Tag Archives: Military Modernization

The Russian Military Import Substitution Program: Still Struggling

The independence of the Russian defense industry on foreign components has been on the table for years. There have been many talks about import substitution, vast sums of money were spent, but the situation hasn’t considerably changed. Since Crimea’s annexation, this issue became even more relevant. First, because of the economic sanctions. Second, because of the interdependence between the Russian and the Ukrainian military-industrial complexes.

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Another problem has been the relationship between the Armed Forces and the Russian Military-Industrial Complex, which is still problematic, although it was even worse until 2014. On the one hand, the military often complain that the industrial sector is unable to fulfill the procurement demands and that the Armed Forces’ needs aren’t matched. Quality is considerably low. On the other hand, the industrial sector complains that the Armed Forces don’t know what to procure, including the technical specifications and requirements. In other words, the industrial sector complains that the Armed Forces don’t know what they want. There’s poor planning.

Nevertheless, from 2008 the result was that the industrial lobby was able to impose its specifications and norms on the Armed Forces. In 2012, the then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov even blackmailed the Military-Industrial Complex saying that “if you don’t provide us with what we want, we’ll buy foreign on-the-shelf full-scale systems. This was one of the most critical factors for Serdyukov being substituted by Shoigu, who has been less confrontational. It didn’t work as expected, because of MoD officials lobbying the interests of the industrial sector.

The relationship deteriorated on such a scale that in December 2014, Putin decided to renew the Military-Industrial Commission (in Russian “VPK” like the newspaper). Its role has been to be a coordination platform between the MoD and the industry to promoting consensus and compromising. And since 2016 to promote import substitution and stimulate technological development.

In 2016 it was disclosed that some 800 weapons systems’ production depends on foreign components from NATO and EU countries, and the Security Council returned to the discussions about import substitution. Although it has been happening for decades, it never really happened despite the luges amounts of money invested. This time, the VPK asked the domestic industry to replace 127 items. One year later, in 2017, they managed seven. There isn’t more recent information.

The volume of civilian dual-use systems is supposed to increase by 30% in 2025 and by 50% in 2030. The logic is to follow the same model as the United States since the 1950s, the one of the military-industrial complex and military Keynesianism. There’s a good story about this. A real one. When the Americans had to go to space, they faced a problem. How to write with a fountain pen without gravity? They developed a pen for that, which gave the technical base for the modern pens we use today. And the Soviet Union? They used a pencil.

And this is the biggest problem. Most of the technology Russia has is still from Soviet times. There is no serious financing for Research and Development Programs. The Russians are also convinced that the best is to exploit possible spillovers with the oil and gas sector, but the industry lacks economic complexity. Although such spillovers might be good at the sectoral level, they won’t promote economic development. Nor reduce the dependence on Western technologies.

Another serious problem for the Russian military industry has been the war with Ukraine. Before Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, some sixty Ukrainian companies produced ship engines, and aircrafts and their components for the Russian military. It included nuclear weapons’ key components like the R-36M missile system and the Voyevoda RS-20 missile (which in NATO is known as the SS-18 Satan). It was developed in the 1980s in the Dnepropetrovsk Design Bureau “Yuzhny” and produced in the same place by “Yuzhmash.”

The Russian MoD has announced plans to dispose it, but at the same time, there is information that their service life is being extended. The obvious conclusion is that the Russians still don’t have a replacement for these systems yet. The deployment of the Sarmat (Satan 2) missiles is expected for no sooner than 2021. Another example is the TOPOL-M, which was developed in the Kyiv Arsenal Plant. There are rumors they will be completely withdrawn from service in 2021 to be replaced with Russian-made Yars and Yars-M missile systems.

The production plans of ships also had to be adjusted because there are no modern Russian ships engines. At the beginning of the modernization program, the MoD counted on the Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt’s gas turbine engines. Some ships were designed to use these engines, including the Project 11356 “Patrol Guards,” the Project 22350 “Frigates” and Project 21956 “Multi-Purpose Destroyers.” In September of 2019, the Russian government announced that the United Engine Corporation, the NPO Saturn (Rybinsk, Yaroslavl region), and the OJSC Klimov from Saint Petersburg would replace the Ukrainian engines. There isn’t a precise timing for the commissioning of the new ships.

Some import substitution has been happening in helicopters engines. The Kazan Helicopters and the JSC Kamov, which produce the Mi and the KA series, have been using engines produced by the Zaporizhzhya Motor Sich company from Ukraine. Now they are receiving the Rostech VK-2500 engine, which is more expensive and still needs a complete foreign base. Unmanned aerial vehicles are advancing more. The Forpost-R system was being produced under an Israeli license. Russian companies were able to replace all components. Another drone, the S-70 “Okhotnik” for reconnaissance and strike, was fully developed in Russia and is allegedly able to interact with the 5th generation Su-57 fighter.

Finally, the GLONASS satellites. Until 2014, the share of foreign components was 70%, mostly from the United States. Today it is approximately 40%. The Glonass-K2 satellite, with only domestic components, was expected to be ready by 2021, but there is no recent information about the program.

Import substitution was very effective in promoting South Korea’s economic development. It could work in Russia, but there is a significant barrier posed by the lack of new technologies. Before, it was possible to develop independently. The technology was free. Today, there are patents and intellectual property. One component might use multiple technologies of different owners. It is not possible to develop new technologies isolated from the rest of the world, especially when R&D is underfinanced, and the last significant technological developments were in the 1980s. One alternative is a partnership with China, which has been developing Western level technologies in some spheres, but many times ignored the international rules of property rights.

Can Russia do it? Probably not. Development based on natural resources isn’t sustainable, as discussed by the great Adam Smith already in 1786. Norway might be the exception, but it has a very complex economy. Russia’s development is to be characterized by a situation of the development of underdevelopment. In technological terms, it’ll always be catching up, unless huge, but really huge sums of money are invested in R&D, and new brains are attracted to the country. A herculean task, that, probably, won’t happen. As warfare is increasingly dependent on new technologies, with time, Russia’s operational capabilities will become outdated, forcing the Armed Forces to rely on the nuclear arsenal for deterrence and asymmetric methods for combat.

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Gerasimov: A World on the Brink of War

As every year, General Gerasimov’s address to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences was published by the VPK (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/35591), Military-Industrial Courier, Issue No 10 (674), 15th March 2017. Below is Mark Voyger from NATO LANDCOM’s brilliant translation. My comments are in green.

A World on the Brink of War

Tracking the current challenges is not enough, it is the future ones that must be forecast
Army General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the RF AF

This article is based on the report “Contemporary Warfare and the Current Problems of the Defense of our Country” presented by the ChoGS to the General Assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences.

It was Clausewitz who compared warfare to an expanded single combat, defining it as an act of violence whose purpose is to force the adversary into acting according to our will. The prominent Russian and Soviet theoreticians from the early 20th century Andrey Snesarev and Aleksander Svechin had their considerable contribution to the development of the science of warfare. The subject of their research became the main trends in the conduct of warfare that are the result of not only the political, but also of the economic and social relations. By the early 1990s a firm understanding had been formed of warfare as the means of attaining political goals based exclusively on armed struggle.

Svechin and Snesarev are very important Russian military thinkers.  The first was the first chief of the Soviet General Staff. 

A classification was developed in the USA that includes traditional and non-traditional warfare, and in the beginning of 21st century the American theoreticians posited that hybrid warfare should be added to it. They define it as actions taken during a period, which is impossible to define purely as either war or peace.

The concept of Hybrid Warfare was fully developed by Frank Hoffman, but I remember to see a Master Thesis from some USA’s military institutional calling similar strategies “hybrid” already in the beginning of the 1990’s.  It was mostly about developments of Low Intensity Conflict. If someone find it, please drop me a line. 

“The mobilization capacities of the social networks were first revealed during the conflicts in the Middle East”

Our country’s science and practice offers a more balanced approach to the classification of contemporary armed conflicts that accounts for a larger number of parameters. At the same time, the definition of warfare is lacking in the international and domestic official documents. The Military Doctrine of the RF calls it a form of resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts by using military force.

An active discussion is ongoing in trying to clarify the term itself. Some of the scholars and specialists adhere to the classical definition. Others propose a radical revision of the views on the content and substance of the term “warfare”, as they think that armed struggle is not one of its mandatory attributes. At present one can encounter definitions, such as information, economic, hybrid warfare, and numerous other variations.

The General Staff pays due attention to the discussion of the said problem. In 2016 a discussion was organized at the Military Academy of the General Staff on the meaning of the term “warfare” under the current conditions. The said issue was being discussed during the session of the Security Council’s scientific council section. In the course of the discussions a common position was elaborated on the necessity of analyzing the characteristics and features of contemporary armed conflicts, and of revealing the trends in their emergence and evolution.

This is most the result of authors as Chekinov. Bogdanov, Maruyev and others claiming for “futurology” to be recognized as a branch of Military Sciences. The Russian General Staff has great interest in the subject.

The No-Contact Warfare has been replaced by the Hybrid One

Such conflicts of the end of the 20th and early 21st centuries differ from each other in the composition of their participants, the types of weapons used, the forms and methods of troop actions. At the same time, however, they do not exceed the limits of the overall content of warfare, while they include as components various forms of struggle – the direct armed one, along with political, diplomatic, information, and others. New features have appeared nowadays. These include the change in the ratio of contribution of one or another type of struggle into the overall political success of the war, the overwhelming superiority of one of the sides in terms of military power and economic strength.

Basically, it is a development of Low Intensity Conflict. New technologies, etc., of course changed the character of warfare.

Contemporary conflicts can be characterized by a number of features.

The experience of NATO’s operations in Yugoslavia that ushered in the age of the so-called no- contact or distance warfare, did not gain universal distribution. The reason for this was objective since the limitations of geographical, as well as economic nature impact the attainment of the goals of war. The factor of the cost of armaments, and of the war as a whole, started to play an important role in the choice of methods for conducting military actions.

He is referring to Slipchenko’s discussion about 6th Generation Warfare. Also, Putin’s idea that warfare has to be asymmetric, as explained by him already in 2006. Besides, it is clear he knows Russia doesn’t have the money to afford engaging in long traditional wars. Russia isn’t a rich country.

An important feature is the increased use of the newest robotic systems and unmanned aerial vehicles of various purposes and actions.

New forms of application of the diverse forces and means have appeared. For example, in the course of the operation in Libya, a no-flight zone was created while simultaneously imposing a naval blockade in conjunction with the joint actions of private military companies from the NATO member- states, and the armed formations of the opposition.

Here it’s clear how the Russians see the West as a mirror. If they use private military companies as mercenaries in the orst sense of the word, of course  the US and NATO do the same.

The army operating concepts of the leading states postulate that achieving information dominance is an indispensable pre-requisite of combat actions. The means of mass media and social networks are used to perform the set tasks. Simultaneously, the forces and means of information-psychological and information-technical influence are activated. Thus, the mobilization capacities of the social networks were first revealed during the conflicts in the Middle East.

The conflict in Syria became a visual example of the use of hybrid methods. It involved the simultaneous use of traditional and non-traditional actions of military, as well as non-military nature.

It’s implicit that the Hybrud part was the proteste of the populaiton agains Assad. Of course it has to be Western interference… 

During its first phase the internal Syrian contradictions were transformed into armed demonstrations of the opposition. After that, they became organized in nature with the support of foreign instructors, accompanied by active information warfare.

It’s the West again. And the United States is to blame. The CIA, the illuminati, the Free Mansonry and Soros. :-))))))

Later on, terrorist groups supplied and directed from abroad entered the fight against the government forces.

The hybrid actions are actively introduced in practice on the international arena by the USA and the NATO countries. In many respects this is conditioned by the fact that this variation of activities does not fall under the definition of aggression.

In the Western media the combination of such methods has received the name “hybrid warfare”. However, it is still premature to use this term as an established one.

I agree, Sir.

The New Perception of a Common Term

The analysis indicates a number of trends testifying of the transformation of armed conflicts in the beginning of the 21st century. Nowadays the erasing of the boundary between the state of war and peace is obvious. The negative side of hybrid actions is becoming the new perception of peacetime, when no military or other overt violent measures are used against one or another state, but its national security and sovereignty are under threat and can be violated. The range of reasons and causes for using military forces is widening, as it is activated ever more often to secure the economic interests of states under the slogans of defending democracy, or the inculcation of democratic values into one country or another.

He’s clearing referring to the USA again, but he has a point.

The emphasis of the content of conflict methods is moving toward the wide application of political, economic, diplomatic, information and other non-military means, implemented by involving the protest potential of the population.

It’s post-modern Low Intensity Conflict. 

The non-military forms and means of action have experienced unprecedented technological development, and have acquired a dangerous, often violent nature.

Their practical use can trigger the collapse of the energy, banking, economic, information and other spheres of the state’s vital functions. The example can be adduced of the impacts of the cyberattacks against Iran’s energy infrastructure sites in 2015.

Or Russian attacks against Estonia…

The analysis of the characteristics, features and trends in the evolution of contemporary conflicts demonstrates that all of them share a common feature – the use of violent military means. At the same time, almost classical armed struggle is used during some of those, such as the two US wars against Iraq or the NATO operations against Yugoslavia. In other conflicts, such as Syria, for example, the armed struggle was waged by one of the parties in the form of anti-terrorist operations, and by the enemy – in the form of actions of the illegal armed formations and terrorist groups. This way, the essence of wars in modernity and in the foreseeable future will remain the same. Their main feature is the presence of armed struggle.

This is a very important point. It isn’t only asymmetric Low Intensity Conflict (Hybrid, if you prefer). Concentional military force is and will be part of the Russian strategy.

Along with that, the question of defining the nature of warfare has not been closed, it is still relevant and requires constant studies and a thorough development.

For this purpose, the scientific-business program of the international military-technical forum “Army-2017” to be held in August of this year will include a “roundtable” discussing the topic of “Contemporary warfare and armed conflict: characteristics and features”. The scientists from the Academy of Military Science must take the most active participation in it. It is necessary to continue working on the inter-institutional standardization of the military-political and military terms and definitions.

The rise of the world’s conflict potential underlines the relevancy of a number of tasks in the sphere of our country’s defense.

The High-Precision Measures

The main among those remains the same – the guaranteed repelling of potential aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies from any direction. At the same time, it is necessary to guarantee the neutralization of the threats to the security of the country by relying on the existing forces and means in the course of performing the activities of strategic containment in peacetime. In that regard, the role and importance of forecasting the military threats and dangers increases, as it is expedient to conduct it in conjunction with the assessment of economic, information and other challenges.

“The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the RF Armed Forces will
increase fourfold by 2021”

The improvement of the capabilities of the Armed Forces is implemented by means of the balanced development of all of the troops (forces) branches and services, the mastering of high-precision weapons and the modern means of communication, reconnaissance, automated command and control, and electronic warfare. At present, a large-scale re-armament of the Strategic Rocket Forces with modern systems is underway. The navy is receiving new nuclear submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles that have no analogues in the world. The strategic aviation airplanes, our legendary missile carriers Tu-160 and Tu-95MS are being actively modernized. This will allows us to re-arm the strategic nuclear forces with 90 percent of modern weapons by 2020. The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the RF Armed Forces will increase fourfold by 2021, which will allow for guaranteeing the security of Russia along the entire perimeter of our borders. By 2021 the share of modern weapons and military hardware in the Ground Forces will be no less than 70 percent. The Aerospace Forces will receive new-generation airplanes, which will increase the combat capabilities of the air force by 50 percent. The Navy will receive modern ships armed with high-precision long- range missiles.

It WILL. One day. The important point here isn’t about they having the capabilities or not at this moment. First, it is about the strategic changes on the Russian strategy, the way of fighting. Second, that they’re trying to catch up and sooner or later they might surprose the West with some new technologies.

A considerable role in increasing the combat capabilities is played by robotics. The large-scale and substantiated application of robotic systems of various purposes will increase the effectiveness of troop actions, and will guarantee the considerable reduction of personnel loss.

It’s like an Industrial Revolution in combat capabilities. 

The Science of Preemption

Nowadays the Armed Forces are gaining combat experience in Syria. They have had the unique opportunity to check and test the new models of weapons and military hardware under complex climatic conditions. It is necessary to continue summarizing the experience gained by using the means of armed struggle during the Syrian campaign, and draw lessons for their improvement and modernization.

We must remember – victory is always achieved by using not only the material, but also the spiritual resources of the people, its cohesion and its drive for resisting aggression by using all its strengths. The military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is exerting serious efforts to restore the nation’s confidence in the army. Nowadays the Armed Forces are reaching a fundamentally new level of combat readiness, and it is enjoying the utmost support of society. In the interest of increasing their prestige further, it is important to develop the linkages between army and society, and in order to achieve that we must improve the system of training of service members and of patriotic upbringing of the youth.

Solving the current problems of our country’s defense would be impossible without studying them in a thorough and preemptive fashion. In that regard, it is worth focusing the attention on the priority tasks of the Academy of Military Science.

The study of the new forms of conflict between states and the development of efficient methods to counter that stand above all.

In other words, Russian miltary scientists will look very closely to what the US and NATO do. They will reframe what they’ve seen within their own moral system, beliefs, etc., and that will become the new developments of Russian New Generation Warfare.

A relevant task is the development of scenarios, long-term forecasts of the evolution of the military- political and strategic situation in the most important regions of the world. It is necessary to study operationally the features of contemporary armed conflicts and based on them to develop the work methodology of military command and control and the troop actions under various conditions.

General Gareev, did you understand? Enough of your guys writing about WWII. It’s the second time he saying that.

A separate study is required of the problems related to the organization and conduct of regrouping of forces (troops) to distant theaters of operations. The standard tasks of military science have not lost their relevancy, as they also need further development.

Voyennaya Misl will start to publish such articles soon. I’m ready to bet. 

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Is Russia Preparing for a Major War?

Russia is buying 49,265 military burial flags. Are they preparing to starting a major war or some “budgetnik” is just making money? During the entire Vietnam War the number of KIA (Killed in Action) was similar, just to have an idea. See the procurement call below (Google translation):

PURCHASE №0173100004517000101

Posted: 17/02/2017 10:16
GENERAL INFORMATION PURCHASING DOCUMENTS THE EVENT LOG

GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE PROCUREMENT

The method for determining the supplier (contractor, executor) Electronic auction
Name of an electronic platform in the information and telecommunication network “Internet” ETP NEP
E platform in the information and telecommunication network “Internet” http://www.etp-ets.ru
Accommodation carries Customer
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
purchase object Buying heraldic products (flags, banners, flags and logos) for the needs of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence.
purchase Stage Submission of applications
Information about the connection with the position of the schedule Communication with the position of the schedule is not set
Number of model contracts, standard contract terms Communication with the model contract, standard terms and conditions of the contract has not been established

INFORMATION ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SUPPLIER (CONTRACTOR, EXECUTOR)

The organization that conducts placement MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Mailing address The Russian Federation, 105175, Moscow, ul. Myasnitskaya, d.37a, p.1
Location The Russian Federation, 119019, Moscow, Znamenka, House 19
Responsible Officer The administrator of a single information center Vetchinin Elizabeth B.
E-mail address dgz@mil.ru
Contact phone number 7-495-6930177
Fax
Additional Information Information is absent

INFORMATION ON THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Date and time of filing 02.17.2017 10:16
The date and time for the submission of applications 03.09.2017 8:00
Place of filing EMAIL SITE The information and telecommunications network “INTERNET»: www.etp-ets.ru
Application Procedure established in article 66 of the Federal Law of April 5, 2013 № 44-FZ “About contract system in the procurement of goods, works and services for state and municipal needs” (hereinafter – the Law № 44-FZ).
The expiration date review of the first parts of the applications of the participants 03/16/2017
Date of the auction in electronic form 03/20/2017
Time of the auction 9:00
Additional Information Information is absent

THE INITIAL (MAXIMUM) CONTRACT PRICE

The initial (maximum) contract price 36 560 002.79
Currency Russian ruble
Source of financing federal budget.
Identification procurement code
171770425226177040100104530010000244
Payment of the contract by year Information is absent

INFORMATION ABOUT THE PURCHASE OBJECT

Terms, restrictions and limitations of access to goods originating from a foreign state or group of foreign states, works and services, respectively, performed or rendered by foreign persons the documentation of the electronic auction.
NAME OF GOODS, WORKS, SERVICES CODE OKPD2 UNIT OF
MEASUREMENT
AMOUNT PRICE PER UNIT OF MEASURE. COST OF
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The logo of the Centre (integrated security management) (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 34 500,00 34 500,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem on the arms trafficking Supervision Service of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Railway Troops (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Financial Monitoring Department of the state defense order of the RF Ministry of Defense (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Western Military District (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 3.00 6 833.33 20 499.99
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
Flags for military ceremonies: The flag of the State flag of the Russian Federation for the coffin cover (Type 3.8) 13.92.29.190 PC 49265.00 509,00 25 075 885,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Eastern Military District (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 6 833.33 13 666.66
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 16,00 2 023.33 32 373.28
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Office of the state supervision of nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 5.00 6 833.33 34 166.65
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 1 Guards Engineering Brigade of Engineers (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 28 pontoon bridge brigades (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the City of Moscow (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 5 500,00 33 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Railway Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.6) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 42 750,00 171 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 750,00 2 023.33 1517 497.50
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4) 13.96.17.129 PC 5.00 23 500,00 117 500,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Central Research Institute of the test engineer troops (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4) 13.96.17.129 PC 5.00 23 500,00 117 500,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the International Mine Action Centre of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 50,00 5 500,00 275 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the eighth management of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 34 500,00 34 500,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 18 test site of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 32,00 5 500,00 176 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the federal autonomous institution of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, “the Central Army Sports Club” (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Defence Ministry (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 187 Emblem of the training center of engineering troops (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.2) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 233.33 4 933.32
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 210 Guard Emblem inter regional training center (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 66 Training Centre (interagency, methodical) (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of Engineering Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
FLAGS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FLAGPOLES and units: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 11,00 2 023.33 22 256.63
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the Office of the state supervision of nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Emblem 76 single track railway battalion (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.3) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 100,00 4 400,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Office emblem (the construction and development of the application of the system of unmanned aerial vehicles) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 4.1) 13.96.17.129 PC 2.00 34 500,00 69 000,00
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: 630 Emblem single track railway battalion (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.4) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 6 910,00 6 910,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 3.5) 13.92.29.190 PC 1.00 11 966.67 11 966.67
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag Signal Corps (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 2.00 5 500,00 11 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “PATRIOT”: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS on the flagpole PARK “patriots”: The flag of the military authorities, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 3.7) 13.92.29.190 PC 6.00 2 023.33 12 139.98
EMBLEM FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The emblem of the military unit 21480 (Type 4.2) 13.96.17.129 PC 1.00 6 833.33 6 833.33
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.2) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 233.33 4 933.32
Standart OFFICIAL: Standard of 68 army corps commander 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 105 466.67 105 466.67
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.2) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 1 233.33 4 933.32
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Znamenny complex technique (Type 1.1) 13.92.29.190 compl 16,00 60 976.67 975 626.72
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Pantaler 13.92.29.190 PC 20,00 7 933.33 158 666.60
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Russian Federation State flag (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of military control bodies, formations, military units and organizations of the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Grasp assistant Znamenshchikov 13.92.29.190 PC 40,00 5 400,00 216 000,00
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Chemical Corps (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 40,00 17 666.67 706 666.80
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag intelligence units and formations (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: A copy of the Victory Banner (Type 2.1) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Engineering Troops (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the federal autonomous institution of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense “Central Army Sports Club” (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
BANNERS: Znamenny complex battle flag of the military unit (Type 1) 13.92.29.190 compl 25,00 81 476.67 2036 916.75
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: The flag of the Land Forces (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Signal Corps (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Missile Forces and Artillery (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of formations and military units of nuclear maintenance (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of formations and military units of electronic warfare (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Western Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
Heraldic PROPERTY FOR VICTORY PARADE MAY 9: Flag of the Navy (Type 2) 13.92.29.190 compl 1.00 18 233.33 18 233.33
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Navy (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag Railway Troops (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Southern Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of aerospace forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Central Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3) 13.92.29.190 PC 3.00 15 933.33 47 799.99
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Navy (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Strategic Missile Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: State flag of the Russian Federation (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 40,00 17 666.67 706 666.80
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: The flag of the Airborne Troops (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 10,00 17 666.67 176 666.70
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Army Air Defence (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 3.00 17 666.67 53 000,01
FLAGS FOR PLACEMENT INDOOR: Flag of the Eastern Military District (Type 2.2) 13.92.29.190 compl 11,00 17 666.67 194 333.37
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Russian Federation State flag (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 4.00 5 500,00 22 000,00
FLAGS ON BUILDINGS FLAGPOLES MO: Flag of the Land Forces (Type 3.1) 13.92.29.190 PC 8.00 5 500,00 44 000,00
Total: 36 560 002.79

BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS REQUIREMENTS

Benefits not installed
Requirements for participants 1 Uniform Requirements for participants (in accordance with Part 1 of Article 31 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ)
the documentation of the electronic auction.
2 Uniform Requirements for participants (in accordance with Paragraph 1.1 of Article 31 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ)
the documentation of the electronic auction.
Restricting participation in the definition of the supplier (contractor, executor), established in accordance with the Federal Law № 44-FZ (in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 42 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ not installed.
Place of delivery of goods, works and services Russian Federation, is contained in Appendix 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.
Terms of delivery of goods or completion of the work or the schedule of services is contained in Annex 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.

CONDITIONS OF A CONTRACT

Place of delivery of goods, works and services Russian Federation, is contained in Appendix 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.
Terms of delivery of goods or completion of the work or the schedule of services is contained in Annex 1 to the number of documentation about the electronic auction.

SECURING APPLICATIONS

Requires software applications
The amount of security applications 1828 000.14 Russian ruble
The procedure for making money as security applications Providing the application for participation in electronic auctions can be provided only by a party to make money. Participation in the electronic auction is possible with the personal account of the purchase of a participant, open for operations to ensure the participation in this auction on the account of the operator of an electronic platform, funds for which have not implemented the blocking operations in the personal account in accordance with Part 18 of Article 44 of the Federal Law № 44-FZ, in an amount not less than the amount of security applications for participation in the electronic auction.
Payment details for the transfer of funds at evading member purchases from contract award p / c 40302810900001001901 l / s 05,951,001,870, BIC 044501002

PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT

Provision of the contract is required
The size of the contract to ensure 5484 000.42 Russian ruble
The procedure of ensuring execution of the contract, to ensure requirements, information on banking support contract Contained in the documentation of the electronic auction. Requirements for the public performance of the contract established in the documentation of the electronic auction. Banking support of a government contract: Not required.
Payment details for the contract p / c 40302810900001001901 l / s 05,951,001,870, BIC 044501002

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Russia’s Military Modernization 2015

Russia’s plans of military modernization are quite ambitious. They result from the operational needs determined by New Generation Warfare. In Putin’s own words “our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, and less costly.” In other words, it’s about adapting hardware (the Armed Forces) to a new software (New Generation Warfare). One question, however, is if the sanctions are affecting the modernization plans. Accordingly to the numbers presented by the Russian MoD during session of the Board in March 11, the answer is a clear no. In 2015, 97% of the modernization was fulfilled. By now, 47% of the armament and hardware of the Russian Armed Forces are modernized.

kl2015_final-en

Overall, the troops received around 4,000 major advanced weapons and military equipment, including 96 aircraft, 81 helicopter, 2 multi-purpose submarines, 152 anti-aircraft missile systems, 291 radars, more than 400 pieces of artillery and armored vehicles. These equipment are already in operation and were used in Syria. In details: Continue reading Facebooktwitterpinterestlinkedinmail