the quisling authorities.
(k) Do not cooperate in salvage schemes.
Explaining growth of the military budget Shoigu refers to founder of political economy Adam Smith saying that in his work “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” he stated that defense of the country was more important than wealth and called the military art “the noblest of all arts.” Thus, Shoigu concludes that it is not worth arguing with Smith proposing an alternative “army or economy.”
Source: WPS Observer.
We just published the English version of our research “The Possibility of Societal Destabilization in Latvia: Potential National Security Threats.” It’s the result of 18 months of work using the most advanced research techniques to understand the possibilities for Russian influence in Latvia. Specifically regarding Latgale, one of the main conclusions is that “(D)espite the fact that the highest support for Russia’s narratives can be seen in Latgale, this is not a basis for separatism. A powerful contrasting tendency was also observed in Latgale – speakers of the Latgalian dialect expressed patriotic views and attitudes, supporting Latvia’s Western geo-political orientation to the largest degree. It was also established that the effectiveness of Russia’s public diplomacy activities in Latgale is low.”
I believe many people in the West use to project their views on other people. This might explain the failure when dealing with Russia. I’ve been arguing that Russia, including Putin, are very clear about their world view, including Geopolitics. Please, read the man:
– We see how some of our partners continue stubborn attempts to retain their monopoly on geopolitical domination. They put to use centuries of experience in suppressing, weakening, and setting opponents against each other, and turn to their advantage enhanced political, economic, financial and now information levers as well. By this, I mean, for example, the practice of intervening in other countries’ internal affairs, provoking regional conflicts, exporting so-called ‘color revolutions’ and so on. In pursuing this policy, they sometimes take on as accomplices terrorists, fundamentalists, ultra-right nationalists, and even outright neo-fascists. We see direct evidence of the harm this policy causes right on our borders. Two years ago, the list of regional hotspots got the addition of Ukraine, much to our regret, where the flames of internal conflict were fanned at the cost of human lives, destruction of economic ties, and streams of refugees, including into Russia.
– We are not going to let ourselves get intoxicated by these military passions. It seems that others are trying to nudge us this way, provoke us into a costly and futile arms race so that we divert resources and effort from our great socioeconomic development tasks at home. We will not do this, but we will always ensure our reliable defense and will guarantee the security of our country and its citizens.
– Syria has found itself at the epicenter of the fight against terrorism. It is no exaggeration to say that Syria’s future will be decisive not only for the future of the Middle East. It is in Syria that the fight against terrorism is being decided, the fight against this same Islamic State that has gathered terrorists and extremists of all stripes under its banners and united them in a desire to expand throughout the entire Muslim world. We know that they have set the goal of gaining strongholds in Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, the countries of Central Asia, the regions along our borders. This is why we responded last autumn to the Syrian government’s request for help in fighting this terrorist attack. I would .like to thank once again our military service personnel, who did all they could to push back the terrorists, prevent an illegitimate external armed intervention in Syria’s affairs, and preserve Syrian statehood.
– Brexit was a decision of the British and Russia is not going to interference into this process although it will watch the divorce of London and Brussels attentively.
– Russia will accept any choice of the American people and will work with any new president of the US. We want is to work in close cooperation with the United States on international affairs, but we will not accept the approach of that part of the U.S. establishment that thinks they can decide themselves in which areas we will cooperate and in which areas they will turn up the pressure, including through sanctions. We seek a partnership based on equality and consideration of each other’s interests.
– We must put up strong resistance to the Western media’s information monopoly, including by using all available methods to support Russian media outlets operating abroad. Of course, we must also act to counter lies about Russia and not allow falsifications of history.
Source: Izvestia, July 01, 2016.