Nevienlīdzība Latvijā

Ar prieku piedālos SSE Rīgas “Task Force on Reducing Inequality” pēc bijuša Zviedrijas vēstnieka Henrika Lendholma aicinājuma. Apakšā dažas domas par šo jautājumu.

Analizējot nevienlīdzību, ir nepieciešams atbildēt uz četriem svarīgākajiem jautājumiem (Stewart 2015):

  1. Kāda ir nevienlīdzība?
  2. Starp ko ir nevienlīdzība?
  3. Kad ir nevienlīdzība?
  4. Kur ir nevienlīdzība (Costa 2015)?

Pirmais jautājums nav jāskata saistībā ar individuālu darbu un sasniegumiem, kas balstās uz iespēju vienlīdzības ideju (Costa 2015), bet gan plašākā nozīmē, piemēram, attiecībā uz rasi, etnisko izcelsmi, dzimumu un sociālos aizspriedumus kā sociālās mobilitātes faktorus.   Turklāt politiskās varas asimetrijas tiesībās, sociālajās tiesībās, neveselīgas vides iedarbībā, minot tikai dažus, ir būtiskas nevienlīdzības dimensijas, kuras bieži ignorē, koncentrējoties uz sociālekonomisko nevienlīdzību (Therborn 2013, Berthe un Ferrari 2012, Costa 2015). Uz otro jautājumu jāatbild, izmantojot tādus jēdzienus kā horizontālā nevienlīdzība[1], starpsektoru nevienlīdzība[2] un kategoriskā nevienlīdzība. [3]

Trešais jautājums ir būtisks, jo ļoti bieži ekonomikas analīze neņem vērā laiku un vēsturi. Kā atzīmē Kosta (Costa 2015), sociālās struktūras ir ilglaicīgu vēsturisku procesu rezultāts. Ceturtajam jautājumam ir īpaša nozīme, jo pētījumi par nevienlīdzību pārsvarā ir vērsti uz reģionālu vai nacionālu mērogu. Tomēr nevienlīdzība jāapsver plašākā mērogā, ņemot vērā ekonomisko un varas attiecību strukturālās īpašības starptautiskā līmenī. Citiem vārdiem, nevienlīdzība ienākumos, ienākumu koncentrācijā, izglītības kvalitātē, sociālajā aizsardzībā, bezdarbā, dzīves apstākļos utt. starp valstīm, ko izraisa atšķirīgi attīstības un ekonomikas sarežģītības līmeņi, kas rada nevienlīdzīgas ekonomiskās un politiskās attiecības.

Ortodoksālā ekonomika pieņem, ka neattīstītajās valstīs ekonomiskās izaugsmes process palielinās ienākumu atšķirības starp bagātajiem un nabadzīgajiem. Tajā pašā laikā attīstītajās valstīs rezultātam vajadzētu būt pretējam, citiem vārdiem, ekonomikas izaugsmei vajadzētu radīt ienākumu konverģenci starp bagātajiem un nabagajiem. Šī ideja balstās uz Saimona Kuzneta (Simon Kuznets) 1955. gada rakstu “Ekonomikas izaugsme un ienākumu nevienlīdzība”. Lai gan viņš skaidri norādīja, ka “iespējams, rakstā ir 5 procenti empīriskas informācijas un 95 procenti pieņēmumu, dažus no tiem, iespējams, vēlamā uzdošana par īstenību” (Kuznets 1955: 26), ideja par to, ka vispirms jābūt izaugsmei un tad dalīšanai, neapšaubāmi kļuva par vissvarīgāko ekonomisko aksiomu, lai attaisnotu ienākumu koncentrēšanu un tādējādi nevienlīdzību.

Smalkāks skatījums ir ekonomistiem Paulam Rozenšteinam-Rodanam, Hansam Zingeram un Albertam Hiršmanam (Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Hans Singer, Albert Hirschman), kuri uzskatīja, ka valsts ražošanas struktūra noteic, kā veidojas un tiek sadalīti ienākumi. Tādējādi ienākumu nevienlīdzība vai konverģence rodas valsts attīstības procesa, nevis ekonomikas izaugsmes rezultātā.[4] Tas nozīmē, ka attīstības modeļi, nevis tikai izaugsme pati par sevi, jeb veids, kādā valsts ekonomika diversificējas no lauksaimniecības un ieguves industrijas uz sarežģītāku ražošanas struktūru, ir labāki nākotnes ekonomikas izaugsmes, nabadzības līmeņa, sociālās labklājības (Bourguignon 2004; Ravallion 2004) un ekonomiskās nevienlīdzības prognozētāji.

Reālā pasaulē nepastāv tāda lieta kā tīrs brīvais tirgus vai pilnīga konkurence. Drīzāk ir dažādi ekonomikas regulēšanas veidi ar lielāku vai mazāku valsts iejaukšanos. Šo ekonomikas regulēšanas ietvaru nosaka politiskā līmenī, un tas savukārt noteic izaugsmes un attīstības modeļus. Tādējādi nevienlīdzības līmenis, tās dinamika un samazināšanas iespējas ir atkarīgas no valsts ekonomikas struktūras. Tas rodas politisku lēmumu rezultātā, kas noteic, lai gan ne pilnībā, ekonomikas attīstības procesu un rezultātā lielāku vai mazāku nevienlīdzību kādā ģeogrāfiskā telpā un noteiktā vēsturiskā laikposmā.

Citiem vārdiem, nevienlīdzība, tās iemesli un sekas ir jāanalizē, izmantojot daudzpusēju pieeju. Šajā rakstā galvenā uzmanība tiks pievērsta sakarībai starp ekonomikas sarežģītību un tās saikni ar sociāli ekonomisko nevienlīdzību Latvijā.

Nevienlīdzība Latvijā

Latvijas Džini koeficients pēc valdības pārdales ir 0,34. Pēc ESAO datiem tas ir nedaudz labāks nekā Lielbritānijai, Jaunzēlandei un Amerikas Savienotajām Valstīm un līdzīgs Spānijai, Grieķijai, Portugālei un Rumānijai. Tas ir rezultāts tam, ka valstij ir nozīmīga pārdales loma subsīdiju, pabalstu un citu sociālo atbalstu formā. ESAO dati rāda, ka pirms valsts pārdales darbības Latvijas Džini koeficients būtu 0,50, kas ir līdzīgs Meksikai. Tādējādi izmantojot tikai šo rādītāju, iznāk, ka Latvijas sabiedrība nav īpaši nevienlīdzīga. Latvijas Džini koeficients ir par četriem punktiem augstāks nekā vidēji E28, bet par deviņiem punktiem zemāks nekā Urugvajai (0,42). Rūpīgāka analīze liecina, ka Latvijā 10% bagātākiem pieder 25,6% no valsts izlīdzinātajiem ienākumiem. Tas nozīmē, ka Latviju nacionālā līmenī var uzskatīt par valsti ar zemu ienākumu nevienlīdzību, kā Beļģija un Japāna. Izmantojot 20:20 attiecības metriku, Latvijā ir mazāka nevienlīdzība nekā, piemēram, Lielbritānijā, lai gan tā ir lielāka nekā Skandināvijas valstīs.

Vēl viens veids, kā mērīt nevienlīdzību, ir bagātība. Šajā gadījumā Latvija tiek uzskatīta par valsti, kurā ir liela bagātības nevienlīdzība. Tas ir industrializācijas un ekonomikas sarežģītības, t.i., konkurētspējīgas attīstības trūkuma dēļ. Lielākā daļa labklājības Latvijā rodas no valsts līdzekļu piesaistīšanas, galvenokārt no privatizācijas, finanšu starpniecības un nekustamā īpašuma. Nekustamā īpašuma gadījumā tas ir saistīts ar zemes vērtības pieaugumu, kas nav saistīts ar investīciju un produktivitātes pieaugumu. Zemes cena palielinās tikai tāpēc, ka ir liels pieprasījums noteiktās vietās. Tā kā daudzi miljonāri ir vienkārši renti meklējoši aģenti, kuri kļuvuši bagāti, piesavinoties valsts īpašumu vai naudu vai palielinot nekustamā īpašuma vērtību, Latvijā ir divi būtiski nevienlīdzības faktori – īpašumtiesības uz nekustamo īpašumu vai nē, un politika konkurētspējai starptautiskā līmenī ar zemām algām. Tieši šīs nevienlīdzības ir iemesls esošajam emigrācijas līmenim.

1. diagramma – Latvijas Lorenca līkme

Noskaidrojot aprēķinos, ka bagātības sadalījums Latvijā ir nevienlīdzīgs, nākamais solis ir izanalizēt, cik Latvija ir nevienlīdzīga salīdzinājumā ar citām valstīm. Tas ir nepieciešams, jo neviena valsts nav izolēta sala. Tā kā Latvija ir Eiropas Savienības dalībvalsts, to var uzskatīt par vienības daļu – tāda, kas arī ir nevienlīdzīga. Šādā perspektīvā augstākais neto bagātības rādītājs Latvijā bija 254,8 tūkstoši eiro, Beļģijas augstākais neto bagātības rādītājs bija 1407,5 tūkstoši eiro, Vācijas – 1284,2 tūkstoši, Igaunijas – 541,0 tūkstoši, citējot tikai dažus. Tas nozīmē, ka Latvijas ekonomiskā elite starptautiskā salīdzinājumā ir nabadzīga. Tas pats attiecināms arī uz citiem rādītājiem – absolūtos skaitļos Latvijas neto bagatība ir daudz zemāka nekā citās Eiropas Savienības valstīs. Tas nozīmē, ka starptautiskajā sistēmā ir dziļa nevienlīdzība. Dažas valstis ir daudz bagātākas nekā citas un gūst lielāku labumu no brīvās tirdzniecības un brīvās kapitāla kustības.

1.tabula – Labklājības nevienlīdzība

Latvijas gadījumā to noteic ekonomikas sarežģītības trūkums. Ekonomikas sarežģītība ir “sabiedrības zināšanu mērījums, kas tiek pārtulkots produktos, ko tā ražo” (Hartmann et alli 2017:1). Citiem vārdiem, ekonomikas attīstība ir nepārtraukts sarežģītāku spēju kopu apgūšanas process, kas rosina pārmaiņas uz darbībām ar augstāku produktivitātes līmeni (Hidalgo un Hausmann 2009). Sarežģītākie produkti ir smalkas ķīmiskās vielas, mašīnas un metāli. Vismazāk sarežģīti produkti ir kokmateriāli, tekstilmateriāli, izejvielas un preces, kā arī vienkārši lauksaimniecības produkti (Felipe et alli 2011). Pastāv pārliecinoši pierādījumi, ka ekonomiskās sarežģītības rezultātu pieaugums samazina ienākumu nevienlīdzību. Tas ir tāpēc, ka pastāv saikne starp valsts ražošanas struktūru un ienākumu nevienlīdzību, jo ražošanas struktūras ir dažādu faktoru rezultāts no institūcijām līdz izglītībai (Hartmann et alli 2017: 10-11).

1.attēls: Latvijas ekonomikas sarežģītība: eksports 1995 – 2016 un eksports 2016. gadā

2.attēls: Zviedrijas ekonomikas sarežģītība: eksports 1995 – 2016 un eksports 2016. gadā

Avots: Ekonomikas sarežģītības atlants, Hārvardas Universitāte

Latvijā ir viens no zemākajām ekonomikas sarežģītības līmeņiem Eiropas Savienībā. Latvijas neto eksports ir viens no vismazāk sarežģītajiem, galvenokārt tie ir kokmateriāli, lauksaimniecības produkti un preces (sk. 1.attēlu iepriekš). Tajā paša laikā Zviedrijai ir viena no pasaules sarežģītākajām ekonomikām (sk. 2. attēlu), un tā ir viena no vistaisnīgākajām pasaules valstīm. Šajā gadījumā ir pilnīgi skaidra saikne starp ekonomikas sarežģītību un sociālo, labklājības, ienākumu, izglītības kvalitātes u.c. līmeni. Taisnīgi secināms, ka valstis ar augstu ienākumu līmeni eksportē sarežģītākus produktus, savukārt valstis ar zemu ienākumu līmeni ir galvenie mazāk sarežģītu produktu eksportētāji (Felipe et alli 2011).

Kopš neatkarības atgūšanas no Padomju Savienības Latvijas ekonomikas politika ir sekojusi piecām galvenajām paradigmām. Pirmkārt, valstij būtu minimāli jāiejaucas ekonomikā, tādējādi ļaujot attīstības procesam notikt pašam par sevi. Otrkārt, Latvijai ir jāattīsta banku darbība, tranzīts, tūrisms, lauksaimniecība un kokmateriāli kā galvenās ekonomikas nozares, jo Latvijas ģeogrāfiskais stāvoklis ir dabiska priekšrocība, un tāpēc, ka šīs nozares ir vieglāk attīstīt nekā ražošanu. Izņemot banku darbību, šajās nozarēs ir zems ekonomiskās sarežģītības līmenis.

Treškārt, biznesa attīstības finansēšana gandrīz pilnībā tika nodota privātajām bankām. Tā kā privātās bankas nopietni uztver risku, jo to bizness ir nopelnīt nevis zaudēt naudu, finansējot jaunus uzņēmumus un dinamiskus uzņēmumus, tad riskantās nozares kļuva par problēmu. Rezultātā tās pašas primitīvās un nesarežģītās nozares tiek finansētas, kamēr potenciāli kompleksi uzņēmumi nesaņem pietiekamu atbalstu. Ceturtkārt, darba tirgus tika reformēts, lai panāktu lielāku tirgus elastību, kā rezultātā samazinājās algas, t.i., cilvēki kļuva nabadzīgāki un nevienlīdzīgāki, kas ir viens no galvenajiem faktoriem starptautiskās konkurētspējas panākšanai. Tā kā algas ir zemas, uzņēmumiem nav motivācijas modernizēt un aizstāt darbaspēku ar kapitālu, tādējādi ražīgums salīdzinājumā ar citām valstīm ir zemāks.

Piektkārt, iepriekšējie punkti attīstīja “rentes” kultūru valstī. Ļoti bagāti ir tie, kas varēja iegūt renti no kādiem zemes gabaliem, vai tas būtu mežs vai nekustamā īpašuma aktīvi un to vērtības pieaugums. Arī ar kādu aktīvu, parasti no valsts, iegūšana un pārdošana kādam citam, parasti ārvalstu investoriem. Īsumā Latvijas ekonomikas politika no neatkarības atjaunošanas brīža ir veicinājusi nesarežģītas ekonomikas izveidošanu, kā tas redzams 1. attēlā. Rezultātā nav izstrādāta industriālā politika, kas dotu norādes valsts pārvaldes atbalstam uzņēmējdarbības attīstībai sarežģītās nozarēs.

Rīcībpolitikassekas

Sarežģītāku ekonomikas nozaru attīstīšana ir vienīgais veids, kā pastāvīgi samazināt nevienlīdzību visās tās dažādajās formās un izpausmēs. Tas jādara, palielinot gan valsts, gan privātā sektora līdzdalību valsts attīstības procesā. Pirmais solis būtu izstrādāt un ieviest valsts attīstības stratēģiju. Nākamais solis ir stimulēt inovācijas. Sarežģītas ekonomikas saglabāšana nav rezultāts kādas ekonomikas nozares, ražošanas tehnikas vai kāda konkrēta produkta ražošanas zināšanai. Tas tiek darīts, radot pastāvīgu spēju radīt jaunas produktīvas kombinācijas, procesus un produktus un vadot inovāciju procesu. Trešais solis ir koncentrēt visus valsts kontrolētos resursus, tostarp Eiropas fondus konverģencei un strukturālajai attīstībai, lai attīstītu nozares ar augstu ekonomisko sarežģītību.

Ceturtkārt, valstij ir jāizveido programmas ar privātām bankām, lai garantētu, ka jaunie uzņēmumi un uzņēmumi ļoti sarežģītās nozarēs saņem pietiekamu finansējumu ar zemām procentu likmēm. Piektkārt, ir jāveic visas nepieciešamās reformas, lai piesaistītu ārvalstu investorus, kuri vēlas izveidot Latvijā ražošanas rūpnīcas un pētniecības telpas. Fiskālās politikas pasākumi un citi stimuli, kas darbojas banku un tranzīta jomā, bieži vien nav vislabākie augstas sarežģītības nozaru attīstības atbalstam. Sestkārt, sadarbībā ar privāto sektoru ir jāsāk pārkvalifikācijas programmas uzņēmējiem, darbiniekiem un ierēdņiem. Septītkārt, ir nepieciešamas programmas sociālās nevienlīdzības mazināšanai, kamēr notiek attīstības process.

[1] Horizontāla nevienlīdzība ir starp konkrētām sociālām grupām, kuras noteic pēc rases, etniskās izcelsmes, reliģijas, reģionālās kultūras utt. (Stewart 2015: 270).

[2] Starpgrupu nevienlīdzība rodas dzimumu, rasu un šķiru mijiedarbības rezultātā. Dažas pieejas pieņem jebkuru citu dažādu kategoriju kombināciju (Anthias 2012).

[3] Kaut arī kategoriskās atšķirības tiek uzskatītas par atsevišķu talantu vai darbību variāciju rezultātu, patiesībā tās vairāk atbilst dihotomijām, piemēram, melns / balts, vīrietis / sieviete, pilsonis / ārzemnieks, musulmanis / kristietis, nevis individuālām pazīmju, tieksmju vai snieguma atšķirībām (Tilly 1998: 6-7).

[4] Šajā rakstā attīstība un izaugsme tiek saprasta Šumpētera teorijas izpratnē.

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Dažas pārdomas par nodokļu reformu

Nodokļu reforma ir raisījusi polemiku. Protams. Latvijas nodokļu politika soda uzņēmējus un strādniekus, bet ir ļoti labvēlīga turīgiem cilvēkiem, tāpēc ir diezgan liela pretestība to mainīt. Turīgie finansē partijas taču. Šis ir Flika paradoksa galvenais pamats, jeb 2010.g toreizējais AirBaltica prezidents Bertolts Fliks teica, ka “(B)ūt bagātam Latvijā ir ļoti lēti, un man tā nodokļu sistēma perfekti der. Bet būt nabagam Latvijā ir ļoti dārgi, un tas ir briesmīgi.”

Diskusija galvenokārt balstās uz diviem punktiem. Nav tā, ka atbalstu šo nodokļu reformu, bet tomēr aicinu domāt par tiem no cita uzskatījuma.

i. Ienākuma nodokļi lielām algām ir vieni no augstākajiem ES

Tas nav. Piemēram (runa iet tikai par IIN nevis par IIN+SOC+un citi):

Zviedrija: 57,1%
Dānija: 55.8%
Austrija: 55%
Beļģija: 53,7%
Nīderlande: 52%
Somija: 51,6%
Francija: 50.2%
ASV: 39.6%
Eirozona: 39%

Ir interesants pievērst uzmanību tam, ka Latvija šobrīd ir 30. vietā. Dažas valsts, kur nodokļi ir mazāk nekā Latvijā ir:

Igaunija: 20%
Moldova: 18%
Ukraina: 18%
Rumānija: 16%
Lietuva: 15%
Baltkrievija: 13%
Krievija: 13%
Bulgārija: 10%
Melnkalne: 9%

Kāds ir pirmais visacīmredzamākais secinājums? Ka IIN nodokļi attīstītās valstīs ir daudz augstāks nekā neattīstītās valstīs.

ii. Ir stiprs viedoklis, ka jauno darba nodokļu likmju un augstākas darba izmaksas  dēļ nebūs investīcijas konkurētspējīgās nozarēs, īpaši ārzemju investījas.

Tas ir mīts. Pirmkārt, ja tas būtu patiesība, ņemot vērā Latvijas esošo nodokļu slodzi, mums līdz šīm būtu investīciju bums. Mums nebija. Otrkārt, kā izskaidrot ārzemju investīcijas Skandināvijā, Vācijā, ASV, utt.? Atbilde ir vienkārša. Augstās produktivitātes nozarēs darba izmaksas nav visbūtiskākās. Citēju Risto Laulajainen and Howard A. Stafford’s “Corporate Geography Business Location Principles and Cases.” Tā ir gandrīz 25 gādu veca, bet joprojām aktuālā:

“The generalization is that relatively unsophisticated production processes requiring less skilled workers producing standardized products are more likely to be located in low-wage peripheral areas with ample labor pools; sophisticated products and processes are more likely to be found in established manufacturing regions, and often near corporate headquarters and R&D laboratories.”

Tāds ir Latvijas gadījums. Es esmu gatavs piekrist tam, ka jaunās likmes nebūs labvēlīgas Latvijas esošajiem ekonomiskajiem sektoriem. Galu galā, kopš neatkarības galvenais konkurētspējas mehānisms ir bijuši mazas algas, nevis darbu aizstāt ar kapitālu un saražot augstākās tehnoloģijas preces. Protams, ka ir izņēmumi, bet kopumā Latvijas ekonomika vēl daudz kas jāattīstās. Lai tas būtu, noteikti jāmaina esoša ekonomisko politika, jo pēc 25. gadiem tā rezultāts ir neapmierinošs.

Tāpēc diskusijai jābūt dziļakai. Jārunā nevis vienkārši par progresīvo nodokļu, bet par progresīvo fiskālo politiku kā daļa no industriālās politikas, kas mērķē uz augstās produktivitātes sektoru attīstību. Igaunijas ekonomikas produktivitāte ir ievērojami augstāka, tāpēc algas arī. Lietuva drīz mūs apsteigs. Drīzāk, tas ir rezultāts no tiem saucamiem nemateriāliem faktoriem kā izglītība, birokrātija, tiesu neatkarība, (ne)korupcija, utt..

Latvijai ir nepieciešams izveidot attīstības politiku, nevis vienkārši domāt par izaugsmi. Ļoti nopietni aicinu ņemt vērā atšķirību starp “izaugsmi” un “attīstību”. Diemžēl ekonomikas zinātne ir diezgan ideoloģiska. Vairākas pieejas, tā skaitā tā, kas ir pašlaik modē, pieņem, ka izaugsme un attīstība ir viena un tā pati lieta. Taču, izaugsme nenozīmē attīstību. Mums bija ļoti strauja izaugsme starp 2004. g. un 2008. g., bet ir skaidrs, ka tā nebija attīstība. Attīstības līmeni var konkrēti un viegli noteikt, salīdzinot valstu eksportus. Piemēram, Latvija un Zviedrija. Mēs galvenokārt eksportējam primāras preces. Zviedrija eksportē ieročus, Volvo un Scania mašīnas, IKEA (tās nav vienkārši mēbeles, bet ir koncepcija: dizains, praktiskums, kvalitāte), Ericsson telekomunikāciju iekārtas un, vēl svarīgāk, tehnoloģiju, Electrolux sadzīves tehniku, utt. Ja mūsu ekonomika turpinās augt tajos pašos sektoros kā līdz šim, mēs neattīstāmies. Vai nu mēs stagnējam, vai mēs palikām arvien vairāk attīstīto valstu aizmugurē. Izaugsmei ir jābūt ar attīstību.

Tāpēc nodokļu politikai vai drīzāk fiskālai politikai ir jābūt daļa no industriālas politikas, kas ir instruments Latvijas ekonomikas attīstībai. Esoša attīstības politikai bija piemērota 1990-jos gados un varbūt līdz pat brīdim, kad Latvijas pievienojās Eiropas Savienībai. Paldies visiem, kas palīdzēja Latvijai pāriet uz moderno ekonomiku. Tagad Latvijai vajag citu ekonomisko politiku lai attīstītos. Jādomā ārpus vecas ekonomistu paaudzes (Repše, Godmanis, utt.) teorētiskiem rāmiem un pieņēmumiem. Tie nestrādā, jo esam citā attīstības posmā un valsts ekonomikai ir citas problēmas un vajadzības.

Es vēlāk rakstīšu, kas būtu nepieciešams. Konceptuāli atbilde ir vienkārša: valsts jāatbalsta reālās ekonomikas augstas produktivitātes nozarēm, nevis finanšu sektoram, mājokļu  tirgum, baļķu eksportētājus, utt. Kā konceptu, tas ir ļoti acīmredzams un vienkārši. Lai to īstenotu reālā dzīvē, būs ļoti grūti “neredzamo spēku” dēļ.

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Gerasimov: A World on the Brink of War

As every year, General Gerasimov’s address to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences was published by the VPK (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/35591), Military-Industrial Courier, Issue No 10 (674), 15th March 2017. Below is Mark Voyger from NATO LANDCOM’s brilliant translation. My comments are in green.

A World on the Brink of War

Tracking the current challenges is not enough, it is the future ones that must be forecast
Army General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the RF AF

This article is based on the report “Contemporary Warfare and the Current Problems of the Defense of our Country” presented by the ChoGS to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences.

It was Clausewitz who compared warfare to an expanded single combat, defining it as an act of violence whose purpose is to force the adversary into acting according to our will. The prominent Russian and Soviet theoreticians from the early 20th century Andrey Snesarev and Aleksander Svechin had their considerable contribution to the development of the science of warfare. The subject of their research became the main trends in the conduct of warfare that are the result of not only the political, but also of the economic and social relations. By the early 1990s a firm understanding had been formed of warfare as the means of attaining political goals based exclusively on armed struggle.

Svechin and Snesarev are very important Russian military thinkers.  The first was the first chief of the Soviet General Staff. 

A classification was developed in the USA that includes traditional and non-traditional warfare, and in the beginning of 21st century the American theoreticians posited that hybrid warfare should be added to it. They define it as actions taken during a period, which is impossible to define purely as either war or peace.

The concept of Hybrid Warfare was fully developed by Frank Hoffman, but I remember to see a Master Thesis from some USA’s military institutional calling similar strategies “hybrid” already in the beginning of the 1990’s.  It was mostly about developments of Low Intensity Conflict. If someone find it, please drop me a line. 

“The mobilization capacities of the social networks were first revealed during the conflicts in the Middle East”

Our country’s science and practice offers a more balanced approach to the classification of contemporary armed conflicts that accounts for a larger number of parameters. At the same time, the definition of warfare is lacking in the international and domestic official documents. The Military Doctrine of the RF calls it a form of resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts by using military force.

An active discussion is ongoing in trying to clarify the term itself. Some of the scholars and specialists adhere to the classical definition. Others propose a radical revision of the views on the content and substance of the term “warfare”, as they think that armed struggle is not one of its mandatory attributes. At present one can encounter definitions, such as information, economic, hybrid warfare, and numerous other variations.

The General Staff pays due attention to the discussion of the said problem. In 2016 a discussion was organized at the Military Academy of the General Staff on the meaning of the term “warfare” under the current conditions. The said issue was being discussed during the session of the Security Council’s scientific council section. In the course of the discussions a common position was elaborated on the necessity of analyzing the characteristics and features of contemporary armed conflicts, and of revealing the trends in their emergence and evolution.

This is most the result of authors as Chekinov. Bogdanov, Maruyev and others claiming for “futurology” to be recognized as a branch of Military Sciences. The Russian General Staff has great interest in the subject.

The No-Contact Warfare has been replaced by the Hybrid One

Such conflicts of the end of the 20th and early 21st centuries differ from each other in the composition of their participants, the types of weapons used, the forms and methods of troop actions. At the same time, however, they do not exceed the limits of the overall content of warfare, while they include as components various forms of struggle – the direct armed one, along with political, diplomatic, information, and others. New features have appeared nowadays. These include the change in the ratio of contribution of one or another type of struggle into the overall political success of the war, the overwhelming superiority of one of the sides in terms of military power and economic strength.

Basically, it is a development of Low Intensity Conflict. New technologies, etc., of course changed the character of warfare.

Contemporary conflicts can be characterized by a number of features.

The experience of NATO’s operations in Yugoslavia that ushered in the age of the so-called no- contact or distance warfare, did not gain universal distribution. The reason for this was objective since the limitations of geographical, as well as economic nature impact the attainment of the goals of war. The factor of the cost of armaments, and of the war as a whole, started to play an important role in the choice of methods for conducting military actions.

He is referring to Slipchenko’s discussion about 6th Generation Warfare. Also, Putin’s idea that warfare has to be asymmetric, as explained by him already in 2006. Besides, it is clear he knows Russia doesn’t have the money to afford engaging in long traditional wars. Russia isn’t a rich country.

An important feature is the increased use of the newest robotic systems and unmanned aerial vehicles of various purposes and actions.

New forms of application of the diverse forces and means have appeared. For example, in the course of the operation in Libya, a no-flight zone was created while simultaneously imposing a naval blockade in conjunction with the joint actions of private military companies from the NATO member- states, and the armed formations of the opposition.

Here it’s clear how the Russians see the West as a mirror. If they use private military companies as mercenaries in the orst sense of the word, of course  the US and NATO do the same.

The army operating concepts of the leading states postulate that achieving information dominance is an indispensable pre-requisite of combat actions. The means of mass media and social networks are used to perform the set tasks. Simultaneously, the forces and means of information-psychological and information-technical influence are activated. Thus, the mobilization capacities of the social networks were first revealed during the conflicts in the Middle East.

The conflict in Syria became a visual example of the use of hybrid methods. It involved the simultaneous use of traditional and non-traditional actions of military, as well as non-military nature.

It’s implicit that the Hybrud part was the proteste of the populaiton agains Assad. Of course it has to be Western interference… 

During its first phase the internal Syrian contradictions were transformed into armed demonstrations of the opposition. After that, they became organized in nature with the support of foreign instructors, accompanied by active information warfare.

It’s the West again. And the United States is to blame. The CIA, the illuminati, the Free Mansonry and Soros. :-))))))

Later on, terrorist groups supplied and directed from abroad entered the fight against the government forces.

The hybrid actions are actively introduced in practice on the international arena by the USA and the NATO countries. In many respects this is conditioned by the fact that this variation of activities does not fall under the definition of aggression.

In the Western media the combination of such methods has received the name “hybrid warfare”. However, it is still premature to use this term as an established one.

I agree, Sir.

The New Perception of a Common Term

The analysis indicates a number of trends testifying of the transformation of armed conflicts in the beginning of the 21st century. Nowadays the erasing of the boundary between the state of war and peace is obvious. The negative side of hybrid actions is becoming the new perception of peacetime, when no military or other overt violent measures are used against one or another state, but its national security and sovereignty are under threat and can be violated. The range of reasons and causes for using military forces is widening, as it is activated ever more often to secure the economic interests of states under the slogans of defending democracy, or the inculcation of democratic values into one country or another.

He’s clearing referring to the USA again, but he has a point.

The emphasis of the content of conflict methods is moving toward the wide application of political, economic, diplomatic, information and other non-military means, implemented by involving the protest potential of the population.

It’s post-modern Low Intensity Conflict. 

The non-military forms and means of action have experienced unprecedented technological development, and have acquired a dangerous, often violent nature.

Their practical use can trigger the collapse of the energy, banking, economic, information and other spheres of the state’s vital functions. The example can be adduced of the impacts of the cyberattacks against Iran’s energy infrastructure sites in 2015.

Or Russian attacks against Estonia…

The analysis of the characteristics, features and trends in the evolution of contemporary conflicts demonstrates that all of them share a common feature – the use of violent military means. At the same time, almost classical armed struggle is used during some of those, such as the two US wars against Iraq or the NATO operations against Yugoslavia. In other conflicts, such as Syria, for example, the armed struggle was waged by one of the parties in the form of anti-terrorist operations, and by the enemy – in the form of actions of the illegal armed formations and terrorist groups. This way, the essence of wars in modernity and in the foreseeable future will remain the same. Their main feature is the presence of armed struggle.

This is a very important point. It isn’t only asymmetric Low Intensity Conflict (Hybrid, if you prefer). Concentional military force is and will be part of the Russian strategy.

Along with that, the question of defining the nature of warfare has not been closed, it is still relevant and requires constant studies and a thorough development.

For this purpose, the scientific-business program of the international military-technical forum “Army-2017” to be held in August of this year will include a “roundtable” discussing the topic of “Contemporary warfare and armed conflict: characteristics and features”. The scientists from the Academy of Military Science must take the most active participation in it. It is necessary to continue working on the inter-institutional standardization of the military-political and military terms and definitions.

The rise of the world’s conflict potential underlines the relevancy of a number of tasks in the sphere of our country’s defense.

The High-Precision Measures

The main among those remains the same – the guaranteed repelling of potential aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies from any direction. At the same time, it is necessary to guarantee the neutralization of the threats to the security of the country by relying on the existing forces and means in the course of performing the activities of strategic containment in peacetime. In that regard, the role and importance of forecasting the military threats and dangers increases, as it is expedient to conduct it in conjunction with the assessment of economic, information and other challenges.

“The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the RF Armed Forces will
increase fourfold by 2021”

The improvement of the capabilities of the Armed Forces is implemented by means of the balanced development of all of the troops (forces) branches and services, the mastering of high-precision weapons and the modern means of communication, reconnaissance, automated command and control, and electronic warfare. At present, a large-scale re-armament of the Strategic Rocket Forces with modern systems is underway. The navy is receiving new nuclear submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles that have no analogues in the world. The strategic aviation airplanes, our legendary missile carriers Tu-160 and Tu-95MS are being actively modernized. This will allows us to re-arm the strategic nuclear forces with 90 percent of modern weapons by 2020. The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the RF Armed Forces will increase fourfold by 2021, which will allow for guaranteeing the security of Russia along the entire perimeter of our borders. By 2021 the share of modern weapons and military hardware in the Ground Forces will be no less than 70 percent. The Aerospace Forces will receive new-generation airplanes, which will increase the combat capabilities of the air force by 50 percent. The Navy will receive modern ships armed with high-precision long- range missiles.

It WILL. One day. The important point here isn’t about they having the capabilities or not at this moment. First, it is about the strategic changes on the Russian strategy, the way of fighting. Second, that they’re trying to catch up and sooner or later they might surprose the West with some new technologies.

A considerable role in increasing the combat capabilities is played by robotics. The large-scale and substantiated application of robotic systems of various purposes will increase the effectiveness of troop actions, and will guarantee the considerable reduction of personnel loss.

It’s like an Industrial Revolution in combat capabilities. 

The Science of Preemption

Nowadays the Armed Forces are gaining combat experience in Syria. They have had the unique opportunity to check and test the new models of weapons and military hardware under complex climatic conditions. It is necessary to continue summarizing the experience gained by using the means of armed struggle during the Syrian campaign, and draw lessons for their improvement and modernization.

We must remember – victory is always achieved by using not only the material, but also the spiritual resources of the people, its cohesion and its drive for resisting aggression by using all its strengths. The military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is exerting serious efforts to restore the nation’s confidence in the army. Nowadays the Armed Forces are reaching a fundamentally new level of combat readiness, and it is enjoying the utmost support of society. In the interest of increasing their prestige further, it is important to develop the linkages between army and society, and in order to achieve that we must improve the system of training of service members and of patriotic upbringing of the youth.

Solving the current problems of our country’s defense would be impossible without studying them in a thorough and preemptive fashion. In that regard, it is worth focusing the attention on the priority tasks of the Academy of Military Science.

The study of the new forms of conflict between states and the development of efficient methods to counter that stand above all.

In other words, Russian miltary scientists will look very closely to what the US and NATO do. They will reframe what they’ve seen within their own moral system, beliefs, etc., and that will become the new developments of Russian New Generation Warfare.

A relevant task is the development of scenarios, long-term forecasts of the evolution of the military- political and strategic situation in the most important regions of the world. It is necessary to study operationally the features of contemporary armed conflicts and based on them to develop the work methodology of military command and control and the troop actions under various conditions.

General Gareev, did you understand? Enough of your guys writing about WWII. It’s the second time he saying that.

A separate study is required of the problems related to the organization and conduct of regrouping of forces (troops) to distant theaters of operations. The standard tasks of military science have not lost their relevancy, as they also need further development.

Voyennaya Misl will start to publish such articles soon. I’m ready to bet. 

 

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Is Russia Preparing for a Major War?

Russia is buying 49,265 military burial flags. Are they preparing to starting a major war or some “budgetnik” is just making money? During the entire Vietnam War the number of KIA (Killed in Action) was similar, just to have an idea. See the procurement call below (Google translation):

PURCHASE №0173100004517000101

Posted: 17/02/2017 10:16
GENERAL INFORMATION PURCHASING DOCUMENTS THE EVENT LOG

GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE PROCUREMENT

The method for determining the supplier (contractor, executor) Electronic auction
Name of an electronic platform in the information and telecommunication network “Internet” ETP NEP
E platform in the information and telecommunication network “Internet” http://www.etp-ets.ru
Accommodation carries Customer
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
purchase object Buying heraldic products (flags, banners, flags and logos) for the needs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence.
purchase Stage Submission of applications
Information about the connection with the position of the schedule Communication with the position of the schedule is not set
Number of model contracts, standard contract terms Communication with the model contract, standard terms and conditions of the contract has not been established

INFORMATION ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SUPPLIER (CONTRACTOR, EXECUTOR)

The organization that conducts placement MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Mailing address The Russian Federation, 105175, Moscow, ul. Myasnitskaya, d.37a, p.1
Location The Russian Federation, 119019, Moscow, Znamenka, House 19
Responsible Officer The administrator of a single information center Vetchinin Elizabeth B.
E-mail address dgz@mil.ru
Contact phone number 7-495-6930177
Fax
Additional Information Information is absent

INFORMATION ON THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Date and time of filing 02.17.2017 10:16
The date and time for the submission of applications 03.09.2017 8:00
Place of filing EMAIL SITE The information and telecommunications network “INTERNET»: www.etp-ets.ru
Application Procedure established in article 66 of the Federal Law of April 5, 2013 № 44-FZ “About contract system in the procurement of goods, works and services for state and municipal needs” (hereinafter – the Law № 44-FZ).
The expiration date review of the first parts of the applications of the participants 03/16/2017
Date of the auction in electronic form 03/20/2017
Time of the auction 9:00
Additional Information Information is absent

THE INITIAL (MAXIMUM) CONTRACT PRICE

The initial (maximum) contract price 36 560 002.79
Currency Russian ruble
Source of financing federal budget.
Identification procurement code
171770425226177040100104530010000244
Payment of the contract by year Information is absent

INFORMATION ABOUT THE PURCHASE OBJECT

Terms, restrictions and limitations of access to goods originating from a foreign state or group of foreign states, works and services, respectively, performed or rendered by foreign persons the documentation of the electronic auction.
NAME OF GOODS, WORKS, SERVICES CODE OKPD2 UNIT OF
MEASUREMENT
AMOUNT PRICE PER UNIT OF MEASURE. COST OF
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The logo of the Centre (integrated security management) (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 34 500,00 34 500,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem on the arms trafficking Supervision Service of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Railway Troops (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Financial Monitoring Department of the state defense order of the RF Ministry of Defense (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Western Military District (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 3.00 6 833.33 20 499.99
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
Flags for military ceremonies: The flag of the State flag of the Russian Federation for the coffin cover (Type 3.8) 13.92.29.190 PC 49265.00 509,00 25 075 885,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Eastern Military District (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 6 833.33 13 666.66
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 16,00 2 023.33 32 373.28
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Office of the state supervision of nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 5.00 6 833.33 34 166.65
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 1 Guards Engineering Brigade of Engineers (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 28 pontoon bridge brigades (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the City of Moscow (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 5 500,00 33 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Railway Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.6) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 42 750,00 171 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 750,00 2 023.33 1517 497.50
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4) 13.96.17.129 PC 5.00 23 500,00 117 500,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Central Research Institute of the test engineer troops (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4) 13.96.17.129 PC 5.00 23 500,00 117 500,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the International Mine Action Centre of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 50,00 5 500,00 275 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the eighth management of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 34 500,00 34 500,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 18 test site of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 32,00 5 500,00 176 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the federal autonomous institution of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, “the Central Army Sports Club” (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Defence Ministry (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 187 Emblem of the training center of engineering troops (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.2) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 233.33 4 933.32
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 210 Guard Emblem inter regional training center (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 66 Training Centre (interagency, methodical) (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Office of the state supervision of nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 76 single track railway battalion (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Office emblem (the construction and development of the application of the system of unmanned aerial vehicles) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 630 Emblem single track railway battalion (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the military unit 21480 (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.2) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 233.33 4 933.32
Standart OFFICIAL: Standard of 68 army corps commander 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 105 466.67 105 466.67
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.2) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 233.33 4 933.32
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Znamenny complex technique (Type 1.1) 13.92.29.190 compl 16,00 60 976.67 975 626.72
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Pantaler 13.92.29.190 PC 20,00 7 933.33 158 666.60
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Russian Federation State flag (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of military control bodies, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Grasp assistant Znamenshchikov 13.92.29.190 PC 40,00 5 400,00 216 000,00
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 40,00 17 666.67 706 666.80
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: A copy of the Victory Banner (Type 2.1) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Engineering Troops (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the federal autonomous institution of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense “Central Army Sports Club” (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
BANNERS: Znamenny complex battle flag of the military unit (Type 1) 13.92.29.190 compl 25,00 81 476.67 2036 916.75
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Signal Corps (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Flag of the Navy (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Navy (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Railway Troops (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3) 13.92.29.190 PC 3.00 15 933.33 47 799.99
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 40,00 17 666.67 706 666.80
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
Total: 36 560 002.79

BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS REQUIREMENTS

Benefits not installed
Requirements for participants 1 Uniform Requirements for participants (in accordance with Part 1 of Article 31 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ)
the documentation of the electronic auction.
2 Uniform Requirements for participants (in accordance with Paragraph 1.1 of Article 31 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ)
the documentation of the electronic auction.
Restricting participation in the definition of the supplier (contractor, executor), established in accordance with the Federal Law № 44-FZ (in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 42 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ not installed.
Place of delivery of goods, works and services Russian Federation, is contained in Appendix 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.
Terms of delivery of goods or completion of the work or the schedule of services is contained in Annex 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.

CONDITIONS OF A CONTRACT

Place of delivery of goods, works and services Russian Federation, is contained in Appendix 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.
Terms of delivery of goods or completion of the work or the schedule of services is contained in Annex 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.

SECURING APPLICATIONS

Requires software applications
The amount of security applications 1828 000.14 Russian ruble
The procedure for making money as security applications Providing the application for participation in electronic auctions can be provided only by a party to make money. Participation in the electronic auction is possible with the personal account of the purchase of a participant, open for operations to ensure the participation in this auction on the account of the operator of an electronic platform, funds for which have not implemented the blocking operations in the personal account in accordance with Part 18 of Article 44 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ, in an amount not less than the amount of security applications for participation in the electronic auction.
Payment details for the transfer of funds at evading member purchases from contract award p / c 40302810900001001901 l / s 05,951,001,870, BIC 044501002

PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT

Provision of the contract is required
The size of the contract to ensure 5484 000.42 Russian ruble
The procedure of ensuring execution of the contract, to ensure requirements, information on banking support contract Contained in the documentation of the electronic auction. Requirements for the public performance of the contract established in the documentation of the electronic auction. Banking support of a government contract: Not required.
Payment details for the contract p / c 40302810900001001901 l / s 05,951,001,870, BIC 044501002
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OSS’s Simple Sabotage Field Manual

This is sections 11,12 of the now declassified OSS’s Simple Sabotage Field Manual, a 1944 document that has been declassified. The OSS became the CIA after WWII. The full document is here.

(11) General Interference with Organizations and Production

(a) Organizations and Conferences

(1) Insist on doing everything through “channels.” Never permit short-cuts to be taken in order to, expedite decisions.

(2) Make “speeches.” Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your “points” by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. Never hesitate to make a few appropriate “patriotic” comments.

(3) When possible, refer all matters to committees, for “further study and consideration.” Attempt to make the committees as large as possible – never less than five.

(4) Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible.

(5) Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions.

(6) Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to reopen the question of the advisability of that decision.

(7) Advocate “caution.” Be “reasonable” and urge your fellow-conferees to be “reasonable” and avoid haste which might result in embarrassments or difficulties later on.

(8) Be worried about the propriety of any decision -raise the question of whether such action as is contemplated lies within the jurisdiction of the group or whether it might conflict with the policy of some higher echelon.

(b) Managers and Supervisors

(1) Demand written orders.

(2) “Misunderstand” orders. Ask endless questions or engage in long correspondence about such orders. Quibble over them when you can.

(3) Do everything possible to delay the delivery of orders. Even though parts of an order may be ready beforehand, don’t deliver it until it is completely ready.

(4) Don’t order new working materials until your current stocks have been virtually exhausted, so that the slightest delay in filling your order will mean a shutdown.

(5) Order high-quality materials which are hard to get. If you don’t get them argue about it. Warn that inferior materials will mean inferior work.

(6) In making work assignments, always sign out the unimportant jobs first. See that the important jobs are assigned to inefficient workers of poor machines.

(7) Insist on perfect work in relatively unimportant products; send back for refinishing those which have the least flaw. Approve other defective parts whose flaws are not visible to the naked eye.

(8) Make mistakes in routing so that parts and materials will be sent to the wrong place in the plant.

(9) When training new workers, give incomplete or misleading instructions.

(10) To lower morale and with it, production, be pleasant to inefficient workers; give them undeserved promotions. Discriminate against efficient workers; complain unjustly about their work.

(11) Hold conferences when there is more critical work to be done.

(12) Multiply paper work in plausible ways. Start duplicate files.

(13) Multiply the procedures and clearances involved in issuing instructions, pay checks, and so on. See that three people have to approve everything where one would do.

(14) Apply all regulations to the last letter.

(c) Office Workers

(1) Make mistakes in quantities of material when you are copying orders. Confuse similar names. Use wrong addresses.

(2) Prolong correspondence with government bureaus.

(3) Misfile essential documents.

(4) In making carbon copies, make one too few, so that an extra copying job will have to be done.

(5) Tell important callers the boss is busy or talking on another telephone.

(6) Hold up mail until the next collection.

(7) Spread disturbing rumors that sound like inside dope.

(d) Employees

(1) Work slowly. Think out ways to increase the number of movements necessary on your job: use a light hammer instead of a heavy one, try to make a small wrench do when a big one is necessary, use little force where considerable force is needed, and so on.

(2) Contrive as many interruptions to your work as you can: when changing the material on which you are working, as you would on a lathe or punch, take needless time to do it. If you are cutting, shaping or doing other measured work, measure dimensions twice as often as you need to. When you go to the lavatory, spend a longer time there than is necessary. Forget tools so that you will have to go back after them.

(3) Even if you understand the language, pretend not to understand instructions in a foreign tongue.

(4) Pretend that instructions are hard to understand, and ask to have them repeated more than once. Or pretend that you are particularly anxious to do your work, and pester the foreman with unnecessary questions.

(5) Do your work poorly and blame it on bad tools, machinery, or equipment. Complain that these things are preventing you from doing your job right.

(6) Never pass on your skill and experience to a new or less skillful worker.

(7) Snarl up administration in every possible way. Fill out forms illegibly so that they will have to be done over; make mistakes or omit requested information in forms.

(8) If possible, join or help organize a group for presenting employee problems to the management. See that the procedures adopted are as inconvenient as possible for the management, involving the presence of a large number of employees at each presentation, entailing more than one meeting for each grievance, bringing up problems which are largely imaginary, and so on.

(9) Misroute materials.

(10) Mix good parts with unusable scrap and rejected parts.

(12) General Devices for Lowering Morale and Creating Confusion

(a) Give lengthy and incomprehensible explanations when questioned.

(b) Report imaginary spies or danger to the Gestapo or police.

(e) Act stupid.

(d) Be as irritable and quarrelsome as possible without getting yourself into trouble.

(e) Misunderstand all sorts of regulations concerning such matters as rationing, transportation, traffic regulations.

(f) Complain against ersatz materials.

(g) In public treat axis nationals or quislings coldly.

(h) Stop all conversation when axis nationals or quislings enter a cafe.

(i) Cry and sob hysterically at every occasion, especially when confronted by government clerks.

(j) Boycott all movies, entertainments, concerts, newspapers which are in any way connected with the quisling authorities.

(k) Do not cooperate in salvage schemes.

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Shoigu, the Economist

Explaining growth of the military budget Shoigu refers to founder of political economy Adam Smith saying that in his work “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” he stated that defense of the country was more important than wealth and called the military art “the noblest of all arts.” Thus, Shoigu concludes that it is not worth arguing with Smith proposing an alternative “army or economy.”

Source: WPS Observer.

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Russian Hybrid War in Latvia

We just published the English version of our research “The Possibility of Societal Destabilization in Latvia: Potential National Security Threats.” It’s the result of 18 months of work using the most advanced research techniques to understand the possibilities for Russian influence in Latvia. Specifically regarding Latgale, one of the main conclusions is that “(D)espite the fact that the highest support for Russia’s narratives can be seen in Latgale, this is not a basis for separatism. A powerful contrasting tendency was also observed in Latgale – speakers of the Latgalian dialect expressed patriotic views and attitudes, supporting Latvia’s Western geo-political orientation to the largest degree. It was also established that the effectiveness of Russia’s public diplomacy activities in Latgale is low.”

Click here to download it.

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Putin’s Recent Remarks on Geopolitics: Russia is not Going to Let Itself Get Intoxicated by Military Passions

I believe many people in the West use to project their views on other people. This might explain the failure when dealing with Russia. I’ve been arguing that Russia, including Putin, are very clear about their world view, including Geopolitics. Please, read the man:

– We see how some of our partners continue stubborn attempts to retain their monopoly on geopolitical domination. They put to use centuries of experience in suppressing, weakening, and setting opponents against each other, and turn to their advantage enhanced political, economic, financial and now information levers as well. By this, I mean, for example, the practice of intervening in other countries’ internal affairs, provoking regional conflicts, exporting so-called ‘color revolutions’ and so on. In pursuing this policy, they sometimes take on as accomplices terrorists, fundamentalists, ultra-right nationalists, and even outright neo-fascists. We see direct evidence of the harm this policy causes right on our borders. Two years ago, the list of regional hotspots got the addition of Ukraine, much to our regret, where the flames of internal conflict were fanned at the cost of human lives, destruction of economic ties, and streams of refugees, including into Russia.

– We are not going to let ourselves get intoxicated by these military passions. It seems that others are trying to nudge us this way, provoke us into a costly and futile arms race so that we divert resources and effort from our great socioeconomic development tasks at home. We will not do this, but we will always ensure our reliable defense and will guarantee the security of our country and its citizens.

– Syria has found itself at the epicenter of the fight against terrorism. It is no exaggeration to say that Syria’s future will be decisive not only for the future of the Middle East. It is in Syria that the fight against terrorism is being decided, the fight against this same Islamic State that has gathered terrorists and extremists of all stripes under its banners and united them in a desire to expand throughout the entire Muslim world. We know that they have set the goal of gaining strongholds in Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, the countries of Central Asia, the regions along our borders. This is why we responded last autumn to the Syrian government’s request for help in fighting this terrorist attack. I would .like to thank once again our military service personnel, who did all they could to push back the terrorists, prevent an illegitimate external armed intervention in Syria’s affairs, and preserve Syrian statehood.

– Brexit was a decision of the British and Russia is not going to interference into this process although it will watch the divorce of London and Brussels attentively.

– Russia will accept any choice of the American people and will work with any new president of the US. We want is to work in close cooperation with the United States on international affairs, but we will not accept the approach of that part of the U.S. establishment that thinks they can decide themselves in which areas we will cooperate and in which areas they will turn up the pressure, including through sanctions. We seek a partnership based on equality and consideration of each other’s interests.

– We must put up strong resistance to the Western media’s information monopoly, including by using all available methods to support Russian media outlets operating abroad. Of course, we must also act to counter lies about Russia and not allow falsifications of history.

Source: Izvestia, July 01, 2016.

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Ukraine Doomed for a New Conflict?

The Nezavisimaya Gazeta of May 16, 2016 published an interisting editorial by Tatiana Ivzhenko, asking if Ukraine is doomed for a new conflict.

The article’s main argument is that if Poroshenko fulfills the Minsk Agreements, the country might explode.  In this case, the elections will legitimize the same people Kiev has been calling terrorists as political leaders. I think this might be extremely difficult, therefore, T. Ivzhenko has a good point. This also means that the Minsk Agreements might be flawed from the very beginning and there’s no real solution to the conflict without Russia the current leadership in the region.

The most important parts of the article are:

“From the standpoint of Western leaders, the election of new authorities with which Kiev will be obliged to sit down at a table of negotiations will put a full stop in the conflict. Therefore, the EU and the US, according to Ukrainian sources, agreed that elections in Donets Basin should take place by the end of August. It is necessary to organize them according to a special law that takes into account peculiarities of the region that the parliament of Ukraine has to adopt yet. Western leaders do not worry if Ukrainian parties will be represented at these elections if the process will be organized by the Ukrainian central election commission alone. They do not see any problem in amnestying of defenders of DNR and LNR and giving a right to run in the elections to them. The West is ready to solve the security problem by a “hybrid method”: without waiting for stopping of fighting and removal of troops, namely for the time of elections, it is necessary to relocate weapons, hardware and soldiers to security zones being in the field of vision of the OSCE mission. The main thing is to conduct the elections as soon as possible.

(…)

Sources in Ukraine say that pressure is exerted on Kiev from three sides: Western, Russian and Donetsk ones. Mikhail Pashkov, co-director of the programs of foreign policy and international security of the Razumkov Center, forecasts, “This pressure aimed at conduction of “express elections” in Donets Basin will grow stronger.” He presumes that elections in the current conditions will turn it into legalization and implementation into Ukraine of “the militarized formation controlled by the Kremlin with all its quasi-state metastases like “ministries,” “people’s councils,” “prosecutor’s offices,” “central banks,” “supreme courts” etc.” Pashkov presumes that scenario of “Russian autumn in New Russia” is not ruled out. He explains, “A full-scale hot conflict and disintegration of the country with unforeseen consequences may become a reality.” Instead of “success story” Europe will receive a new huge problem in Ukraine.

Grounds for such forecast are objective. Sociological polls organized in the last half a year by several authoritative centers demonstrate that elative majority of Ukrainians evaluate the content of the Minsk agreements negatively and do not believe that they will help establishment of peace. But in general the problem of Donets Basin can split the Ukrainian society.

According to the Razumkov Center, 56.4% of respondents are against a special status of Donets Basin (23.8% are for it); the idea of conduction of elections before full demilitarization of the region and its return under control of Ukraine is not supported by 52.5% of citizens and it is supported by 31.2% of citizens. Amnesty for defenders of DNR and LNR is not supported by 42.3% of respondents and it is not supported by 31.2% of respondents.

(…)

Konstantin Bondarenko, head of the institute of Ukrainian policy, (…) (S)peaking about the consequences to which elections in Donets Basin organized in the current conditions may lead inside Ukraine, Bondarenko states, “Ukraine is evidently simply doomed for its “night of long knives.” There are many weapons in the country, many people who have participated in fighting, many organizations that try to dictate their policy to the authorities. It will be necessary to put all this under control sooner or later, otherwise the country will turn into a European version of Somalia.”

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V Moscow Conference on International Security 2nd and 3rd Panels (Video)

The Russian MoD has been very kind to make available the panelists’ speeches of the firsts day. Unfortunately, they didn’t make available the Q&A sessions. Below you can find the videos of the 3rd (Global security and military cooperation) and 4th (Problems of War and Peace in Europe: a new security system in Europe) panels in English and with Q&A. At this time, these videos are not available anywhere else.

Nikolay N. Bordyuzha’s speech and answers were very interesting (3rd panel). In the 4th panel, it was interesting to hear to the Belarussian minister of defense, but General Sergey Makarov was able to make a great resume of the Russian strategic view.

3rd Panel

4th Panel

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