The current conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh began in the second half of the 1980s, but its roots are deeper, reaching back at least to the first quarter of the 20th century. In this lecture, Dr. Tomáš Hoch places these problematic aspects of mutual Armenian-Azerbaijani relations in their historical context and links them with the current conflict and the future.
Increasingly capable and intrusive digital information technologies, advanced dual-use military capabilities, and diffused global power structures will reshape future crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries and challenge traditional ways of thinking about escalation and stability. This emerging security environment will require new concepts and tools to manage the risk of unintended escalation and reduce nuclear dangers.
Many Western Russian specialists wrote about this document, including myself. This piece is of special importance, since it was written by Major General Sterlin, the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and Colonel A.L. Khryapin, the chief researcher at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces for an internal audience, mostly to the Russian Armed Forces troops. This means it is the official position of the Armed Forces and any analysis must take it into the consideration. My comments are in green.
The highest priority of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of national security is to ensure nuclear deterrence as the basis for strategic deterrence
Major General Sterlin A.E., Head of the Directorate of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Honored Military Specialist of the Russian Federation
Colonel Khryapin A.L. – Chief Researcher at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Doctor of Military Sciences
Krasnaya zvezda, August 7, 2020, p. 3
The growing negative trends in the world, accompanying the process of the formation of a new system of global and regional security, contributes to the creation of prerequisites for the activation of current (as well as emergence of new) threats to the military security of the Russian Federation, which may develop into military conflicts of various scales and intensity.
The most important postulate of ensuring the military security of our state is the guaranteed deterrence of any potential enemy, as well as part of a coalition, from unleashing military aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies. It is based on the combat capabilities of the domestic Armed Forces (primarily nuclear forces) to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the aggressor in any, even the most critical conditions of the situation (retaliation strike).
That is why the top priority of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of military and national security in general is to ensure nuclear deterrence as the basis for strategic deterrence.
The official views of the Russian Federation on nuclear deterrence in modern conditions were publicly declared on June 2, 2020 in the “Fundaments of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence” (hereinafter – the Fundaments). It should be emphasized that the appearance of the document of this level in public space occurred for the first time in the entire history of the Soviet Union – and the Russian Federation as its legal successor.
There isn’t anything really new in this document. It is an amalgamation of other documents. The Military Doctrine is still a better document reflecting the views on nuclear deterrence.
Being the document of strategic planning in the field of military security, the Fundaments define the dangers and threats, in order to neutralize which nuclear deterrence is carried out, the basic principles and subjects of deterrence and, most importantly, the conditions for a possible transition to the use of nuclear weapons.
The publication of the Fundamentals caused a wide response in foreign and domestic media and came as a surprise to most experts in the field of nuclear weapons, whose opinions diverged on a number of key provisions of this document.
For example, the media of the United States and its NATO allies emphasize the “aggressiveness” of Russia’s policy, its desire to “justify the creation of its new strategic weapons,” “lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons,” and split the bloc’s ranks. In order to intimidate its NATO allies, especially on the eastern flank, the United States credits Russia with a non-existent concept of “escalation for escalation.”
The concept exists and was discussed in many Russian publications. Two good examples are: V.V. Kruglov and M.E. Sosnovskiy, “On the role of nonstrategic nuclear means in nuclear deterrence,” Military Thought, no. 6 (1997); V.I. Levshin, A.V. Nedelin, and M.E. Sosnovskiy, “On the employment of nuclear weapons for the de-escalation of military actions,” Military Thought, no. 3 (1999). A fair question is if is it doctrine or not.
More balanced publications by “neutral” specialists speak of Russia’s desire to give international legitimacy to Russian initiatives in the field of nuclear deterrence amid aggressive American steps to build up strike weapons and break the system of international arms control treaties.
At the same time, a number of Western experts and most domestic experts note the timeliness of the document’s appearance and Russia’s desire to curb the arms race unleashed by the United States, the militarization of space, the modernization of the American missile defense and the demolition of the international security system. They view the declaration of conditions for a possible transition to the use of nuclear weapons as a warning about the futility of “force pressure” on Russia and its readiness for armed defense of its national interests.
For an objective assessment of Russia’s approach to nuclear deterrence, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the military-political conditions under which our state took a truly unprecedented step and for the first time in the history of possession of nuclear weapons published its vision of its role and place in the overall national security system.
The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identifies the following key provisions that have a significant impact on nuclear deterrence:
– for the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been declared an adversary of the United States with all the ensuing consequences;
– the possibility of the preventive use of nuclear weapons has been declared;
– it is planned to radically re-equip the nuclear forces, including the creation of new modern sea-based cruise missiles and ultra-low-power nuclear weapons.
Well, because the Russian have been doing this too, especially following the concept of 6th Generation Warfare. General Gerasimov openly stated this is a clear objective of the Russian Armed Forces in some speeches.
At the same time, nuclear weapons with the creation of such ammunition, in fact, become “weapons of the battlefield”, which, of course, will lead to a decrease in the threshold for their use.
Some people argue that, during the Cold War, Russian commanders considered nuclear weapons just another weapon. I really don’t remember the source, but remember this discussion. It might not be true.
Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the new nuclear doctrine in the United States, the concept of missile defense development with a number of new provisions was adopted:
– the main focus of the global missile defense system is to neutralize missile threats of all types, primarily from Russia and China, therefore, deployed components, including the European missile defense system, are initially directed against Russian strategic missiles;
– the creation of strike weapons of the missile defense space echelon is declared, that is, there is a return to the 40-year-old Strategic Defense Initiative program, within which the widest range of such means was considered: kinetic miniature interceptors, space lasers, space platforms with weapons based on new physical principles;
– it is planned to recreate airborne laser weapon systems, including those based on a heavy-class unmanned aerial vehicle;
– a new line of interception of ballistic missiles is introduced, the so-called “zero” echelon of missile defense, when the impact on ballistic missiles is carried out not in flight, but at launch positions, that is, a strike is performed at launchers in the positional areas of missile divisions, at aircraft at home airfields and missile carriers in naval bases.
It should be emphasized that the introduction of the zero echelon of missile defense erases the line between offensive (strike) and defensive weapons.
The destabilizing factors should include the creation of space forces in the United States in 2019 and their readiness to deploy strike weapons in space, since in accordance with the Defense Space Strategy of the US Department of Defense, announced in June 2020, space has been declared a theatre for conducting military operations.
In our opinion, all these steps by the American leadership are aimed at implementing the Global Strike concept with the use of promising strike weapons, including hypersonic ones, but with only one proviso – that all these weapons can also be nuclear.
Russia too. The question is to develop the technology.
It all came together – all the steps taken by the United States in the field of strategic weapons over the past two decades are links in one chain and are aimed at achieving military-technical superiority of the United States in order to maintain its global leadership in the world and ensure, as it seems to them, victory in possible future wars over any country in the world, primarily over Russia, including due to its economic weakening by being drawn into another arms race.
We must not forget about the US allies in the NATO bloc either. Taken together, NATO has a significant advantage over Russia in systems of strategic non-nuclear weapons and general-purpose forces, which in the context of the bloc’s expansion and its approach directly to the borders of Russia forces our state to respond to existing military threats and threats to its security.
In order to bring the Russian position on nuclear deterrence to the attention of the global community and the military-political leadership of the states – potential adversaries, there were declared a number of conceptual provisions set out in the Fundaments.
1. Once again, it has been doctrinally confirmed that the “nuclear policy” of the Russian Federation is purely defensive in nature.
This is not a mere declaration, but the cornerstone of the general policy of our state, on which strategic deterrence has been and is being built. Russia is not going to attack anyone, but will take all steps to neutralize any aggression against our country. This approach reflects a strategy of active deterrence and can be described as “active defense”. At the same time, Russia is making and will make all the necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat.
2. Nuclear deterrence is aimed at ensuring that the potential adversary, including the coalition, understands the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against Russia and its allies – inflicting unacceptable damage on it in a retaliatory strike.
In its essence, nuclear deterrence is a specific form of the reflexive policy of our state, carried out by influencing mainly the military-political leadership of a potential adversary through the conviction of the inevitability of negative consequences for him as a result of the guaranteed use by the Russian Federation of forces and means of nuclear deterrence.
3. The core of nuclear deterrence is the combat capabilities of nuclear forces of various basing, therefore, maintaining the nuclear potential at a level sufficient to ensure deterrence is one of the priority tasks of our state.
At the same time, the minimum sufficiency of combat-ready forces and means is stated, capable, due to the rationality of their structure and composition, methods of use, as well as high combat readiness, to ensure the infliction of unacceptable damage to any potential enemy in any development of the military-political and strategic situation.
This means that Russia will not be drawn into a grueling nuclear arms race; priority is given not to quantitative, but to their qualitative composition.
4. It was emphasized that the main military threats, to neutralize which nuclear deterrence is being carried out, emanate from the collective West and are associated with the build-up of general-purpose groupings near the borders of the Russian Federation. These groupings, among other things, are armed with means of delivering nuclear weapons, with the deployment of systems and means Missile defense, strike weapons for various purposes and basing, including space.
5. Two groups of states are identified as subjects of nuclear deterrence:
– individual states possessing nuclear and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction or significant combat potential of general-purpose forces that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, as well as military coalitions (blocs, alliances) with the participation of these states;
– states that provide their national territory for the deployment of strategic offensive weapons (cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic aircrafts, attack unmanned aerial vehicles), strategic anti-missile defense systems, radar stations of the nuclear missile strike warning system, nuclear weapons and (or) others types of weapons of mass destruction of other states that can be used against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
The point here is, in clear words, Poland and the Baltic States.
The first group of states does not raise questions, while the highlighting of the second group is a warning to the leadership of these states that they have to think very well before giving permission to deploy strategic offensive weapons of other states on their territory.
6. The above principles of nuclear deterrence are well known and determine the main directions of our state’s policy to ensure deterrence. This also applies to the centralization of control, the constant readiness of forces and means, and the rationality of their structure and composition.
Compliance with international obligations in the field of arms control is a priority for Russia. Our state has always respected and will abide by all the international obligations it has assumed.
The continuity of measures to ensure deterrence means that all measures of a military and non-military nature are carried out in a comprehensive manner within the framework of the nuclear deterrence mechanism in peacetime, during the period of an imminent threat of aggression and in wartime at all stages of the emergence and development of a military conflict, up to the beginning of the massive use of nuclear weapons.
The adaptability of deterrence to military threats presupposes the choice of certain deterrent measures (actions) depending on the existing and emerging military threats to Russia’s security, which are determined on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the military-political and strategic situation in the world and military dangers for Russia in the short, medium-term and long-term perspective.
7. For the first time in a public space, conditions have been declared that determine the possibility of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.
The first condition is related to the receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and (or) its allies. The very fact of a ballistic missile launch will be recorded by a missile attack warning system.
At the same time, there will be no possibility to determine the type of its equipment (nuclear or non-nuclear). Therefore, any attacking missile will be positioned as a nuclear-armed missile. Information about the launch of the missile in automatic mode will be communicated to the military-political leadership of Russia, which, depending on the prevailing situation, will determine the scale of the response actions of the nuclear forces.
Conditions on the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, on the impact on critical targets of Russia, on aggression with the use of conventional weapons should not raise questions from experts.
If the question is posed about target setting of aggression against Russia, which has a significant nuclear potential, one can give a concrete answer – the destruction of Russia as a state.
Thus, in the Fundamentals, Russia has outlined “red lines”, which we do not advise anyone to cross. If a potential adversary decides to do this, then the answer will no doubt be overwhelming.
At the same time, the specification of response actions (where, when, how much) will be determined by the military-political leadership of Russia, depending on the situation.
Last night, the forces of group “A” of the KGB with the support of the OMON GUVD of the Minsk city executive committee detained 32 militants of the foreign private military company Wagner. In addition, one more person was found and detained in the south of the country.
According to sources from the Belarussian law enforcement agencies, there was information about the arrival of more than 200 militants in Belarus to engage in destabilization operations during the Presidential election campaign. Each man had small hand luggage and three large heavy suitcases.
Upon arrival in the capital on the night of July 24-25, the group checked into one of the hotels in Minsk and was supposed to check out on July 25. They left the hotel on July 27 and moved to one of the sanatoriums in the Minsk region.
According to the sanatorium’s administration, the visitors drew attention to their uncharacteristic behavior for Russian tourists and uniform military-style clothing. They did not use alcohol, did not visit entertainment establishments, kept themselves apart, and tried to not attract attention. They carefully studied the territory and surroundings of the sanatorium in small groups.
The list of detained citizens of the Russian Federation is:
1. Milaev Arem Viktorovich, born 02/01/1981;
2. Bakhtigaraev Takhir Minigayanovich, born on April 18, 1980;
3. Altukhov Alexander Viktorovich, born on April 18, 1980;
4. Lee Vladimir Alexandrovich, born on July 26, 1989;
5. Kozhevnikov Andrey Yurievich, born January 16, 1980;
6. Sapronov Alexey Vladimirovich, born on 08.07.1978;
7. Shcherbakov Sergey Vladimirovich, born on July 21, 1981;
8. Volgin Alexey Vladimirovich, born June 21, 1975;
9. Driga Oleg Igorevich, born 03.06.1986;
10. Pavlenko Sergey Grigorievich, born June 25, 1976;
11. Rudenko Alexander Svyatoslavovich, born on 26.12.1984;
12. Kharitonov Denis Yurievich, born on March 16, 1980;
13. Sidorov Sergey Alexandrovich, born 01.01.1972;
14. Koshman Maxim Yaroslavovich, born on 06.09.1981,
15. Bubnov Sergey Gennadievich, born on 08.01.1971;
16. Nizhnik Pavel Alexandrovich, born June 24, 1987;
17. Selikhov Vladimir Ivanovich, born on 04.10.1986;
18. Fetisov Gennady Evgenievich, born on October 22, 1986;
19. Fomin Mikhail Nikolaevich, born 03/07/1973,
20. Ekimov Vladimir Sergeevich, born on October 19, 1973;
21. Karimov Rinat, born on August 15, 1984;
22. Shubin Alexander, born January 15, 1996;
23. Shelomentsev Igor, born on August 18, 1975;
24. Maslov Sergey Alekseevich, born September 29, 1988;
25. Zaydulen Rustem, born 06.10.1974;
26. Tokarenko Andrey Viktorovich, born on January 24, 1965;
27. Serdyukov Andrey Viktorovich, born on August 16, 1975;
28. Sergeev Fedor Mikhailovich, born 05.17.1987;
29. Tanov Rafik Kabulovich, born on April 30, 1975;
30. Zyablitsev Evgeniy Sergeevich, 23.11.1992;
31. Samarin Pavel Lvovich, 11.11.1981 year of birth;
32. Bakunovich Andrey Petrovich, born on 30.12.1977;
33. Shatskiy Artem, born July 30, 1982.
Last week the British Parliament published a report about Russian malign influence in the UK. A considerable debate followed, ignoring Russia’s motivations and strategic objectives in the United Kingdom and in the West. Russia’s ambitions were described as “Russia’s substantive aims, however, are relatively limited: it wishes to be seen as a resurgent ‘great power’ – in particular, dominating the countries of the former USSR – and to ensure that the privileged position of its leadership clique is not damaged.” It’s much more than that. This view is too simplistic and obscures the understanding of their objectives. The discussions have been concentrating on “Putin and his cronies”, “the mafia state”, etc. This obfuscates the debate about our own problems, which they use against us. Besides, it doesn’t help much to understand their way of thinking and gives the false feeling to know what they’re after.
The independence of the Russian defense industry on foreign components has been on the table for years. There have been many talks about import substitution, vast sums of money were spent, but the situation hasn’t considerably changed. Since Crimea’s annexation, this issue became even more relevant. First, because of the economic sanctions. Second, because of the interdependence between the Russian and the Ukrainian military-industrial complexes.
Another problem has been the relationship between the Armed Forces and the Russian Military-Industrial Complex, which is still problematic, although it was even worse until 2014. On the one hand, the military often complain that the industrial sector is unable to fulfill the procurement demands and that the Armed Forces’ needs aren’t matched. Quality is considerably low. On the other hand, the industrial sector complains that the Armed Forces don’t know what to procure, including the technical specifications and requirements. In other words, the industrial sector complains that the Armed Forces don’t know what they want. There’s poor planning.
Nevertheless, from 2008 the result was that the industrial lobby was able to impose its specifications and norms on the Armed Forces. In 2012, the then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov even blackmailed the Military-Industrial Complex saying that “if you don’t provide us with what we want, we’ll buy foreign on-the-shelf full-scale systems. This was one of the most critical factors for Serdyukov being substituted by Shoigu, who has been less confrontational. It didn’t work as expected, because of MoD officials lobbying the interests of the industrial sector.
The relationship deteriorated on such a scale that in December 2014, Putin decided to renew the Military-Industrial Commission (in Russian “VPK” like the newspaper). Its role has been to be a coordination platform between the MoD and the industry to promoting consensus and compromising. And since 2016 to promote import substitution and stimulate technological development.
In 2016 it was disclosed that some 800 weapons systems’ production depends on foreign components from NATO and EU countries, and the Security Council returned to the discussions about import substitution. Although it has been happening for decades, it never really happened despite the luges amounts of money invested. This time, the VPK asked the domestic industry to replace 127 items. One year later, in 2017, they managed seven. There isn’t more recent information.
The volume of civilian dual-use systems is supposed to increase by 30% in 2025 and by 50% in 2030. The logic is to follow the same model as the United States since the 1950s, the one of the military-industrial complex and military Keynesianism. There’s a good story about this. A real one. When the Americans had to go to space, they faced a problem. How to write with a fountain pen without gravity? They developed a pen for that, which gave the technical base for the modern pens we use today. And the Soviet Union? They used a pencil.
And this is the biggest problem. Most of the technology Russia has is still from Soviet times. There is no serious financing for Research and Development Programs. The Russians are also convinced that the best is to exploit possible spillovers with the oil and gas sector, but the industry lacks economic complexity. Although such spillovers might be good at the sectoral level, they won’t promote economic development. Nor reduce the dependence on Western technologies.
Another serious problem for the Russian military industry has been the war with Ukraine. Before Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, some sixty Ukrainian companies produced ship engines, and aircrafts and their components for the Russian military. It included nuclear weapons’ key components like the R-36M missile system and the Voyevoda RS-20 missile (which in NATO is known as the SS-18 Satan). It was developed in the 1980s in the Dnepropetrovsk Design Bureau “Yuzhny” and produced in the same place by “Yuzhmash.”
The Russian MoD has announced plans to dispose it, but at the same time, there is information that their service life is being extended. The obvious conclusion is that the Russians still don’t have a replacement for these systems yet. The deployment of the Sarmat (Satan 2) missiles is expected for no sooner than 2021. Another example is the TOPOL-M, which was developed in the Kyiv Arsenal Plant. There are rumors they will be completely withdrawn from service in 2021 to be replaced with Russian-made Yars and Yars-M missile systems.
The production plans of ships also had to be adjusted because there are no modern Russian ships engines. At the beginning of the modernization program, the MoD counted on the Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt’s gas turbine engines. Some ships were designed to use these engines, including the Project 11356 “Patrol Guards,” the Project 22350 “Frigates” and Project 21956 “Multi-Purpose Destroyers.” In September of 2019, the Russian government announced that the United Engine Corporation, the NPO Saturn (Rybinsk, Yaroslavl region), and the OJSC Klimov from Saint Petersburg would replace the Ukrainian engines. There isn’t a precise timing for the commissioning of the new ships.
Some import substitution has been happening in helicopters engines. The Kazan Helicopters and the JSC Kamov, which produce the Mi and the KA series, have been using engines produced by the Zaporizhzhya Motor Sich company from Ukraine. Now they are receiving the Rostech VK-2500 engine, which is more expensive and still needs a complete foreign base. Unmanned aerial vehicles are advancing more. The Forpost-R system was being produced under an Israeli license. Russian companies were able to replace all components. Another drone, the S-70 “Okhotnik” for reconnaissance and strike, was fully developed in Russia and is allegedly able to interact with the 5th generation Su-57 fighter.
Finally, the GLONASS satellites. Until 2014, the share of foreign components was 70%, mostly from the United States. Today it is approximately 40%. The Glonass-K2 satellite, with only domestic components, was expected to be ready by 2021, but there is no recent information about the program.
Import substitution was very effective in promoting South Korea’s economic development. It could work in Russia, but there is a significant barrier posed by the lack of new technologies. Before, it was possible to develop independently. The technology was free. Today, there are patents and intellectual property. One component might use multiple technologies of different owners. It is not possible to develop new technologies isolated from the rest of the world, especially when R&D is underfinanced, and the last significant technological developments were in the 1980s. One alternative is a partnership with China, which has been developing Western level technologies in some spheres, but many times ignored the international rules of property rights.
Can Russia do it? Probably not. Development based on natural resources isn’t sustainable, as discussed by the great Adam Smith already in 1786. Norway might be the exception, but it has a very complex economy. Russia’s development is to be characterized by a situation of the development of underdevelopment. In technological terms, it’ll always be catching up, unless huge, but really huge sums of money are invested in R&D, and new brains are attracted to the country. A herculean task, that, probably, won’t happen. As warfare is increasingly dependent on new technologies, with time, Russia’s operational capabilities will become outdated, forcing the Armed Forces to rely on the nuclear arsenal for deterrence and asymmetric methods for combat.
Putin signed the “Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence.” It hasn’t brought anything really new. It merges many documents into one. Still, the Military Doctrine from 2014 is a far better document. Nevertheless, some points are important to note. This included See below my (poor) translation of the document with the important parts in red and my comments in green.
Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence
I. General
1. These principals are a strategic planning document in the field of assuring defense and reflect the official views on the essence of nuclear deterrence, determine which military dangers and threats are to be neutralized, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the conditions which nuclear deterrence is to be applied, and the conditions for employing nuclear weapons.
2. One of the most important defense priorities is to guarantee the deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or allies. Deterrence is to be achieved by the totality of the military power of the Russian Federation, including nuclear weapons.
3. The state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence (hereinafter referred to as the state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence) is a set of coordinated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures implemented by the force and means of nuclear deterrence, to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
4. The state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature. It has the objective of maintaining the potential of nuclear forces at a levet enough to ensure nuclear deterrence, and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, deterring a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, and in the event of a military conflict – preventing the escalation of hostilities and their cessation on conditions acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
5. The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and compelled measure. It is making all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and to prevent the aggravation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones.
6. The regulatory framework of these Principles is constituted by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation in the field of defense and arms control, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, other regulatory legal acts and documents regulating defense issues and security.
7. The provisions of these Principles are binding on all federal government bodies, other government bodies and organizations involved in nuclear deterrence.
8. These Fundamentals may be specified depending on external and internal factors affecting the provision of defense.
II. The Essence of Nuclear Deterrence
9. Nuclear deterrence is aimed at ensuring that the potential adversary understands the inevitability of retaliation in the event of an aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
10. Nuclear deterrence is ensured by the Armed Forces’ combat-ready forces and the bmeans capable of using nuclear weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential enemy in any situation, as well as the willingness and determination of the Russian Federation to use such weapons.
11. Nuclear deterrence is carried out continuously in peacetime, during the period of direct threat of aggression and in wartime, until the start of the use of nuclear weapons.
12. The main military dangers, which, depending on the change in the military-political and strategic situation, can develop into military threats for the Russian Federation (threats of aggression) and which can be neutralized by nuclear deterrence, are:
a) the building up of military capabilities by a potential adversary, including nuclear weapons and systems near the Russian Federation and its allies, including maritime areas;
b) the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, shock unmanned aerial vehicles, and direct energy weapons by states that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary;
For many years the Russian Armed Forces have been developing both at the doctrinal and the operational level the idea of non-nuclear weapons having the same strategic and tactical effect as nuclear-weapons. Gerasimov have mentioned this issue many times in the last three/four years. The development of the new hypersonic weapons reflects this. There are two issues. First, hypersonic missiles can use plasma stealth to create a cloud of plasma around the missile absorbing any radio waves. This results in the missile being invisible to radars and able to penetrate air defense systems. One example is the Russian 3M22 Tsirkon and the under development BrahMos-II (with India).
Very much of the Soviet programs are still alive. Some time ago, I’ve read a paper called “Weapons of the XXI Century.” Terrifying stuff, including non-lethal biological weapons, earthquakes, radiological weapons, microwaves, and other. Of course, the question is about capacity. Do they have the technological capacity to develop such weapons? Some yes, but still most of Russia’s technology is from Soviet times. It is very much dependent of Western technology. Still, they’re trying and the idea of direct energy weapons has some populararity, since it often appears in doctrinal documents.
c) the creation and deployment in space of missile defense and strike systems;
Reagan’s Star Wars traumatizes them. At the doctrinal level they have been consistently mentioning the outer space as the next warfare frontier.
d) the presence of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction which can be used against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, as well as means of delivery of these types of weapons in non-allies states;
e) the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, technologies and equipment for their manufacture;
f) deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the territories of non-nuclear states.
This is a clear message for the Baltic States and Poland. There were some think tanks in Washington flirting with the idea.
13. The Russian Federation carries out nuclear deterrence in relation to individual states and military coalitions (blocs, unions) that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and possess nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction or significant combat potential of general forces.
This is obviously about NATO.
14. In carrying out nuclear deterrence, the Russian Federation takes into account the deployment of a potential adversary’s offensive capabilities on the territories of other states, including cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic aircraft, attack unmanned aerial vehicles, directed energy weapons, anti-missile defense, a warning about an attack with a nuclear missile, nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.
See above.
15. The principles of nuclear deterrence are:
a) compliance with international arms control obligations;
b) the continuity of measures to ensure nuclear deterrence;
c) the adaptability of nuclear deterrence to military threats;
d) the uncertainty for a potential adversary of the scale, time and place of the possible use of forces and means of nuclear deterrence;
e) centralization of state administration of the activities of federal executive bodies and organizations involved in nuclear deterrence;
Nothing new here, but this is clearly about the National Defense Management Center.
f) the rationality of the structure and composition of the forces and means of nuclear deterrence, as well as their maintenance at a level minimally sufficient to fulfill the tasks;
g) maintaining the constant readiness of the allocated part of the forces and means of nuclear deterrence for combat use.
16. The nuclear deterrence forces of the Russian Federation include land, sea and air-based nuclear forces.
III. Conditions for the Russian Federation to using nuclear weapons:
17. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened.
Again the idea of conventional and nuclear weapons having similar strategic and tactical effect.
18. The decision on employing nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation.
19. The conditions determining the possibility of employing nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation are:
a) the receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
b) the use by the adversary of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction across the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
c) the enemy’s impact on critical state or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the failure of which will lead to the disruption of the response of nuclear forces;
d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is jeopardized.
20. The President of the Russian Federation may, if necessary, inform the military-political leadership of other states and (or) international organizations of the readiness of the Russian Federation to use nuclear weapons or of the decision to use nuclear weapons, as well as the fact of their use.
IV. Tasks and Functions of the Federal Government Agencies, Other Government Agencies and Organizations for the Implementation of the State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence
21. The President of the Russian Federation exercises general guidance on state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence.
22. The Government of the Russian Federation is developing measures to implement economic policies aimed at maintaining and developing nuclear deterrence facilities, as well as formulating and implementing foreign and information policies in the field of nuclear deterrence.
23. The Security Council of the Russian Federation establishes the main directions of the military policy in the field of nuclear deterrence, and also coordinates the activities of federal executive bodies and organizations involved in the implementation of decisions adopted by the President of the Russian Federation regarding nuclear deterrence.
24. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, through the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, directly plans and conducts organizational and military measures in the field of nuclear deterrence.
Gerasimov is the boss.
25. Other federal executive bodies and organizations participate in the implementation of decisions adopted by the President of the Russian Federation regarding nuclear deterrence, in accordance with their authority.
In January 2020, China and the United States signed a trade agreement called Phase One. The agreement provides for an increase in Chinese purchases of American products and services over the next two years by approximately $ 200 billion, including USD 32 billion in agricultural products, USD 52.4 billion in the energy sector, and USD 78 billion in manufactured products. Since then, China has not changed its abusive trade practices and, until mid-March, President Trump has repeatedly praised Chinese President Xi Jinping for his leadership during China’s COVID-19 crisis. He even cited the professional work of the Chinese while expressing his immense respect and friendship with President Xi Jinping.
Although there was hope that the two countries were entering a new phase, the coronavirus crisis has resulted in an acute deterioration in their relations, the greatest in recent decades. The pandemic could have resulted in an opportunity to develop deeper cooperation, including joint actions to stem the epidemic, develop a vaccine or medicine, and reduce the impact of the global economic depression.
However, the two countries have started a rhetorical war over who is to blame for the pandemic. The Chinese government has been presenting the narrative that American soldiers took the virus to Wuhan during the World Military Games in October 2019. At the same time, President Trump has repeatedly claimed that the United States has evidence of COVID-19 being developed in a Chinese laboratory in the same city. To date, neither country has provided any evidence substantiating their narratives. Also, it is a consensus among the scientific community that the virus developed in nature.
In recent weeks, competition between the two countries has been going to the ideological arena. The Chinese government has been using its propaganda machine to presenting itself as a success in managing the pandemic and as a reliable and responsible world leader who is supplying the world with medical products in urgent need. The Chinese media has also denigrated the Western governance model, especially the American one, accentuating the end of Western supremacy in the last thirty years. See my video on this subject by clicking here. China has also developed a video ridiculing the American response to the pandemic (below). Other factors negatively influencing the relations between the two countries are tensions in the South China Sea, the issue of Taiwan and Hong Kong, and China’s commercial and technological practices.
The relations between the two countries are expected to worsen as the result of two problems: one structural and the other political. The structural problem stems from 40 years of neoliberal policies, which resulted in the American economy’s structural transformation. During that period, part of the American and the Western manufacturing sector was relocated to China. This resulted in two problems. On the one hand, there was the belief that the service sector would absorb the labor force turned unnecessary by the productive sector. This didn’t happen. Many workers went through a process of precarious work or “uberization.”
At the same time, China has been going through an intense economic and social transformation, which has resulted in the development of a more complex economy. Before China had a subordinate insertion in the productive global chains. By developing economic complexity, it started directly competing with American and European companies. The most significant example at the moment is Huawei and the 5G cellular network. Despite economic rhetoric saying that competition is always good, the United States has been trying to limit Chinese competition in complex sectors. An example is actions that restrict access to electronic components of American technology, such as the chips of Huawei cell phones.
The political problem is the result of these structural problems. During the first campaign, one of Trump’s main points was the promise to bring back the manufactures that had been relocated to China. However, the process of industrial localization follows economic and not political logic. And this process fell far short of expectations.
COVID-19 offers an opportunity to change the economic logic in the name of the security of production chains and strategic stocks in times of emergency. However, even if there is a transformation in global production chains, it is impossible to return to the economic structure of 40 years ago. To offset higher labor costs, job creation in a hypothetical manufacturing boom in the United States will be low due to the high technological level of production lines. Thus, the problem is not solved.
In this way, Trump’s attacks on China serve three purposes. First, to decrease support for populist democrats. Second, to divert people’s attention from the failure of the American government to combat the pandemic. Third, to have an external enemy as a political campaign element. Polls show that 31% of American voters regard China as an enemy, while 23% consider it as neither an enemy nor an ally. Democratic candidate Joe Biden accused Trump of being too condescending to China in a recent campaign commercial, promising to be tougher. Considering that China has been adopting increasingly assertive diplomacy, it is to be expected that Sino-American relations are far from calming down.
Igor (Strelkov) Girkin was the former FSB and allegedly GRU officer who became the Donetsk People’s Republic’s leading commander. It’s believed that Surkov sacked him because of being too successful. One version says that the Kremlin never intended Donetsk and Luhansk to be independent. Instead, the idea was to divert from Crimea and to create a frozen conflict to avoid Ukraine becoming too close to the EU and NATO. It seems Girkin became too emotional about Donetsk, becoming a problem for Moscow. He still cares.
In a piece published in the VPK on April 21, 2020, he regrets the current situation and draws three conclusions:
1. Attempts at a peaceful settlement based on a compromise between Moscow and Kyiv have completely failed because the concessions made by Moscow in the Minsk agreements resulted in losing the opportunity for politically consolidating what he considered a military victory in September 2014.
2. The war isn’t over. The capitulation of the Donetsk People’s Republic will become the prologue of the general capitulation of the Russian Federation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict around the Crimea.
3. Taking into consideration Russia’s current difficult socio-economic situation and the consequent increasing socio-political instability, a frozen conflict as it is now might become a heavy burden. Losses will increase.
It is clear, that he still expects to see intensity increasing. What is interesting is the VPK publishing such an article. Some military newspapers have become very critical of the central government, and this is only one example. Does it mean Putin is losing his power?
So, this is the part of Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly which frightened some people, with the videos. He has some valid points as the USA withdrawing from the ABM and announcing the deployment of new nuclear weapons, besides the perception of an increasing willingness of American officials in the Trump administration to use them. Overall, his main audience was the Russian public. Since living conditions are deteriorating in Russia and elections are in March 18, he played the great power card. Overall, people shouldn’t be worried about it. The main issue with nuclear war isn’t the destruction and the causualities. The main problem is the nuclear winter and the spread of radiation by winds, which is believed to extinct human life in the planet. Look:
The fact is that these weapons are still being tested or are projects. He didn’t mention other missile systems like Onyx, Kalibr, Tsirkon and Brahmos which aren’t as incridible as the Sarmat II, but if real can cause great headaches for the Western defense planners. I’ll write more about them soon. Now to the speech:
Colleagues,
The operation in Syria has proved the increased capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. In recent years, a great deal has been done to improve the Army and the Navy. The Armed Forces now have 37 times more modern weapons. Over 300 new units of equipment were put into service. The strategic missile troops received 80 new intercontinental ballistic missiles, 102 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and three Borei nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Twelve missile regiments have received the new Yarsintercontinental ballistic missile. The number of long-range high-precision weapons carriers has increased by 12 times, while the number of guided cruise missiles increased by over 30 times. The Army, the Aerospace Forces and the Navy have grown significant stronger as well.
Both Russia and the entire world know the names of our newest planes, submarines, anti-aircraft weapons, as well as land-based, airborne and sea-based guided missile systems. All of them are cutting-edge, high-tech weapons. A solid radar field to warn of a missile attack was created along Russia’s perimeter (it is very important). Huge holes appeared after the USSR disintegrated. All of them were repaired.
A leap forward was made in the development of unmanned aircraft; the National Defence Control Centre was established; and the operational command of the far maritime zone was formed. The number of professional service members has increased by 2.4 times, and the availability of equipment in the Armed Forces grew from 70 percent to 95–100 percent. The years-long queue for permanent housing was eliminated, and the waiting period was cut by 83 percent.
Now, on to the most important defence issue.
I will speak about the newest systems of Russian strategic weapons that we are creating in response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States of America from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the practical deployment of their missile defence systems both in the US and beyond their national borders.
I would like to make a short journey into the recent past.
Back in 2000, the US announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia was categorically against this. We saw the Soviet-US ABM Treaty signed in 1972 as the cornerstone of the international security system. Under this treaty, the parties had the right to deploy ballistic missile defence systems only in one of its regions. Russia deployed these systems around Moscow, and the US around its Grand Forks land-based ICBM base.
Together with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the ABM Treaty not only created an atmosphere of trust but also prevented either party from recklessly using nuclear weapons, which would have endangered humankind, because the limited number of ballistic missile defence systems made the potential aggressor vulnerable to a response strike.
We did our best to dissuade the Americans from withdrawing from the treaty. All in vain. The US pulled out of the treaty in 2002. Even after that we tried to develop constructive dialogue with the Americans. We proposed working together in this area to ease concerns and maintain the atmosphere of trust. At one point, I thought that a compromise was possible, but this was not to be. All our proposals, absolutely all of them, were rejected. And then we said that we would have to improve our modern strike systems to protect our security. In reply, the US said that it is not creating a global BMD system against Russia, which is free to do as it pleases, and that the US will presume that our actions are not spearheaded against the US.
The reasons behind this position are obvious. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, which was known as the Soviet Union or Soviet Russia abroad, lost 23.8 percent of its national territory, 48.5 percent of its population, 41 of the GDP, 39.4 percent of its industrial potential (nearly half of our potential, I would underscore), as well as 44.6 percent of its military capability due to the division of the Soviet Armed Forces among the former Soviet republics. The military equipment of the Russian army was becoming obsolete, and the Armed Forces were in a sorry state. A civil war was raging in the Caucasus, and US inspectors oversaw the operation of our leading uranium enrichment plants.
For a certain time, the question was not whether we would be able to develop a strategic weapon system – some wondered if our country would even be able to safely store and maintain the nuclear weapons that we inherited after the collapse of the USSR. Russia had outstanding debts, its economy could not function without loans from the IMF and the World Bank; the social sphere was impossible to sustain.
Apparently, our partners got the impression that it was impossible in the foreseeable historical perspective for our country to revive its economy, industry, defence industry and Armed Forces to levels supporting the necessary strategic potential. And if that is the case, there is no point in reckoning with Russia’s opinion, it is necessary to further pursue ultimate unilateral military advantage in order to dictate the terms in every sphere in the future.
Basically, this position, this logic, judging from the realities of that period, is understandable, and we ourselves are to blame. All these years, the entire 15 years since the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, we have consistently tried to reengage the American side in serious discussions, in reaching agreements in the sphere of strategic stability.
We managed to accomplish some of these goals. In 2010, Russia and the US signed the New START treaty, containing measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. However, in light of the plans to build a global anti-ballistic missile system, which are still being carried out today, all agreements signed within the framework of New START are now gradually being devaluated, because while the number of carriers and weapons is being reduced, one of the parties, namely, the US, is permitting constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.
Despite our numerous protests and pleas, the American machine has been set into motion, the conveyer belt is moving forward. There are new missile defence systems installed in Alaska and California; as a result of NATO’s expansion to the east, two new missile defence areas were created in Western Europe: one has already been created in Romania, while the deployment of the system in Poland is now almost complete. Their range will keep increasing; new launching areas are to be created in Japan and South Korea. The US global missile defence system also includes five cruisers and 30 destroyers, which, as far as we know, have been deployed to regions in close proximity to Russia’s borders. I am not exaggerating in the least; and this work proceeds apace.
So, what have we done, apart from protesting and warning? How will Russia respond to this challenge? This is how.
During all these years since the unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, we have been working intensively on advanced equipment and arms, which allowed us to make a breakthrough in developing new models of strategic weapons.
Let me recall that the United States is creating a global missile defence system primarily for countering strategic arms that follow ballistic trajectories. These weapons form the backbone of our nuclear deterrence forces, just as of other members of the nuclear club.
As such, Russia has developed, and works continuously to perfect, highly effective but modestly priced systems to overcome missile defence. They are installed on all of our intercontinental ballistic missile complexes.
In addition, we have embarked on the development of the next generation of missiles. For example, the Defence Ministry and enterprises of the missile and aerospace industry are in the active phase of testing a new missile system with a heavy intercontinental missile. We called it Sarmat.
Sarmat will replace the Voevoda system made in the USSR. Its immense power was universally recognized. Our foreign colleagues even gave it a fairly threatening name.
That said, the capabilities of the Sarmat missile are much higher. Weighing over 200 tonnes, it has a short boost phase, which makes it more difficult to intercept for missile defence systems. The range of the new heavy missile, the number and power of its combat blocs is bigger than Voevoda’s. Sarmat will be equipped with a broad range of powerful nuclear warheads, including hypersonic, and the most modern means of evading missile defence. The high degree of protection of missile launchers and significant energy capabilities the system offers will make it possible to use it in any conditions.
Could you please show the video.
Voevoda’s range is 11,000 km while Sarmat has practically no range restrictions.
As the video clips show, it can attack targets both via the North and South poles.
Sarmat is a formidable missile and, owing to its characteristics, is untroubled by even the most advanced missile defence systems.
But we did not stop at that. We started to develop new types of strategic arms that do not use ballistic trajectories at all when moving toward a target and, therefore, missile defence systems are useless against them, absolutely pointless.
Allow me to elaborate on these weapons.
Russia’s advanced arms are based on the cutting-edge, unique achievements of our scientists, designers and engineers. One of them is a small-scale heavy-duty nuclear energy unit that can be installed in a missile like our latest X-101 air-launched missile or the American Tomahawk missile – a similar type but with a range dozens of times longer, dozens, basically an unlimited range. It is a low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost an unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries. It is invincible against all existing and prospective missile defence and counter-air defence systems. I will repeat this several times today.
In late 2017, Russia successfully launched its latest nuclear-powered missile at the Central training ground. During its flight, the nuclear-powered engine reached its design capacity and provided the necessary propulsion.
Now that the missile launch and ground tests were successful, we can begin developing a completely new type of weapon, a strategic nuclear weapons system with a nuclear-powered missile.
Roll the video, please.
You can see how the missile bypasses interceptors. As the range is unlimited, the missile can manoeuvre for as long as necessary.
As you no doubt understand, no other country has developed anything like this. There will be something similar one day but by that time our guys will have come up with something even better.
Now, we all know that the design and development of unmanned weapon systems is another common trend in the world. As concerns Russia, we have developed unmanned submersible vehicles that can move at great depths (I would say extreme depths) intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels, including some of the fastest. It is really fantastic. They are quiet, highly manoeuvrable and have hardly any vulnerabilities for the enemy to exploit. There is simply nothing in the world capable of withstanding them.
Unmanned underwater vehicles can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, which enables them to engage various targets, including aircraft groups, coastal fortifications and infrastructure.
In December 2017, an innovative nuclear power unit for this unmanned underwater vehicle completed a test cycle that lasted many years. The nuclear power unit is unique for its small size while offering an amazing power-weight ratio. It is a hundred times smaller than the units that power modern submarines, but is still more powerful and can switch into combat mode, that is to say, reach maximum capacity, 200 times faster.
The tests that were conducted enabled us to begin developing a new type of strategic weapon that would carry massive nuclear ordnance.
Please play the video.
By the way, we have yet to choose names for these two new strategic weapons, the global-range cruise missile and the unmanned underwater vehicle. We are waiting for suggestions from the Defence Ministry.
Countries with high research potential and advanced technology are known to be actively developing so-called hypersonic weapons. The speed of sound is usually measured in Mach numbers in honour of Austrian scientist Ernst Mach who is known for his research in this field. One Mach is equal to 1,062 kilometres per hour at an altitude of 11 kilometres. The speed of sound is Mach 1, speeds between Mach 1 and Mach 5 is called supersonic, and hypersonic is above Mach 5. Of course, this kind of weapon provides substantial advantages in an armed conflict. Military experts believe that it would be extremely powerful, and that its speed makes it invulnerable to current missile and air defence systems, since interceptor missiles are, simply put, not fast enough. In this regard, it is quite understandable why the leading armies of the world seek to possess such an ideal weapon.
Friends, Russia already has such a weapon.
The most important stage in the development of modern weapons systems was the creation of a high-precision hypersonic aircraft missile system; as you already know for sure, it is the only one of its kind in the world. Its tests have been successfully completed, and, moreover, on December 1 of last year, these systems began their trial service at the airfields of the Southern Military District.
The unique flight characteristics of the high-speed carrier aircraft allow the missile to be delivered to the point of discharge within minutes. The missile flying at a hypersonic speed, 10 times faster than the speed of sound, can also manoeuvre at all phases of its flight trajectory, which also allows it to overcome all existing and, I think, prospective anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems, delivering nuclear and conventional warheads in a range of over 2,000 kilometres. We called this system Kinzhal (Dagger).
Video, please.
But this is not all I have to say.
A real technological breakthrough is the development of a strategic missile system with fundamentally new combat equipment – a gliding wing unit, which has also been successfully tested.
I will say once again what we have repeatedly told our American and European partners who are NATO members: we will make the necessary efforts to neutralise the threats posed by the deployment of the US global missile defence system. We mentioned this during talks, and even said it publicly. Back in 2004, after the exercises of the strategic nuclear forces when the system was tested for the first time, I said the following at a meeting with the press (It is embarrassing to quote myself, but it is the right thing to say here):
So, I said: “As other countries increase the number and quality of their arms and military potential, Russia will also need to ensure it has new generation weapons and technology.
In this respect, I am pleased to inform you that successfully completed experiments during these exercises enable us to confirm that in the near future, the Russian Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, will receive new hypersonic-speed, high-precision new weapons systems that can hit targets at inter-continental distance and can adjust their altitude and course as they travel. This is a very significant statement because no country in the world as of now has such arms in their military arsenal.” End of quote.
Of course, every word has a meaning because we are talking about the possibility of bypassing interception boundaries. Why did we do all this? Why did we talk about it? As you can see, we made no secret of our plans and spoke openly about them, primarily to encourage our partners to hold talks. Let me repeat, this was in 2004. It is actually surprising that despite all the problems with the economy, finances and the defence industry, Russia has remained a major nuclear power. No, nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the problem, and nobody wanted to listen to us. So listen now.
Unlike existing types of combat equipment, this system is capable of intercontinental flight at supersonic speeds in excess of Mach 20.
As I said in 2004, in moving to its target, the missile’s gliding cruise bloc engages in intensive manoeuvring – both lateral (by several thousand km) and vertical. This is what makes it absolutely invulnerable to any air or missile defence system. The use of new composite materials has made it possible to enable the gliding cruise bloc to make a long-distance guided flight practically in conditions of plasma formation. It flies to its target like a meteorite, like a ball of fire. The temperature on its surface reaches 1,600–2,000 degrees Celsius but the cruise bloc is reliably guided.
Play the video, please.
For obvious reasons we cannot show the outer appearance of this system here. This is still very important. I hope everyone understands this. But let me assure you that we have all this and it is working well. Moreover, Russian industrial enterprises have embarked on the development of another new type of strategic weapon. We called it the Avangard.
We are well aware that a number of other countries are developing advanced weapons with new physical properties. We have every reason to believe that we are one step ahead there as well – at any rate, in the most essential areas.
We have achieved significant progress in laser weapons. It is not just a concept or a plan any more. It is not even in the early production stages. Since last year, our troops have been armed with laser weapons.
I do not want to reveal more details. It is not the time yet. But experts will understand that with such weaponry, Russia’s defence capacity has multiplied.
Here is another short video.
Those interested in military equipment are welcome to suggest a name for this new weaponry, this cutting-edge system.
Of course, we will be refining this state-of-the-art technology. Obviously, there is far more in development than I have mentioned today. But this is enough for now.
I want to specifically emphasise that the newly developed strategic arms – in fact, new types of strategic weapons – are not the result of something left over from the Soviet Union. Of course, we relied on some ideas from our ingenious predecessors. But everything I have described today is the result of the last several years, the product of dozens of research organisations, design bureaus and institutes.
Thousands, literally thousands of our experts, outstanding scientists, designers, engineers, passionate and talented workers have been working for years, quietly, humbly, selflessly, with total dedication. There are many young professionals among them. They are our true heroes, along with our military personnel who demonstrated the best qualities of the Russian army in combat. I want to address each of them right now and say that there will absolutely be awards, prizes and honorary titles but, because I have met many of you in person many times, I know you are not after awards. The most important thing is to reliably ensure the security of our country and our people. As President and on behalf of the Russian people, I want to say thank you very much for your hard work and its results. Our country needs them so much.
As I have already said, all future military products are based on remarkable advances that can, should and will be used in high-technology civilian sectors. I would like to stress that only a country with the highest level of fundamental research and education, developed research, technology, industrial infrastructure and human resources can successfully develop unique and complex weapons of this kind. You can see that Russia has all these resources.
We will expand this potential and focus on delivering on the ambitious goals our country has set itself in terms of economic, social and infrastructure development. Effective defence will serve as a guarantee of Russia’s long-term development.
Let me reiterate that each of the armament systems I referred to is uniquely important. Even more importantly, taken together all these advances enable the Defence Ministry and General Staff to develop a comprehensive defence system, in which every piece of new military equipment will be assigned a proper role. On top of strategic weapons that are currently on combat alert and benefit from regular updates, Russia will have a defence capability that would guarantee its security in the long term.
Of course, there are many things that we have to do in terms of military construction, but one thing is already clear: Russia possesses a modern, high-technology army that is quite compact given the size of the territory, centred on the officer corps, who are dedicated to their country and are ready to sacrifice anything for its people. Sooner or later, other armies will also have the technology, the weapons, even the most advanced ones. But this does not worry us, since we already have it and will have even better armaments in the future. What matters is that they will never have people or officers like the Russian pilot Major Roman Filipov.
I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defences and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives.
It was our duty to inform our partners of what I said here today under the international commitments Russia had subscribed to. When the time comes, foreign and defence ministry experts will have many opportunities to discuss all these matters with them, if of course our partners so desire.
For my part, I should note that we have conducted the work to reinforce Russia’s defence capability within the current arms control agreements; we are not violating anything. I should specifically say that Russia’s growing military strength is not a threat to anyone; we have never had any plans to use this potential for offensive, let alone aggressive goals.
We are not threatening anyone, not going to attack anyone or take away anything from anyone with the threat of weapons. We do not need anything. Just the opposite. I deem it necessary to emphasise (and it is very important) that Russia’s growing military power is a solid guarantee of global peace as this power preserves and will preserve strategic parity and the balance of forces in the world, which, as is known, have been and remain a key factor of international security after WWII and up to the present day.
And to those who in the past 15 years have tried to accelerate an arms race and seek unilateral advantage against Russia, have introduced restrictions and sanctions that are illegal from the standpoint of international law aiming to restrain our nation’s development, including in the military area, I will say this: everything you have tried to prevent through such a policy has already happened. No one has managed to restrain Russia.
Now we have to be aware of this reality and be sure that everything I have said today is not a bluff ‒ and it is not a bluff, believe me ‒ and to give it a thought and dismiss those who live in the past and are unable to look into the future, to stop rocking the boat we are all in and which is called the Earth.
In this connection, I would like to note the following. We are greatly concerned by certain provisions of the revised nuclear posture review, which expand the opportunities for reducing and reduce the threshold for the use of nuclear arms. Behind closed doors, one may say anything to calm down anyone, but we read what is written. And what is written is that this strategy can be put into action in response to conventional arms attacks and even to a cyber-threat.
I should note that our military doctrine says Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons solely in response to a nuclear attack, or an attack with other weapons of mass destruction against the country or its allies, or an act of aggression against us with the use of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state. This all is very clear and specific.
As such, I see it is my duty to announce the following. Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of short, medium or any range at all, will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, with all the attendant consequences.
There should be no doubt about this whatsoever. There is no need to create more threats to the world. Instead, let us sit down at the negotiating table and devise together a new and relevant system of international security and sustainable development for human civilisation. We have been saying this all along. All these proposals are still valid. Russia is ready for this.
Our policies will never be based on claims to exceptionalism. We protect our interests and respect the interests of other countries. We observe international law and believe in the inviolable central role of the UN. These are the principles and approaches that allow us to build strong, friendly and equal relations with the absolute majority of countries.
Our comprehensive strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China is one example. Russia and India also enjoy a special privileged strategic relationship. Our relations with many other countries in the world are entering a new dynamic stage.
Russia is widely involved in international organisations. With our partners, we are advancing such associations and groups as the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. We are promoting a positive agenda at the UN, G20 and APEC. We are interested in normal and constructive cooperation with the United States and the European Union. We hope that common sense will prevail and our partners will opt for honest and equal work together.
Even if our views clash on some issues, we still remain partners because we must work together to respond to the most complex challenges, ensure global security, and build the future world, which is becoming increasingly interconnected, with more and more dynamic integration processes.
Russia and its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union seek to make it a globally competitive integration group. The EAEU’s agenda includes building a common market for electricity, oil, petroleum products and gas, harmonising financial markets, and linking our customs authorities. We will also continue to work on a greater Eurasian partnership.